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A bstract
3
This thesis contains three chapters. The first two chapters are essays on monetary 
economics. The last chapter is an essay on general equilibrium asset pricing.
In chapter 1 ,1 study the behavior of disaggregated prices in response to economic 
shocks. I suggest a production chain model with nominal rigidities to replicate some 
stylized facts about data. I argue, first, that the input-output linkages in production 
can create heterogeneity in the response of sectoral prices to aggregate shocks. Second, 
a realistic calibration of this multi-sector model to the US data can create 5 times more 
real rigidities in response to nominal shocks, compared to an equivalent homogeneous 
economy with intermediate inputs. Finally, the model implies that upstream industries 
would respond faster to aggregate shocks than downstream industries.
In chapter 2, I study the effect of imperfect commitment of a central bank on 
inflationary outcomes. I present a model in which monetary authority is a committee 
with churning of members who have finite terms. Older and younger generations 
of Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) members decide on policy by engaging in a 
bargaining process. I show that this set-up gives rise to a continuous measure of the 
degree of monetary authority’s commitment. The model suggests that lowering the 
churning rate or increasing the tenure time improves welfare.
Chapter 3 (joint work with Aytek Malkhozov) focuses on the asset pricing impli­
cations of a real-business-cycle model with recursive preferences and a general shock 
structure that allows for news shocks. We show that introducing recursive preferences 
and anticipated shocks into a canonical DSGE model can produce large premia and 
low risk-free rates without compromising the model’s ability to fit the key macroeco­
nomic variables. We illustrate how this class of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) models can be solved using higher order perturbation methods.
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This thesis presents three essays in empirical macroeconomics. The first two chapters 
broadly fall under monetary economics. The final chapter deals with modeling asset 
prices in a general equilibrium setting.
The first chapter of this thesis focuses on reconciling the high frequency of price 
changes at the micro level, and the apparent rigidity at the aggregate level that has 
been the subject of considerable debate in macroeconomics recently.
Much applied work in monetary economics relies on models in which nominal 
rigidities are the key friction generating monetary non-neutrality. However, studies 
calibrating models based on newly available micro-data on the frequency of price 
changes conclude that nominal rigidities cause very little monetary non-neutrality. 
This conclusion poses a serious challenge for our understanding of the transmission 
of monetary policy. It is therefore of great importance for monetary economics to 
explore whether richer models can be consistent with both of the stylized facts above.
The literature has enriched the basic monetary models to bring them closer to 
the reality, for instance by including intermediate inputs and heterogeneity between 
goods in several dimensions. In chapter 1 ,1 explore how a production chain structure 
in the economy can translate small rigidities at the micro level into large rigidities at 
the aggregate level. I argue that along a production chain the marginal cost of firms 
depends on the prices of their material inputs, i.e. the prices of other firms’ output 
in the economy. Therefore, despite individual prices adjusting relatively quickly to 
changes in their own marginal cost, the accumulation of small lags along the produc­
tion chain will lead to large lags at the aggregate level. I formalize this idea in a model 
with a multi-sector economy.
An important implication of this model is that upstream industries (such as crude 
materials and agricultural products) would be the first to respond to aggregate shocks, 
whereas downstream industries (such as consumption goods) responds much more 
slowly. I show that this broad pattern is supported by the data.
The second chapter looks at how the institutional design of central banks can in­
fluence monetary policy outcomes. Despite the popularity of committee-based central 
banks, and the usually complicated structure of these committees, the literature on 
monetary policy has mostly focused on a single, infinitely-lived central banker. In 
reality monetary policy committees are composed of several members whose tenures 
overlap and enter and exit the committee at different times. Chapter 2  proposes a 
model where the set-up of the monetary policy committee is closer to reality. In 
particular I assume that the members of the monetary policy committee have finite,
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overlapping tenures and study the implications of this institutional design on monetary 
outcomes.
The reason that the outcomes would be different under such a committee is that the 
incoming (“young”) and existing (“old”) policy makers face different expectations. An 
incoming committee member has not had the opportunity to influence the expectations 
about his performance. Therefore, he takes expectations about future path of policy 
as given and hence faces a worse trade-off between inflation and output gap. On the 
other hand, a committee member who has served before has had the opportunity to 
commit to certain future (state-contingent) policies. I assume that the differences 
between these two groups of committee members are resolved through a bargaining 
process, and I study the welfare implications of different compositions of monetary 
committees.
The main implication of the model is that slower the replacement rate of the com­
mittee members (referred to as the churning rate), the closer the monetary outcomes 
would be to the optimal policy under commitment.
The third chapter (joint work with Aytek Malkhozov) studies the asset pricing 
implications of the “long-run risks” class of asset pricing models, in a real business 
cycle (RBC) setting. Whereas the standard time-separable utility model parsimo­
niously links the returns of all assets to per capita consumption growth through the 
Euler equation of consumption, per capita consumption growth covaries too little with 
the returns of most classes of financial assets, creating the familiar asset pricing puz­
zles. Several generalizations of essential features of the model have been proposed to 
mitigate its poor performance. In particular, Bansal and Yaron (2004) introduce a 
long-run risk state variable that simultaneously drives aggregate consumption growth 
and aggregate dividend growth. In conjunction with Epstein-Zin preferences, the 
long-run risk state variable has a rich set of pricing implications.
In this chapter, we investigate whether long-run risk can arise endogenously by in­
cluding a richer structure of news about productivity shocks in an RBC model. Antic­
ipated shocks are news about movements in the productivity process that materialize 
in the future. We show that anticipated shocks can generate a significant amount of 
long-run risk. This is because shocks to expected productivity growth will translate 
into shocks to expected consumption growth which are priced when preferences are 
defined recursively a la Epstein and Zin (1989). Hence, enriching the standard RBC 
model along two dimensions (incorporating news and assuming recursive preferences) 
generates much larger premia compared to the standard RBC model.
The methodological contribution of this paper is also noteworthy. We show how 
to solve a large class of asset pricing models with Epstein-Zin preferences using a 
second order approximation. This method significantly improves the computational
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efficiency in models with a large number of state variables, compared to the often used 
alternative, i.e. value function iteration.
A calibration of our benchmark model matches important macro indicators such as 
consumption growth level and volatility and investment volatility as a share of output 
volatility. The model also matches the financial data well. The implied level of risk 
free rate and its volatility are in line with the data. Expected premia over risk free 
rate are on average 4.5% annually. These results are even more remarkable given that 
we do not resort to extreme values of risk aversion.
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1 Price Setting in a M odel w ith  
Production Chains: Evidence 
from Sectoral D ata
1.1 In trod u ction
Reconciling the high frequency of price changes at the micro level, and the apparent 
rigidity at the aggregate level has been the subject of considerable debate in macro­
economics recently. It has been shown that a model of price adjustment with some 
type of nominal rigidity, such as menu-costs or Calvo type rigidities, calibrated to 
match the frequency of individual price changes, fails to deliver aggregate nominal 
rigidities that are consistent with typical VAR studies (See, for example, Golosov and 
Lucas (2007) for an empirical documentation of this fact) . 1
In a recent development, Boivin, Giannoni, and Mihov (2009) (henceforth BGM) 
offer an explanation for the apparent discrepancy: They decompose the fluctuations 
in prices into aggregate versus sector-specific components, and show that even disag­
gregated prices appear sticky in response to aggregate shocks whereas they are flexible 
in response to sector-specific disturbances. Therefore, the observed flexibility of dis­
aggregated prices, as reported by Bils and Klenow (2005), Nakamura and Steinsson 
(2008a), and others, is not necessarily at odds with the results of typical VAR studies.
Furthermore, BGM show that there is significant heterogeneity in the speed of 
response to aggregate shocks, such as monetary policy shocks, whereas the speed 
of response of disaggregated prices to own sector specific disturbances are similar 
across sectors. For instance they report a 11% standard deviation of price adjustment 
(relative to the price level before the shock) across all sectors six months after a 
monetary policy shock has occurred (average adjustment over the same period is 6 %), 
whereas following a sector specific shock nearly all sectors respond fully within the 
first 6  months.
The different nature of response of firms to aggregate versus idiosyncratic shocks 
can be an explanation for the discrepancy in the frequency of price adjustment at the 
micro and macro level. But what mechanism causes such difference? In this paper 
I explore a possible explanation for this observation. I argue that the existence of a 
structure which amplifies the small nominal rigidities at the firm level, could deliver 
large nominal rigidities at the aggregate level. The particular structure that I have 
in mind is a production chain. Along a production chain, the marginal cost of firms
xMany papers, beginning with Caplin and Spulber (1987), argue this point theoretically. Caballero 
and Engel (2007) offer a very useful discussion of this literature.
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depends on the prices of their material inputs, i.e. the prices of other firms in the 
economy. Therefore, despite individual prices adjusting relatively quickly to changes 
in their own marginal cost, the accumulation of small lags along the production chain 
will lead to large lags at the aggregate level. I formalize this idea in a model with a 
multi-sector economy where firms face Calvo-type nominal rigidities.
An important implication of the model is that there is heterogeneity across sectors 
in response to aggregate shocks, based on where a sector is situated along the produc­
tion chain. On the other hand all sectors respond to their own sectoral shocks quickly. 
This is precisely in line with the findings of BGM. Furthermore, the model would 
suggest that upstream industries (such as crude materials and agricultural products) 
would be the first to respond to aggregate shocks, whereas downstream industries 
(such as consumption goods) responds much more slowly. I will show that this broad 
pattern is supported by the data.
The appealing feature of this model is that it can substantially add to the ag­
gregate nominal rigidity without making prices too sticky at micro-level. Nakamura 
and Steinsson (2008b) emphasize this fact in a multi-sector menu cost model. They 
show that adding input-output linkages will substantially increase the aggregate price 
rigidity. I show in this paper, that heterogeneity in the degree of intermediate inputs 
use increases the real rigidities even further. Furthermore, a realistic calibration of 
the model shows that heterogeneity in “inherent” stickiness (captured here by Calvo 
adjustment frequency) is reinforced by heterogeneity in the material inputs share.2 
Under the most general (and realistic) calibration, the model can produce real rigidi­
ties which are five times larger than the equivalent economy, with intermediate inputs.
A related paper by Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2007) develops a model to ad­
dress the differential response to aggregate vs. idiosyncratic shocks. In their model 
price setting firms decide what to pay attention to, subject to a constraint on the 
information flow. When idiosyncratic conditions are more variable or more impor­
tant than aggregate conditions, firms pay more attention to idiosyncratic conditions. 
This implies prices react fast and by large amounts to idiosyncratic shocks, but only 
slowly and by small amounts to idiosyncratic shocks, which is consistent with the 
results found in BGM3. The model I present here obtains the same conclusions but 
by relying on the real-side features of the economy.
2 Carvalho (2006) shows that monetary shocks tend to have larger and more persistent real effects in 
heterogeneous economies, when compared to identical-firms economies with similar degrees of nominal 
and real rigidity.
3 These results are not typical and crucially depend on assumptions about information structure. 
For instance, Woodford (2002) assumes that firms pay little attention to aggregate conditions, if these 
signals are noisy. Mankiw and Reis (2002) develop a different model in which information disseminates 
slowly. In their model, prices respond with equal speed to all disturbances.
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The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I present the model and discuss 
the solution method. In section 3, I calibrate the model. I start from a very special
case of the model: A two sector example, in which one good is purely an intermediate 
good and the other purely a consumption good. In developing this special example, 
I would like to isolate the effect I am interested in, i.e. the differential response of 
sectoral prices to sector-specific vs. aggregate shocks. I will then present a more re­
alistic, 6 -sector calibration of the US economy. I relax the assumption of symmetry 
across sectors in the make-up of consumption and intermediate input goods. I also 
add heterogeneity in the frequency of price adjustment across sectors. I will examine 
two of the model implications discussed above, using this calibrated version. The 
first implication relates to the different nature of the response to aggregate versus 
idiosyncratic shocks, as observed empirically by BGM. The second implication, is the 
ability of the model to create real rigidities in response to monetary policy shocks. I 
compare the fully calibrated model with equivalent homogeneous economies. I show 
that the production chain effect reinforces the heterogeneity in price adjustment fre­
quencies effect. In section 4, I present some empirical evidence supporting the third 
implication of the model. The model suggests that “up-stream” industries respond 
faster to aggregate shocks than “down-stream” industries. Using disaggregated data 
from manufacturing, I find a significant negative relationship between the position 
down the production chain and the speed of response to monetary policy and oil price 
shocks. I conclude in section 6 .
1.2 M od el
1.2.1 Households
The model is a multi-sector version of the workhorse New Keynesian model with 
monopolistic competition presented in Woodford (2003), chapter 2, or Walsh (2003), 
chapter 5 (among many others). The economy is populated by identical, infinitely 
lived households of measure 1 and an infinite number of firms in a J-sector economy. 
The representative household maximizes a lifetime utility function, specified as follows:
where Et denotes the expectations operator conditional on information known at time 
t, Ct denotes the household consumption of a composite consumption good and Lt 
denotes the household supply of labor. Households own the firms in this economy 
which means that they receive the profits earned by the firms. Markets are complete 
and therefore the household’s budget constraint may be written as:
Ct +  Et [Atj+iBt+i] < WtLt
P t
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where Bt+i is the stochastic payoff of securities purchased at time t, At,t+i is the 
stochastic discount factor, Wt is the wage at time t and H3t denotes total real profits 
earned by sector j. Wages are assumed to be flexible (I will discuss the implications 
of relaxing this assumption in section 1.3.1).
The household’s composite consumption good is an aggregator over the variety of 
all the goods available in the economy:
«=ri («')-' {ciY
j= 1
where Cl denotes the household’s consumption of the good produced by sector j  and 
£j’s are a vector of weights associated with each sector in the consumption basket 
of the household and they satisfy J2j=i =  1- The Cobb-Douglas functional form 
assumed is a special case of CES aggregator with a unit elasticity of substitution. In 
this specification, I follow Bouakez, Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia (2009). The advantage 
of this specification is that the weights are equal to the household’s sectoral expen­
ditures shares, which can be easily obtained from the sectoral break-up of Personal 
Consumption Expenditure, reported by BEA 4.
Let Pi be the price of the good produced by sector j ,  and Pt the aggregate price 
level in period t , defined as
3=1
Then, the cost minimization problem of the household implies that the household’s 
demand for the good produced by sector j , C3t , is given by:
J . .
Note that the definition above for the aggregate price level also implies that ^2 Pi C3 =
j =i
P tC t -
Once the household has decided the cost minimizing composition of its consump­
tion basket, given the consumption of the aggregate good, it will choose the optimal 
total consumption expenditure and labor supply. The first order conditions are stan­
dard: fi-cr
A _  QT&t,t+T ~  P
4 The Cobb-Douglas assumption for consumption aggregator and intermediate input aggregator is 
not essential. All the results will be the same to the first order if a CES aggregator with a non-unity 
elasticity of substitution is used instead.
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I J _ = Wt 
P tx c r * u
Note that the last equation is implied by the assumption about flexible wages.
1.2.2 Firms
The J  differentiated goods in the economy are produced by one of the J  monopo- 
listically competitive sectors. Each sector itself is composed of a continuum of firms 
of measure one, who produce goods that are imperfect substitutes. These goods are 
aggregated by a competitive sector into sector j ’s output. In the interest of brevity, 
the firm level analysis is included in appendix (A.2 ) . 5 Firms are indexed by 2 . The 
representative firm in sector j , has a production technology as follows:
= m H z)
1—Si
where AJt is the sector-specific stochastic level of technology. (z) is an intermediate 
input, itself a CES aggregator of all the goods produced in the economy.6 These goods 
are combined to form the sector-specific intermediate input according to
M l(z) = ri (mUz>)
.i=i
where mJt i (z) is the quantity of input i purchased by firm 2  in sector j .  sj is the 
weight of input i in sector j. Define the price of the intermediate input for industry j  
as: r ./
X I =
. i—l
Given that goods from different sectors are imperfect substitutes in the production 
function of firms, the demand for each good by other firms depends on its price. 
Isomorphically to the consumer’s problem, cost minimization by firm z in sector j  
implies that its demand for the goods produced by sector i is determined by:
m M((z) (1.2)
5 The assumption that each sector is made up of a large number of firms is needed for two reasons: 
First, for the purposes of calibration, I would like to be able to use the model where J, the number of 
sectors, is not necessarily very large. If sectors were populated by a single firm, the assumption that 
sectors take the aggregate prices in the economy as given will become hard to justify. The second 
reason is that an infinite number of firms existing within each sector allows for deriving sector specific 
Philips curves.
6In my notation, I use superscripts to refer to the recipient industry and subscripts to the donor 
industry. So for instance, M 3(z) refers to inputs used by firm z  in sector j  and m 3t i {z), refers to 
inputs produced by sector i and used by firm z  in sector j .
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j
Given the definition of X% it can be shown that ^  Pfm3t i (z) = X ^ M 3(z).
i = 1
M arket C learing  Imposing a market clearing condition for each firm, and each 
sector and using demand functions (1 .1 ) and (1 .2 ) one can show that:
3 1where Yj* = C3 +  ]T] f Q m\ j(z')dz' and 6 is the elasticity of substitution between goods
i—1
within the same sector. See appendix (A.2 ) for the proof.
A few points are worth noting: First, following Basu (1995) I have used a “round­
about” model of intermediate goods, in that all goods could potentially be used as an 
intermediate input and a consumption good. Second, the assumption that the elas­
ticity of substitution between goods is the same for consumption and for production, 
means that the price elasticity of demand for a good does not depend on its use, and 
therefore there is no distinction, from a producer’s point of view, in the two uses for 
its output and hence no price discrimination based on the product’s use. Also note 
that a reasonable choice for 6 would imply that 6 > 1. This implies that the elasticity 
of substitution between goods within a sector is at least as large as that for goods 
from different sectors, which is a desirable assumption.
Second, note that whereas all the firms within a sector are identical in the steady 
state, firms in different sectors are heterogeneous in a number of dimensions: 1 ) their 
production functions differ in the intensity with which they use different factors of 
production, 2 ) the combination of goods used as material inputs can potentially differ 
and 3) they differ in the level of their technology. Therefore in the steady state the 
relative prices of goods produced by firms within a sector will always be 1 , whereas 
goods from different sectors will in general have different prices even in the steady 
state.
Finally, the concept of “production chain” in this paper is related to the difference 
in the production function of different sectors. In particular, the higher is the Sj 
(the share of labor in production) the lower would be the dependence on other firms’ 
output in production. I rank industries along the production chain according to their 
corresponding Sj’s. The higher the Sj the earlier in the chain an industry would be.
Note that there is a close relationship between this definition of a production chain 
and one in which the chain is defined along a temporal dimension. By the latter, I mean 
a model which assumes upstream firms’ output can only be used by more downstream 
firms with a time lag. Such a model will assume that quantities are fixed and therefore
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prices adjust to clear the markets in the period following production. In the model 
that I present here, the assumption is that prices may be fixed after the realization of a 
shock, and therefore quantities have to adjust in order to clear the market. Thus, the 
two models are analytically analogous. Yet, the assumption I have chosen allows for 
a comparison between the results presented here and the New Keynesian literature.
F irm s’ P rice  S e tting  Firms face price rigidities of the form described by Calvo 
(1983). Specifically, in each period 1 — Uj fraction of the firms in sector j  get to adjust 
their prices, whereas the remaining u)j fraction do not. Those firms who do adjust their 
prices do so to maximize the expected discounted value of current and future profits, 
discounted both by the stochastic discount factor and by the probability of survival 
of the current price. Therefore, the firm’s problem can be written as maximizing:
T=00
max Et V  wJAM+r nJ+T(;z)
™3t,i(Z),Pt(Z)’Lt (Z) T= 0
subject to the production function and total demand for the good produced by firm 
z. Period profits of firm z in sector j  as a function of the price it sets for its output is 
defined as:
n l(z) = pi(z)y{(z) -  WtL{(z) -  X lM }(z)
Substituting the demand for a firm’s output and optimal choice of inputs, the firm’s 
problem can be written as choosing the optimal price pj.(z), to maximize
\ t + r ydX t + T
T = 0
where h 3t+T *s the nominal marginal cost of a firm in sector j. The cost-minimization
of the firm implies that 0 ^ 0  * ( 1 ^  )  ' The interpretation
is that the nominal marginal cost is a weighted average of the effective wage and the 
price of the intermediate good. The higher 1 — Sj (the further down the production 
chain an industry is), the higher the dependence on price of intermediate inputs. An 
industry “inherits” the stickiness of its suppliers through the dynamics of X {.
1.2.3 M o n eta ry  Policy and  Shocks
The monetary authority acts so as to make nominal GDP follow a random walk with 
drift in logs. Denote the nominal GDP by St = PtCt• Then,
log St = log St—i +  vt
where
vt =  pvvt- 1  +  £u,t
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and eUjt are white noise innovations with variance a2. pv is strictly smaller than 1 . 
The stochastic level of technology in each sector follows a random walk process:
In {A{) = ln (^ _ !)  +  eAj it
where eAj t are sector specific white noise innovations, uncorrelated across sectors and 
with variance a2A -. eAj t and eUft are independent processes.
1.2.4 Linearized Steady State
Log-linearizing the optimal pricing decision of a firm around a zero inflation, zero 
output growth steady state, the price setting dynamics implies a Phillips curve relation 
for each sector j  such that
ttJ = PEtni+1 +  K?p [(4 -  p{] (1-3)
where 4  = pj. — jPt- i  the change in sector f  s (log) price from t — 1 to t. 4t is 
the deviation of the nominal marginal cost from its steady state. The derivation is 
presented in the appendix (A.2).
1.3 C alibration
In calibrating the model, I begin by choosing some benchmark parameters which will 
remain fixed throughout all the calibration exercises presented below. Table (1.1) 
shows the choice of these parameters. For the consumer’s preferences, I assume log 
utility in consumption and a linear disutility of labor (cr =  1,77 =  0). Assuming log 
utility allows for the existence of a balanced growth path with non-stationary technol­
ogy shocks in a multi-sector setting (see Ngai and Pissarides (2007)). The assumption 
on linear labor disutility can be interpreted as indivisible labor with lotteries, follow­
ing Hansen (1985). To calibrate the discount rate, I choose an annual interest rate of 
3% which corresponds to a monthly value for (3 = 0.9975.
I choose 9 = 8  for the elasticity of substitution between goods within a sector. 
This value for 0 places it in the middle of the range used in the literature. Nakamura 
and Steinsson (2008b) use 6 = 4. This rather low estimate for $ allows them to have a 
higher implied intermediate input share in the production function (see the calibration 
of intermediate input shares below) and thus create greater real rigidities. Carvalho
(2006) uses 6 = 5 and 9 = 11 as a lower and upper bound and Golosov and Lucas
(2007) use 9 = 7. The choice of 9 = 8  implies a markup of p = 1.14, which if interpreted 
as profits, is a realistic estimate for the U.S. economy. Estimates of mark-ups typically 
fall in the 10 — 20 percent range, implying values of 6 in the 6  — 10 range.7 Also note
7 See Rotemberg and Woodford (1993) and Basu and Fernald (1997).
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that 0 = 8  is larger than the elasticity of substitution between goods from different 
sectors (assumed to be 1 ), which is a reasonable assumption.
To calibrate the characteristics of monetary policy shocks, I estimate an 1(1) 
model for the quarterly U.S. nominal GDP during the period 1948 to 2008. The esti­
mate for the standard deviation of nominal GDP growth corresponds to a quarterly 
value for av = 0.004 (monthly av = 0.0025) and pv = 0.50, which are in line with esti­
mates in the literature. I choose the variance of the sector specific productivity shock 
a a  =  0 .0 1 , to match the median estimate of the unconditional (monthly) variance of 
the idiosyncratic shock found in the BGM FAVAR exercise across the PPI prices.
In the remainder of this section, I will go through four calibration exercises. To 
make the intuition clear I first calibrate the model to an “extreme” two-sector pro­
duction chain, where one good is solely used as an intermediate input and the other 
entirely as a consumption good. In the subsequent three calibration exercises, I grad­
ually build a 6 -sector version of the U.S. economy: In the second exercise, I calibrate 
the production share of the intermediate goods in each sector using the BEA’s Input- 
Output (IO) use table, but assume that sectors are homogenous along all other di­
mensions. Next, I add heterogeneity in the parameter describing the Calvo frequency 
of price adjustment across sectors, and finally I allow for varying intensity with which 
a good is used for consumption versus as an input for production, again using the IO 
use table. In terms of the notation introduced earlier, these intensities correspond to 
calibrating the and shares.
At the end of this section, I present a version of the model in which the production 
technologies are characterized by decreasing returns to scale.
1.3.1 A Two Sector Example
Here I develop a special example of the economy described above. This economy is 
composed of two sectors. Sector 1 only uses labor in its production function (si =  
1 ,Y* = AjLt), and sector 2  only uses material inputs which are solely composed of 
sector 1 goods (s2 =  0, q\ =  1, Y? =  AjY^-). Finally, the consumption basket is entirely 
composed of good 2 (e2 =  1, Ct = Y f) .  These specific set of assumptions give rise to a 
production function which can be graphically represented as in figure (1.1). The log- 
linearized model can be represented by two Phillips curves, a wage setting equation,
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the stochastic path of nominal aggregates and the aggregate production equation.
7rJ =  (3Et7rl+1 +  Klp [wt -  p\ ~  ]
7T? =  PEtirj+ 1 +  K2p [p\ - P t ~  a%]
wt - p 2 = act +  vk  
C t + P t -  ( c t - i + P t - i )
=  aj +  a? +  lt
Figure (1.2) shows the response of prices for the two sectors to a shock to monetary 
policy (panel (A)) and to their own idiosyncratic TFP shock (panel (B)). Sector 2 
responds more slowly to a monetary policy shock because its marginal cost is the
slow-moving price of sector 1 output. On the other hand, the responses of each sector
to a shock in its sector specific technology (a\) are indistinguishable. This is not 
surprising given that the two sectors are identical except for their position in the 
production chain.
Note that the relative speed of response to an aggregate shock remains the same 
regardless of the assumption about wage rigidity. To see this more clearly, note that 
Yt1 =  A\Lt  and Y 2 — AjY^.  Therefore, even if sector 2 ’s price is flexible compared to 
wages, since the marginal cost in sector 2  follows the price of sector 1 output, the prices 
in sector 2  inherit the sluggishness in the response of sector 1 through the marginal 
cost movements and thus, would be the slower sector to respond to an aggregate shock. 
This intuition holds in all the exercises presented below: although wage rigidity affects 
the overall amount of real rigidities created in response to a monetary policy shock, it 
does not affect the order in which sectors respond to aggregate shocks. Thus, in the 
interest of brevity, I only present the results under the assumption of flexible wages in 
the main text, but the same exercises are repeated for a model with staggered wage 
setting a-la Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) in appendix (A.l).
1.3.2 T he  M ulti-S ector M odel
I calibrate the multi-sector model to a 6 -sector version of the US economy. The
sectors are Agriculture, Mining, Utilities, Construction, Manufacturing and Services.
These sectors correspond to the most aggregated industry classification in the BLS IO
table .8 I start by calibrating the sector shares to the US IO matrix. Given the Cobb-
Douglas form assumed for the production function, the input share in production will
(  M j X j \
be proportional to expenditure share I 1 — sj = p p j y j  ) ' expenditure shares
81 exclude government, and some other categories of services (including trade, finance and health
care). The latter are excluded for the lack of data on the frequency of adjustment in prices, which 
will be used to calibrate the Calvo adjustment parameters of each sector in the full calibration in case
3. The largest two omissions are Financial services and Business services, which together amount to
40% of total value added.
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are readily available from the IO use table. The corresponding labor shares for each 
sector are reported in table (1.2). The final column in table (1.2) shows the estimates 
of s for some of the sectors in Bouakez, Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia (2009), who estimate 
the parameters of a similar multi-sector model.9
C ase 1: H eterogeneity  in Si In this exercise, the only source of heterogeneity 
between the sectors is the intensity with which they use intermediate inputs versus 
labor. Therefore, only the s column in table (1.2) is relevant. I calibrate the (monthly) 
Calvo price stickiness in all sectors a;* = 0.85 which is close to the corresponding 
median frequency of price adjustment reported by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008a) 
for intermediate goods. This value implies a duration of 7.6 months which is close to 
the slightly larger than the average duration of price rigidity reported by Carvalho 
(2006) (6 .6  months), using data from Bils and Klenow (2005). The response of this 
economy to a shock to the nominal GDP process (vt) is shown in panels (A)-(C) of 
figure (1.3). As would be predicted by the model, Utilities, the sector earliest in the 
chain (characterized by the largest labor share) responds first whereas Manufacturing, 
the latest industry in the chain, is the slowest.
The differences in the speed of response means that the existence of production 
chain creates short-run relative price effects. This non-neutrality caused by monetary 
policy can be measured in several ways. I look at the maximum relative price across 
all the sectors at all horizons in response to a MP shock in the first row of table (1.3). 
Note that without any heterogeneity in labor shares, this metric would be equal to 
zero. I also report the maximum standard deviation between prices at any horizon 
t  (row 2). This standard deviation is another way of measuring the extent to which 
relative prices deviate from 1 at each time. Thus, this measure would also be equal to 
zero in the absence of heterogeneity in sectoral characteristics. In other words, these 
two measures would not be useful for measuring monetary non-neutrality in a 1-sector 
model.
To measure the non-neutrality of nominal shocks for a single sector economy, or in 
order to compare the non-neutrality of the multi-sector economy with an equivalent 
economy, I report two measures of non-neutrality for the overall economy. First, I 
report the conditional variance of consumption’s response to a MP shock. An alterna­
tive measure following Midrigan (2006) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008b), which 
I also report, is the variance of real value-added output when the model is simulated 
with purely nominal aggregate shocks (respectively in rows 3 and 4 of table (1.3)).
9Bouakez, Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia (2009) assume the following production function for the firms 
in sector j  :y[  =  (z3n3t ) l'j {k3t )aj (H3 )7j , where z{ is a sector-specific productivity shock, k3 is capital, 
H{  is material inputs, and Uj -f ct j+  7  ^ =  1. They estimate the production function parameters using 
the yearly data on nominal expenditures on capital, labor and material inputs for each sector collected 
by Dale Jorgenson for the period 1958 to 1996.
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The relative price effects are not uniform across sectors either. Panel (A) of figure
(1.7) shows the deviations of relative sectoral prices from their steady state level in 
response to a MP shock. This is captured by plotting sectoral prices relative to that 
of utilities. The figure shows that the relative prices are not large, around 7%. Also, it 
is intuitive that the largest relative price effect is between manufacturing and utilities 
sectors with the largest difference in their intermediate input shares.
I now look at price responses to technology shocks. The sectoral price responses 
to a productivity shock in their own sector are demonstrated in panel (B) of figure 
(1.3). The non-stationary productivity shocks cause permanent relative price effects, 
and the larger the labor share of a sector, the larger the effect of a one standard 
deviation shock on its final price. This property naturally follows the assumption that 
technology is labor augmenting.
Panel (C) of figure (1.3) shows the response of sectoral prices to a common pro­
ductivity shock. The aggregate productivity shock can be thought of as a common 
component to technology shocks across different sectors. The response to an aggregate 
productivity shock is nearly identical to the response of sectoral prices to a monetary 
policy shock. This result justifies the BGM classification of shocks into aggregate vs. 
idiosyncratic regardless of whether they are supply-side or demand-side shocks.
The fact that an aggregate productivity shock leaves the relative prices unaffected 
in the long-run is because increases in productivity are “shared” among sectors through 
uses of intermediate inputs. Given the Cobb-Douglas structure of the production 
functions across sectors, it can be shown that an aggregate technology shocks leaves 
relative prices unchanged in the long-run (See appendix (A.3)).
C ase 2: H eterogeneity  in  Si and  Ui In this exercise I add heterogeneity in the 
Calvo price adjustment parameter across sectors in addition to varying S{. The uii are 
matched to the PPI-based frequency of price adjustment reported by Nakamura and 
Steinsson (2008a). I match their products to the larger NAICS categories included 
in the definition of industries in the 10 table, provided by the BEA. The frequencies 
of adjustment for each sector is the median frequency of adjustment of all the cate­
gories within that sector. The calibrated values are reported in table (1.2). In this 
calibration, only columns corresponding to s and u; are relevant.
The responses to the shocks discussed in the previous calibration exercise are re­
produced for the new calibration and are presented in figure (1.4). Note that the 
heterogeneity in the response to a monetary policy shock substantially increases. The 
real effects of monetary policy are summarized in table (1.3). Compared to the pre­
vious case, where Ui were constant across sectors, the real effect of monetary policy 
has increased substantially.
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Furthermore, how fast an industry responds to an aggregate shock is determined 
by a combination of the size of and the position of the sector in the chain. Utilities 
is still the fastest sector to respond but agriculture and manufacturing are no longer 
the slowest industries. Note that despite having the highest frequency of price adjust­
ment, agricultural prices respond more slowly than either utilities or mining, because 
agriculture has a high share of intermediate inputs which affect its marginal cost.
In the same way, the relative price effects are not only a function of differences in 
intermediate input shares, but also affected by differences in Ui. Panel (B) of figure
(1.7) shows the largest deviation of relative prices compared to the steady state is now 
between utilities and services, mainly due to the sticky nature of services prices. The 
figure shows that the relative price effect is large reaching around 45%.
The response to sector specific productivity shocks are shown in panel (B). First 
note that the long-run response to these shocks is not different from the previous 
case. This is to be expected, because the only difference between case (1) and case (2) 
calibrations is the heterogeneity in u>i which should not affect the long-run response. 
Also note that responses cross. The reason is that the short run response is driven 
by the heterogeneity in u w h e r e a s  the long-run responses reflect the heterogeneity 
in Si. To the extent that u>i and Si are not perfectly correlated, the short term and 
long-term ordering of prices may differ.
Case 3: H eterogeneity  in e3 and  c- Up to now, I have assumed that all sectors 
are used with equal weights in the consumption and intermediate good baskets. Em­
pirically, this is unrealistic. In this section, I calibrate the e3 and weights to the 
10 matrix. The Cobb-Douglas form assumed for consumption- and intermediate-good 
aggregator would imply that e3 is the expenditure share of good C3 in total consump­
tion expenditure. Therefore, e3 are readily available by taking each sector’s share in 
the “Personal Consumption Expenditure” column of the 10 matrix.
The ^  denotes the share of sector i in the intermediate-input of sector j. So
potentially, we would have n x n  different values. In the interest of tractability, I will
make the simplifying assumption that ^  =  $i, for all i , j  and k. This means
that the composition of the intermediate good is the same for all sectors (across the
recipient sectors) but in the composition of the intermediate input different sector
outputs are used with different intensity (^  ^  $j). I compute as the expenditure
on intermediate inputs purchased from sector i as a share of total intermediate input
expenditure for sector j .  I then compute c* =  X3^ , where X3 is the weight of sector
j
j  in the economy.
The calibrated values for e3 and ^  are shown in table (1.2). Services form a large 
share of consumption whereas manufacturing is the largest share of the intermediate
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good. Using the new calibrated e7 and and keeping Si and u>i as before, I again 
simulate the model subject to the three different shocks discussed above. Figure 
(1.5) shows the result. The relative speed of response has not changed compared to 
the previous case.10 However, the overall real rigidity caused by a monetary policy 
shock is affected, as this economy puts a higher weight on two of the stickiest sectors 
of the economy: Services (because of a low Calvo price adjustment frequency) and 
manufacturing (a sector at the end of the production chain). Compare the cumulative 
response of the GDP to a monetary shock in the fully calibrated model (last column) 
with a perfectly homogeneous economy, in which s = 0.38 and oj = 0.62, both equal 
to the weighted average of the same values in the heterogeneous economy. Table (1.3) 
shows that the realistically calibrated heterogenous model creates around five times 
more rigidity compared to the “equivalent” homogeneous economy (0.38 c.f. 0.07).
1.3.3 Decreasing Returns to  Scale
In the previous section we assumed that the production function featured constant re­
turns to scale to labor and material inputs. In this section, I will relax this assumption 
by assuming that the production function is y{{z) =  ^AJt LJt (z)^ 3 M.{(z)7i • Sbordone 
(2002) and Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2001) derive the New Keynesian Phillips 
curve for a model with decreasing returns to scale. Following their approach, it can 
be shown that within a sector, the marginal cost of each firm can be written as a 
function of the average marginal cost in that sector. Therefore, when written in terms 
of log-deviations from the steady state it can be shown that:
where (prj.(z) is the nominal marginal cost of firm z in sector j ,  (fPt is the average 
nominal marginal cost in sector j  and pl(z) and pi represent the price of firm z ’s 
output and the average price level in sector j  respectively. This implies that firms 
with high price and thus low output, have lower marginal cost. The full derivation of 
the Phillips curve under decreasing returns to scale is included in appendix (A.2).
To calibrate this model, we use the Cobb-Douglas properties of the production 
function. It is still true that
W Lj  J X M j
a i =  V p T T  a1" 1 l j  = (L4)
* 3 * 3  * 3 *3
Both of these ratios are available in the data. The wage spending is obtained from 
the GDP by industry tables published by the BEA. The wage bill is calculated as the
10My conjecture is that under extreme assumptions about the composition of intermediate input, 
this result may be reversed.
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share of compensation for employees to gross output for each industry. The material 
inputs expenditures are obtained as before. The degree of returns to scale, a  +  7 , 
depends not only on the sum of wage bill and material inputs expenditure but also 
on /i, the mark-up. It turns out that a calibration of 0 = 8  will imply increasing 
returns to scale for some of the industries. Therefore, for calibrating the model with 
decreasing returns I assume 0 = 10. This calibration for 6 will ensure that the total 
returns to scale for all industries will be smaller than 1. The calibrated shares of labor 
(a) and intermediate inputs (7 ) are shown in table (1.4). The D R S  shows the total 
degree of returns to scale (a; +  7 ). Calibration of all other parameters are as in Case 
(3) above, i.e. sectors not only differ in their labor and intermediate inputs shares, 
but also in their frequency of price adjustment (Calvo parameter) and the weights of 
different sectoral outputs in the consumption basket and intermediate inputs baskets. 
Table (1.5) shows the degree non-neutrality caused by nominal shocks.
1.3.4 Discussion of results
Creating real rigidities caused by nominal shocks has been one of the challenges of 
monetary models in DSGE context. The New Keynesian models create notoriously 
little rigidity for reasonable levels of micro-rigidities assumed. However, through pre­
vious research (Carvalho (2006), Nakamura and Steinsson (2008b) and many others) 
we have learned that richer, more realistic models of an economy will go a long way in 
increasing the real rigidities caused by nominal shocks. The model presented in this 
paper includes some of the ingredients found in previous papers as important -  exis­
tence of intermediate inputs and heterogeneity in the frequency of price adjustment 
-  and adds new ones: heterogeneity in the production functions across sectors and 
the possibility of decreasing returns to scale. A realistic calibration of the model to a 
6 -sector version of the US economy shows that these two assumptions are featured in 
the data.
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008b) report the variance of HP-filtered log U.S. real 
GDP for the period 1988-2006 to be 0.81 x 10-4 . Table (1.3) shows that the benchmark 
homogeneous economy model (one representative sector) with intermediate inputs 
equal to the average in the economy produces less than a 10th of the variance in output 
observed in the data. The most realistic calibration of the model under constant 
returns to scale assumptions is presented in Case (3), where sectors differ in the 
relative intensity with which they use factors of production, their relative sizes in 
consumption and intermediate input baskets and the frequency of price adjustment. 
This model implies a volatility for real GDP which is about 45% of the fluctuations 
in the real GDP in the data. Finally, in a model with DRS this share rises to about 
55%.
To conclude, the exercises above demonstrate that departure from the simplified
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model of one sector homogeneous economy is an important step in capturing the 
quantitative effects of nominal shocks on the output in the short-run. Furthermore, 
this class of multi-sector models are important in understanding the short-run relative 
price effects of monetary policy and the optimal monetary policy response as discussed 
for instance in Aoki (2001).
1.4 E m pirical E vidence
The relevance of the production chain as a mechanism for amplifying the micro-level 
nominal rigidities in the economy is consistent with the findings of a few papers on the 
frequency of price adjustment. BGM report much faster responses for the PPI index 
to monetary policy shocks compared to the CPI. Nakamura and Steinsson (2008a) 
report that the frequency of price change is strongly related to the stage of processing. 
Although this fact could be evidence for different intrinsic factors for price stickiness, 
such as higher variance of idiosyncratic shocks at the crude material level or lower 
costs of price change, it is also consistent with the lower speed of response to shocks 
as predicted in the production chain model. In this section, I will explore this issue.
One implication of the model presented above was that ceteris paribus, upstream 
industries respond faster to aggregate shocks compared to downstream industries. I 
test this prediction against the data by considering the response of prices to two types 
of aggregate shocks : A monetary policy shock and an oil supply shock. I regress the 
cumulative response of disaggregated prices of around 150 industries in manufacturing 
to these shocks on a measure of their position in the production chain, which I will 
define below, as well as other explanatory factors. I find a significant and negative 
relationship between the position in the chain and the speed of response at different 
horizons.
In this section, I will present the empirical evidence. First I will discuss the 
identification of the shocks, and the implied impulse responses of sectoral prices. I 
will then present the reduced form regressions.
1.4.1 Identification of Shocks and Impulse Responses
I use two measures of identified monetary policy shocks: First, the Romer and Romer 
(2004) measure of monetary policy shocks, which uses a narrative approach based 
on the detailed examination of the Federal Reserve’s meeting minutes. The second 
is monetary policy shocks as identified by the FAVAR method in BGM. A summary 
of the assumptions for this method is included in appendix (A.4). In an isomorphic 
fashion, I use two estimates for oil supply shocks, both due to Lutz Kilian. The first 
approach is similar to the Romer and Romer (2004) analysis, in that oil supply shocks 
are identified by examining historical events and their effects on oil prices. The second
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is a VAR approach based on co-movements of changes in oil production, real oil prices 
and global economic activity (Kilian 2009). I embed this VAR approach into a factor 
augmented framework, similar to the one used by BGM to identify monetary policy 
shocks. A more detailed description of this identification scheme is also included in 
appendix (A.4).
Under the narrative approach, in order to find the impulse response of each price 
series to the identified shocks I proceed as follows. The response to the two histor­
ical measures of monetary policy and oil price shocks can be computed directly. In 
particular, I run the following regressions:
11 24 48
A Pit =  4 \ p  +  Y  a%p D kt +  Y  bi j P A Pi,t-j +  Y  ci j P s ™j +  ei t P
k—1 j = 1 j=l
11 24 64
A Pit = ag  + Y  a?kD kt +  Y  h°3A Pi*-3 +  C?3S t - j  +  ei t P
k—1 j= l j=l
where pa is log of individual PPI price series described in the previous section and 
indexed by i, Dkt are monthly dummies, APi,t-j are lags of inflation for the price 
series being analyzed and S^_p and S£_j are the measures of monetary policy and oil 
price shocks, respectively. In the two regressions above, superscripts M P  and O refer 
to monetary policy and oil regressions, respectively.
In the monetary policy regression I use exactly the same number of lags as Romer 
and Romer (2004). They use 24 lags of monthly inflation series, and 48 lags of the 
shock series to analyze the effect of their measure of monetary policy shocks on the 
price index for finished goods. The regression is performed on monthly data and the 
regression dates are 1976:1 to 1996:12. For the oil supply shock, I try different lag 
specifications.
In analyzing inflation response, Kilian (2008) uses 4 lags of the inflation series and 
8  lags of oil price, on a quarterly basis. Given that the oil shock and price series 
are both available in monthly frequency, I use the monthly data in the oil-supply 
shock regression to be consistent with the monetary policy shock regression. I use 
the same number of lags for the inflation series (24 months), but longer lags for the 
oil-price shock to capture the notion that an oil-price shock might take longer to affect 
production and prices. The results presented in the paper are robust to changes in 
these horizons, and use of quarterly data as in Kilian (2008). The regression uses data 
from 1976:1 to 2004:9. The impulse response of prices to monetary (oil) shocks can 
be directly computed using bfjP and c fjP (b® and c^) coefficients.
To find the impulse response of prices to monetary and oil price shocks using a 
VAR, I follow closely the FAVAR approach in BGM. Briefly, this amounts to extract­
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ing a number of latent factors from a large data-set, including all the sectoral prices, 
as well as major series describing the state of the US economy. In the case of monetary 
policy shocks, the federal funds (FF) rate is added to the latent factors. The VAR 
is composed of the latent factors as well as the FF rate, with a recursive identifica­
tion assumption which imposes that the FF rate can respond to all factors within a 
month, but not vice-versa. Monetary policy shocks are identified this way, and the 
corresponding impulse responses for each price series can be computed. The approach 
is described in more detail in appendix (A.4).
A similar approach is used for identifying oil price shocks. Following Kilian (2009), 
I impose that the monthly change in the global oil production, a measure of global real 
economic activity and real oil prices are the three observable factors. The identification 
assumption, as discussed in Kilian (2009) is that production does not respond, within 
a month, to changes in real economic activity and real oil prices, and that economic 
activity cannot respond, within the same month, to changes in real oil prices, whereas 
real oil prices can respond to shocks to all the factors. The identification scheme is 
discussed in more detail in appendix (A.4).
Finally, I need to construct a measure for the position of an industry in the pro­
duction chain. I define the position of sector i in the production chain as
total f inal use o f  yipOSi —
Vi
i.e. the position of the industry i in the chain is determined by how intensively it is 
used as a final good as a share of that industry’s total output. The higher this ratio, 
the further “downstream” is the corresponding industry.
1.4.2 Data
The data for the FAVARs are exactly the same as those used in the BGM exercise. 
This is a balanced panel of 653 monthly series, for the period running from 1976:1 to 
2005:6. The choice of the initial date reflects the fact that a significant number of the 
disaggregated producer price indices start in 1976:1. All data have been transformed 
to induce stationarity. The original and transformed data are posted by the authors 
on the World Wide Web. 11
To find the impulse response of prices to monetary policy shocks identified by 
Romer and Romer (2004), I directly take their measure for monetary policy which is 
also available on the Web. 12 This measure documents monthly shocks to monetary 
policy from 1969:1 to 1996:12. Therefore, the regressions based on this measure of 
monetary policy use monthly data from 1976:1 to 1996:12. I append 24 months of
11 http: / /www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/mgiannoni /  research.html
12h ttp://elsa . berkeley. edu/ ~ dromer /
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zero inflation to the disaggregated price data (starting from 1974:2), in order to avoid 
throwing away the first 24 months of price data needed for the AR structure of the 
regression.
To identify oil supply shocks in the FAVAR framework, as well as the panel de­
scribing the economy, I need the monthly index of real activity which is available from 
Lutz Kilian’s website.13 The oil production and real oil price data are also readily 
available from the Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration. The 
three series required to repeat the Kilian exercise are available from 1974:1-2006:10, 
and therefore the entire BGM panel can be used in this framework. 14
Finally, for the identification of oil supply shocks using the historical measure, 
I use the monthly historical oil supply shocks identified by Kilian (2008) based on 
episodes of political turmoil in the Middle East. This data is available from 1973:1 to 
2004:9. Therefore the impulse responses based on this measure are calculated using 
monthly data on prices and oil supply shocks from 1976:1 to 2004:9. All sectoral 
inflation between 1973 and 1976 are assumed to be zero, but this will only affect the 
estimates using the first few months of data.
1.4.3 Regressions
As a first pass at the data, I use the Bureau of Labor Statistics classification of 
PPI commodity data by their stage of processing. This classification covers 1893 
commodity categories classified into three stages of processing: “Crude materials for 
further processing” , “Intermediate materials, supplies and components” and “Finished 
goods”.
Figures (1.8) to (1.11) show the impulse response of price indices for each of these 
three broad categories to the four aggregate shocks discussed above. For the two 
monetary policy shocks, the relative speed of response of the different price categories 
strongly support the prediction of the model: The response of the final goods is much 
slower than that of the intermediate goods and the crude materials are the fastest 
to respond. The response of prices to oil shocks, particularly when identified in the 
FAVAR also suggests the same order in the speed of response. However, it seems that 
crude prices are much more volatile and far fewer lags are needed to estimate their 
response to oil price shocks.
For more conclusive evidence, I now use the responses of the 153 industries used 
by BGM in their sectoral regressions. I regress the response of disaggregated prices to 
shocks above at different horizons on posi, defined above. The model would predict
13 http: / / www-personal. umich .edu/ ~ lkilian /  rea. txt
14 Kilian is able to start his series from January 1973 because he uses the Barsky and Kilian (2001) 
estimates of oil prices, before the start of the series published by the Energy department from January 
1974. Given that the price data used in the FAVAR start in 1975, I do not use this extension.
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a negative relationship between the speed of response of an industry to an aggregate 
shock, and the measure pos{. Under the assumption of neutrality of money, all prices 
should respond by the same amount to a monetary policy shock in the long-run. 
Therefore the magnitude of the response of a price series at any time horizon is a 
valid measure of its speed of response. 15
On the other hand, oil prices can have also long-run level effects. Thus, the
magnitude of response cannot be used as an indicator of the speed of response. To
control for this level effect, I either control for the long-run effect, or control for
the level of energy use. I construct an index for the energy use which is the total 
expenditure on energy as a share of total expenditure on intermediate inputs for each 
industry. Controlling for this index of energy use, should allow us to separate the 
long-run level effect of oil-price shocks on sectoral prices from the short-run transition 
effects. Thus, I expect the coefficient on the index of energy use to be negative.
Furthermore, BGM find that other factors, such as the standard deviation of the 
sector specific shocks, or the degree of competition in an industry can affect the 
dispersion in the response to monetary policy shocks. Therefore, I also include those 
variables in my regressions. In particular, I will use the following specifications for 
the cross-industry price responses:
IR^h = a  + (3xPOSi +  (32s.d.(xi) +  P3profit  +  P4p{xi) +  £i (1.5)
IR °h = a  +  faPOSi  +  P2s.d.{xi) +  P r o f i t  + P4p{xi) +  P5energy +  ^  (1.6)
IR?h -  IR?m = a  +  PiPOSi +  P2s.d.{xi) +  P3profit  +  P4p(xi) +  £* (1.7)
where I R ™  (IR°h) is the log of price level in industry z, h periods after an expan­
sionary monetary policy shock (positive oil price shock); posi is the share of final use 
of industry i output; s.d.(xi) is the standard deviation of the inflation series, p{xi) is 
the persistence of the inflation series, profit  is the level of profits as a share of output, 
a measure of competitiveness in industry i which BGM find significant and finally, 
energy is the total energy input as a share of total inputs.
The specification is similar to that in the cross-sectional analysis by BGM. I con­
trol for all factors that they find significant in explaining cross-sectional dispersion 
in response to aggregate shocks, and argue the position in the chain still has some 
explanatory power. There is one small difference however: In BGM, s.d.(xi) and p{xi)
15 This assumption would be invalidated if the speed of response changes along the IRF. In other 
words, if there is a lot of change in the ordering of prices, the magnitude of response is not a good 
proxy for its speed. The correlation of the speed of response has to be constant along the IRF. The 
correlation of the ordering of prices between 6, 9 and 12 month horizons shows a positive, albeit not 
very large, correlation. Also, I avoid using the estimated responses at longer horizons as these are less 
precisely estimated, compared to the estimates at earlier horizons.
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are replaced by the s.d.(ei) and p(ej), where e* is the VAR error term. These esti­
mates, though consistent, suffer from generated regressor bias and therefore, we need 
to correct the standard errors. I use s.d.(xi) and p(x{) (properties of the inflation 
series) as instruments for s.d.{ei) and p{ei). Table (1.6) shows that these are indeed 
strong instruments, particularly in the case of s.d.(xi). Note that I use IR ° h — I R f m as 
the dependent variable in regression (1.7) as opposed to using I R f h as the dependent 
variable and controlling for I R f m on the right hand side. Again, this is in order to 
avoid generated regressor problem, as I R f m are also estimated in the VAR.
Given the specification above, the model suggests that /31 is negative. BGM find a 
positive estimate for /32 and a negative estimate for /?3, both statistically significant. 
A positive /?2, although not predicted by the pricing model presented in this paper, 
could suggest some form of menu-cost pricing: firms with highly volatile idiosyncratic 
shocks need to adjust their prices often; therefore, they will also respond faster to 
aggregate shocks. A negative /33 suggests that in those sectors with higher profit 
levels (associated with less competitive sectors) prices respond more slowly. Finally, I 
expect /35 in the first oil regression to be positive.
Tables (1.7) to (1.8) show the regression results. First, note that the estimates 
of the effect of position in the chain on the speed of chain (pos) is negative, and 
significant in almost all the regressions presented. Furthermore, the estimates are 
quite close, despite the fact that the dependent variables across different regressions 
represent responses to different shocks (or at least the same shocks identified with 
different strategies).
Looking at table (1.7), the estimates for pos can be interpreted as the effect of 
moving an industry from the “end” of production chain to the “beginning” of chain. 
These estimates say that an industry would respond between 20 — 40 per cent faster if 
it was moved from the end of the chain to the beginning. This effect is economically 
significant. Of course, as found in BGM, the effect of one unit larger standard deviation 
of idiosyncratic shocks is several orders of magnitude larger.
Table (1.8) confirms the same intuition for response to oil supply shocks. In the 
first two regressions of each panel I use I R — I R ^  a measure of speed of response 
of prices between months 9 and 1 2 . As explained earlier, the purpose of this choice 
of variable is twofold. First, I need to control for the long-run level response to an oil 
price shock. Secondly, to avoid a generated regressor problem, I use the difference in 
the 9-month and 12-month responses as my preferred measure of independent variable. 
In regressions (3) — (4) instead I use the share of energy use in total intermediate inputs 
to control for the long-run effects.
Here again the estimates of the coefficient on pos are all negative and mostly sig­
nificant, albeit slightly smaller than the estimates obtained from the monetary policy
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responses. The estimates of the energy coefficient are quite small in the regressions 
based on the FAVAR impulse responses, but are significant and have the correct sign 
in the historical-based regression. Overall, the coefficient on energy is less robust in 
alternative specifications of the horizon at which the regression is performed, com­
pared to controlling for the long-run response. This might be an indication that the 
energy index formed this way does not fully capture the extent of the energy use, or 
the relationship between the speed of response and the degree of energy use is not 
correctly specified.
Overall, these results lend support to the hypothesis that the position of an indus­
try in the chain can affect the speed of its price response to aggregate shocks through 
the dependence of the industry’s marginal cost on other prices in the economy.
1.5 C onclusions
Several recent papers have argued that there is significant heterogeneity in the be­
havior of prices across different sectors, and a literature has emerged to identify the 
sources of this heterogeneity. This paper belongs to this strand of research. In par­
ticular, this paper asks whether the existence of a production chain structure in the 
economy can be an important source of heterogeneity in the response of sectoral prices 
to shocks.
I present a multi-sector version of an otherwise typical New Keynesian model with 
intermediate inputs. In the benchmark model, the sectors in the economy differ on 
how intensively they use intermediate inputs, which determines their position in the 
production chain: those industries who mainly use labor as their input to production 
are classified as upstream, whereas those heavily dependent on intermediate inputs 
from other sectors for their production are classified as downstream industries. I 
discuss three implications of this model.
First, I argue that the input-output linkages in production can create heterogeneity 
in the response of sectoral prices to aggregate shocks. The model suggests that if there 
are small nominal rigidities, industries at the end of the chain “inherit” these rigidities 
from their suppliers and hence respond more slowly to aggregate shocks. Whereas in 
response to idiosyncratic shocks, the first order effect of a change in productivity comes 
into effect immediately and thus is reflected in the price, regardless of the position in 
the chain. I argue that the implications of this model are consistent with the facts in 
BGM. Their paper suggests, based on empirical work, that prices respond only slowly 
to aggregate whereas the response to sector-specific shocks are fast.
Second, I argue that in a realistic calibration of this multi-sector model to the 
US data, heterogeneity in the frequency of price adjustments can reinforce the het­
erogeneity in response to aggregate shocks, caused by the position in the chain, to
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produce large rigidities in response to monetary shocks. The fact that introducing 
intermediate goods increases real rigidities has been pointed out by others, and most 
recently by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008b). Furthermore, Carvalho (2006) shows 
that heterogeneity in sectoral frequency of price adjustment also increases rigidities. 
Using data on the sectoral frequency of price adjustment, I show that differences 
across sectors in the intensity of intermediate input use, reinforces the heterogeneity 
in sectoral price adjustment frequencies. So an equivalent “average” economy might 
be underestimating the real rigidities quite substantially.
Finally, the model implies that upstream industries would respond faster to ag­
gregate shocks, compared to “downstream” industries. I test this prediction against 
the data, by looking at the response of 150 industries in manufacturing to two types 
of aggregate shocks: A monetary policy shock and an oil supply shock. I find a sig­
nificant and negative relationship between the position in the chain and the speed of 
response at different horizons. These evidence support the view that production chain 
can be an important mechanism for propagation of aggregate shocks and explaining 
the heterogeneity across sectors in response to these shocks.
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A  A p p en d ix
A .l  Results in the Presence o f Wage Rigidity
Here, I have reproduced the graphs (1.3) - (1.5) in the presence of wage rigidity. In 
modelling wage rigidity, I follow Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) staggered wages 
set-up. The assumptions about households’ problem are altered slightly to allow 
for this set-up. In particular, I assume a continuum of monopolistically competitive 
households, each of which supplies a differentiated labor service to the production 
sector. Under these assumptions, Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) show that a 
wage-setting equation analogous to the price-setting Phillips curve can be derived:
U)t = PEtUt+1 +  [mrst -  C«]
(1  -  ipwP)( 1 -  <pw)where ut = Wt — Wt-i is the wage inflation at time t , =  ----------------------Ms a
constant related to the stickiness of wages (<pw), and ( t is the real wage. I calibrate 
the probability of the nominal wage stickiness such that <pw = 0.85. This calibration 
implies that wages are more rigid than all of the sectoral prices.
The important point to note is that the ordering of sectoral responses do not 
change in the presence of wage rigidity. This is due to the intuition provided in the 
two-sector case: Industries further down the change inherit the stickiness of earlier 
ones, regardless of the source (wage or price stickiness).
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A .2 D erivation  of th e  Sectoral Phillips C urve
D eriving th e  dem and  curves Each sector in the economy is composed of an in­
finite number of firms of mass 1, indexed by 2 . These firms produce imperfectly 
substitutable goods. In this sense, each sector can be thought of as a classical New 
Keynesian economy. Denote by Cl , the household’s consumption of the good pro­
duced by sector j  at time t. Then,
inputs. Remember that the representative firm in sector j, has a production technology 
as follows:
Define the total output of each sector as the sum of consumption goods plus the
where 9 is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods within sector j. 
Define the price of sector j ’s good, P /, as an index over individual firms’ prices:
l
Then the demand for c?t (z) is determined by
A similar set of steps can be taken to determine the demand for intermediate
where M({z) = n  y n )  \ m t i i z)) denotes the intermediate input of firm z, in
sector j. m3t i (z) denotes firm z’s demand of intermediate goods from sector i (super­
scripts refer to the recipient industry). Firm z ’s demand for imperfectly substitutable 
goods in sector i are formed as follows:
e
where m3t i (z , z') is the quantity of input produced by firm z' in sector i, purchased by 
firm z in sector j .  Given the price of the intermediate good X /, the demand function 
m3t i (z,z') is determined by
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sum of intermediate input goods produced by that sector. In other words,
Yi  = c t + I 2 f  m i A z ')dz
. = i Jo
Market clearing for the output of each firm implies, 
y t ( z )  =  +  m t , j ( z ' , z ) d z '
i= 1 Jo
Y.?
, Pi J
. n .
The second line uses the demand functions introduced above, and the last equation 
uses the definition of F /. This last equation is used for deriving the Phillips curve.
Log-linearization and  th e  Ph illips C urve  Consider firm 2  in sector j.The firm’s 
profit maximization problem involves picking a desired price, p  (z) , at time t that 
maximizes
oo
E t ^ 2 u j A t,t+r \pt (z)yi+T(z) -  Wt+TLJt+T(z) -  X 3t+TM 3t+T{z)\
T= 0
Given the form of the demand function derived in appendix (A.2 ), the firm’s objective 
function can be re-written in terms of optimal price set by the firm and aggregate 
variables as follows:
E t '^ v ' jA t j+ T
T = 0
Yt+r
1 ( w t \ Si /  \ 1—Sj /  Si 
where = — —r (X i  ) [ -—-— ) is a firm’s nominal marginal cost and
is constant for all firms within sector j , and hence independent of index 2 .
The first order condition for this maximization problem is
Z3f \ (  ® \  ^  ^ T = 0  Uj^t,t+T0 \  Et "}2t=o A tit+TYt+T'j?l_i.T(Pt+Ty
,t+TYi+r(pi+Ty
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therefore, dividing both sides by P /
pH*) (  0 \  EtE r=0^t,t+rY lM +r(PUry (1.8)
Pi \ e - i j  £ ( E ” o "JA t,t+T^ +T( ^ +T)«p/
mDenote the desired reset price relative to the average industry price by Qj =
P}
This relative price is stationary and thus equation (1.8) can be log-linearized to obtain:
oo
A + A = { 1 ~ ^P)  Et X I “W  H +r] (L9)
T=0
where small letter variables denote deviations from steady state. Equation (1.9) can 
be rewritten
4 + A  = {1 ~ u;jP) A  + u JPEt [gj+i +pj+i] (1.10)
At any time, aP fraction of firms in sector j  adjust their prices and choose the exact 
same reset price Pt(z). Thus, the price level in sector j  is a weighted average of the 
optimal price and last period’s price:
A  = (1  -  u J)pi{z) +  u ^A - i
Re-arranging this expression yields:
0 =  (1 - ujj ) 4  - u Jiri (1.11)
Combining (1.10) and (1.11) to eliminate ^  yields:
A  =  PEtA+i +  A  [A -  A]
where k?p = ~ — U This is the same as equation (1.3) in the text.
Note that aggregate inflation can be obtained by summing the sectoral inflation, 
weighted by the relative steady state coefficients.
tvt = epn t = Pe'pEtn t+1 +  ep ( ^  -  P t) kp (1.12)
where =  diag(ipl), is a diagonal matrix of nominal marginal costs, P* =  diag{jPt ) is
a diagonal matrix of the sectoral prices, 7r* is the vector of sectoral inflation rates, ep 
is the vector of elasticities in the aggregate price expression, or the vector of weights 
associated with the price of each sector in the steady state. kp is a vector of the sector 
specific Phillips curve slope parameters. Note that if the sectors are homogeneous, 
equation (1.12) above would collapse to the usual Phillips curve.
When firms face decreasing return to scale in their production, their marginal
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cost depends on the level of output. Thus firms within the same sector face different 
marginal costs if their prices (and hence output levels) are different. As assumed in 
the text, let y{(z) = i M / (z)7j . It can be shown that the log-linearized
marginal cost for firm 2  in sector j  is equal to
a j+ 7j  ay+7j \ a y + 7j  J
= - ^ — ( w t - a 3t ) +  ^ —x t - o ( —  l )  f p i ( z ) - p { )
<Xj+lj U j+ lj \ « j + 7j  /  V J
= r i ~ A (Pt(z ) - P t )
where (fil in the last line is the average marginal cost in sector j  and A is a constant. 
Thus (1.9) above can be re-written as:
00
4 + A  =  ( l - u Jf3)Et ^ 2 u Tj/3T [v^+rW] (1-13)
T=0 
OO
= ( \ - u P 0 )  E t ^ 2 t f / 3 T \ifPt+T -  A(ql +p>t - r f +T)] (1.14)
T=0
Equation (1.14) can be re-written as
(! + A) { 4  + Pi) = i1 ~ u3P) [ 4  + A4 ] + uP/3 (1 + A) Et [^+1 + pj+1
(jj3
Replace for =    jirl from equation (1.11) to obtain
ttJ =  PEtTr{+1 +  Kp -  pj]
= /3Et7ri+1 + [ 4  ~ 4 ]
i  ( 1 - ( J P ) ( 1 - ( J )  . , . , , 1 Awhere k jv = ----------- : as in the case with constant returns, A = 0  \ ------------1
P w3 J
and $  = ——— (wt — a{) +
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A.3 Long-run response of prices to  an aggregate technology shock
First, I prove that x LR = —a, where x LR is the long-run response of the price of 
intermediate input, and a is the size of aggregate technology shock, where the term 
“aggregate technology shock” implies a* =  aj — a, Vi.  The proof is by contradiction. 
Let x LR =  —b. Then, for each sector i  the long-run price response implied is:
P iR = Sj(w -  aj) +  (1 -  Sj)xLR
= S j d  -  (1 -  Sj)b
The second line follows because 77 =  0 implies perfectly elastic labour supply and 
therefore w = 0. The definition of x  implies:
XLR = ^ 2  qiPf R = - b  +  ^  Sisi(b ~ a)
=  - b
The second line follows from our assumption about the long-run response of x .  This 
must be true for any vector s  and q, which implies b =  a  and x LR =  —a.  It immediately 
follows that
P i R  =  S j ( w  — a j )  +  (1  —  S j ) x L R  
= —a,Vi
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A.4 M onetary  Policy and  Oil P rice  Shock FAVAR
The empirical framework is based on the factor-augmented vector auto-regression 
model (FAVAR) described in BGM and originally due to Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz 
(2005) (BBE). The main feature is to extract a few key variables or “latent factors” 
from a large set of economic variables, in order to summarize the movements of the 
macroeconomy. This strategy is particularly useful for eliminating the identification 
problems associated with small size VARs. As it is largely documented in this liter­
ature, a VAR specified based on an information set smaller than that of the policy 
maker will be potentially misspecified. The FAVAR framework addresses this problem 
by using a large information set from which factors are extracted.
Furthermore, the FAVAR model allows for decomposing fluctuations in all vari­
ables into common and idiosyncratic movements. BGM use this feature to establish 
their stylized facts about the responses of disaggregated prices to aggregate versus 
idiosyncratic shocks. As the methodology for factor decomposition and identification 
of monetary policy shocks is based on BGM, I only provide a brief description of the 
assumptions here and refer the interested reader to BGM for more details.
Identify ing m o netary  policy shocks The assumption is that the economy is 
affected by a vector of factors, Ct, which are common to all variables entering the 
data set. To estimate this vector of common components I follow BGM. I impose 
that one of these factors is the federal funds rate, as we are interested in identifying 
monetary policy shocks. The rest of the common dynamics are captured by a K  x 1 
vector of unobserved factors Ft. These unobserved factors may reflect general economic 
conditions such as “economic activity” or the level of “productivity”, which are 
captured by a wide range of economic variables. The dynamics of Ct are given by
Ct = Q(L)Ct-i + vt (1.15)
where
and 4>(L) is a lag polynomial. The error term Vt is i.i.d. with mean zero and covariance 
matrix Q. Equation (1.15) defines a VAR in Ct, except that the Ft are unobservable. 
I follow a similar strategy to BGM to extract these factors in a two-step principal 
components approach. In the first step, principal components are extracted from the 
entire data-set. In the second step, the federal funds rate is appended to the estimated 
factors, so that the VAR described in (1.15) can be estimated.
To identify a monetary policy shock, again, I follow the strategy described in BGM. 
Specifically, I assume that the federal funds rate may respond to contemporaneous
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fluctuations in estimated factors, but that none of the latent factors of the economy 
can respond within a month to unanticipated changes in monetary policy. This is the 
FAVAR version of the standard VAR identification schemes of monetary policy shocks. 
Note that this identification assumption implies that all the variables (including price 
series) are allowed to respond to monetary policy immediately, insofar this is a response 
only to the monetary policy shock directly and not through changes in other latent 
factors. In all of the simulations presented here I extract 5 latent factors. The results 
are similar with 7, 9 and 10 extracted factors.
Iden tify ing  oil p rice  shocks To identify oil price shocks in VAR, I use the identifi­
cation scheme proposed by Kilian (2009), and embed it in the factor augmented frame­
work. He proposed a VAR model based on monthly data for zt =  (Aprodt, reat, rpot) 
where Aprodt is the percent change in global crude oil production, reat denotes an 
index of monthly global real economic activity in industrial commodity markets based 
on data for dry cargo bulk freight rates, and rpot refers to the real price of oil. The 
structural VAR representation and the reduced form representations are:
24
Aoz t  =  ol + 'y  ^A i Z t - i  + St
i= 1 
24
Zt = P +  ^2, Bizt-i  +  et
i= 1
where et denotes the vector of serially and mutually uncorrelated structural innova­
tions and et = A qlet . The identification assumptions are a set of linear restrictions
on A q1 which uniquely map et to et■ Kilian postulates the following:
/  e f prod \
io0
 H
1 /  oil supply shock 
' £t
et = ertea = x  x  0
aggregate demand shock 
£t
\  e?° ) X X X , coil demand shock \  £t
Kilian motivates the restrictions on A q1 as follows: Crude oil supply shocks are defined 
as unpredictable innovations to global oil production. Crude oil supply is assumed 
not to respond to innovations to the demand for oil within the same month. That 
exclusion restriction is plausible because, in practice, oil-producing countries will be 
slow to respond to demand shocks, given the costs of adjusting oil production and 
the uncertainty about the state of the crude oil market. Innovations to global real 
economic activity that cannot be explained based on crude oil supply shocks will 
be referred to as shocks to the aggregate demand shocks. The model imposes the 
exclusion restriction that increases in the real price of oil driven by shocks that are 
specific to the oil market will not lower global real economic activity immediately, 
but with a delay of at least a month. This restriction is consistent with the sluggish
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behavior of global real economic activity after each of the major oil price increases 
in the sample. Finally, innovations to the real price of oil that cannot be explained 
based on oil supply shocks or aggregate demand shocks by construction will reflect 
changes in the demand for oil as opposed to changes in the global demand. The latter 
structural shock will reflect in particular fluctuations in precautionary demand for oil 
driven by uncertainty about the availability of future oil supplies.
So to identify oil supply shocks using this identification scheme, I follow a similar 
set of steps to those taken in identifying monetary policy shocks. Specifically, I extract 
5 latent factors from the large data-set describing the economy and impose three 
additional observable factors, i.e. zt = (Aprodt, reat, rpot). I consider the response of 
all disaggregated price series to an impulse in the global oil supply. The regression 
results presented in panel (A) of table (1.8) are based on these impulse responses.
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Table 1.1: Calibrating the Benchmark Parameters
Discount factor f3 = 0.9975
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution <7 =  1
Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply T) =  0
Elasticity of substitution for goods within a sector 0  =  8
Speed of mean reversion of the shock to nominal GDP growth pv= 0.50
St. deviation of nominal GDP growth av= 0 .0 0 2
St. deviation of the idiosyncratic productivity shock (7 a — 0 .0 1
This table describes the benchmark monthly calibration of the multi-sector model. The para­
meter values presented in this table will be used throughout all exercises.
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Table 1.2: Calibrating the Multi-sector Economy
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Industry M .X /P .Y  s £ BCR (s)
Manufacturing 0.67 0.24 0.87 0.70 0.51 n.a.
Agriculture 0.65 0.26 0.15 0.08 0 .0 2 0.26
Mining 0.50 0.43 0.42 0.09 0 .0 0 0.24
Construction 0.50 0.43 0 .8 8 0 .0 2 0 .0 0 0.39
Services 0.44 0.50 0.92 0.06 0.40 0.40
Utilities 0.41 0.53 0.56 0.05 0.07 n.a.
This table describes the sectoral heterogeneity as described in cases 1 to 3 of the calibration 
exercise. In case 1, s (the share of labor in production function) varies across sectors. In case
2, u  (the frequency of price adjustment) is also heterogeneous. In case 3, £ and e (the weights 
in the intermediate input aggregator and consumption basket) also vary.
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Table 1.3: Real Effects of Shocks
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Horn. Econ. Case 1 Case 2 Case3
Max. relative price 0 .0 % 7.9% 43.3% 39.1%
Max. std. of the prices 0 .0 % 3.3% 20.3% 17.7%
Cumulative response of consumption 0 .6 8  x 1 0 " 2 1 .1 1  x 1 0 " 2 2.07 x 10" 2 3.10 x 10" 2
Var (C ) x 104 0.07 0.15 0.24 0.38
This table summarizes the short-run relative price effects or the extent of short-run monetary 
non-neutrality in each of the models described in the text. The measure in first row is the 
maximum relative price across all the sectors at all horizons. Without any heterogeneity 
in labor shares, this metric would be equal to zero. The second measure (row 2) reports the 
maximum standard deviation between prices at any horizon t. Rows (3) and (4) report measure 
of the non-neutrality which are relevant even in a 1-sector economy. Row (3) reports the 
conditional variance of consumption’s response to a MP shock. Row (4) reports the variance 
of real value-added output when the model is simulated with purely nominal aggregate shocks.
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Table 1.4: Calibrating the Multi-sector Economy: Decreasing Returns to Scale
Industry a 7 D R S LJ £
Manufacturing 0.25 0.74 0.99 0.87 0.70 0.51
Agriculture 0.15 0.72 0.87 0.15 0.08 0 .0 2
Mining 0.56 0.56 0.78 0.42 0.09 0 .0 0
Construction 0.38 0.56 0.94 0 .8 8 0 .0 2 0 .0 0
Services 0.37 0.49 0 .8 6 0.92 0.06 0.40
Utilities 0.18 0.46 0.64 0.56 0.05 0.07
This table describes the calibration of the model where decreasing returns to scale are as­
sumed. a  and 7  denote the share of labor and intermediate inputs in the production function 
(y{(z) = ^AjLj(z)^ j for each industry respectively. The column D R S  is the
total returns to scale (a +  7 ). uj, q and £ are calibrated as in table (1 .2 ).
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Table 1.5: Real Effects of Nominal Shocks
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DRS
Max. relative price 29.9%
Max. std. of the prices 10.9%
Cumulative response of consumption 4.30 x 10" 2
Var (C ) x 104 0.47
This table summarizes the short-run relative price effects for the model with decreasing re­
turns to scale. The measures presented are the same as in table (1.3). The 1st row is the 
maximum relative price across all the sectors at all horizons, the 2nd row reports the maximum 
standard deviation between prices at any horizon t. Row (3) reports the conditional variance 
of consumption’s response to a MP shock. Row (4) reports the variance of real value-added 
output when the model is simulated with purely nominal aggregate shocks.
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Table 1.6: Validity of Instruments
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Dependent variable: s.d.(x) Dependent variable: p(x)
s.d.(e) 1 .0 0 * P(e) 0.28*
(0 .0 0 ) (0.05)
constant 0 .0 0 * constant 0.50*
(0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 2 )
Observations 154 Observations 154
R 2 1 .0 0 R 2 0.15
This table shows the validity of s.d.(xi) and p(x{) (properties of the data) as good instruments 
for the s.d.{ei) and p(e*) (properties of the estimated VAR errors). Using s.d.{e.i) and p{ci) 
in the second stage regressions would result in incorrect standard errors. This table shows 
that s.d.{xi) and p(xi) are strong instruments, particularly in the case of s.d.(xi).
Table 1.7: Speed of Price Responses to Monetary Policy Shocks
Panel A: FAVAR Panel B: Romer & Romer (2004)
D ependent variable: IR% P IR & r
(l) (2 ) (3) (4) (1 ) (2 ) (3) (4)
constant -1.03* -1.33* -1.07* -1.3* -2.45* -2.87* -2.78* -2.83*
(0.05) (0.07) (0.13) (0.18) (0.07) (0.09) (0 .1 2 ) (0 .1 1 )
p o s -0.41* -0.33* -0.27* - 0 .2 1 * -0.30* - 0 .2 2 * - 0 .2 0 + -0.24*
(0.09) (0,08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.13) (0 .1 1 ) (0 .1 2 ) (0 .1 2 )
s .d . (x ) 19.70* 18.6* 24.1* 70.6* 69.2* 69.6*
(.024) (4.25) (5.40) (8.7) (8 .6 ) (8 .8 )
p r o f i t -1.05+
(0.43)
-0.94+
(0.40)
-0.34
(0.46)
p ( x ) 0.35*
(0.13)
- 0 .1 0
(0.27)
Observations 153 153 152 152 153 153 152 153
R 2 0 .1 2 0.34 0.38 0.41 0.03 0.28 0.28 0.28
* . t •• Signif icant a t  5% ' .S ig n if ican t a t  10%
This table presents the results o f the regression I R f j f  =  oi +  f i i P O S i  +  /32s .d .(x i )  +  P  ^ p r o f i t  +  P Ap { x i )  +  Panel (A) presents the results where 
the dependent variable axe the im pulse response o f sectoral prices to  a m onetary policy shock identified in a  FAVAR m odel, as explained in the tex t. Panel 
(B) presents the regression results where im pulse responses axe com puted in response to  a m onetary policy shock identified using the Rom er and Romer 
(2004) m easure o f m onetary policy shocks. T he dependent variables in both  cases are measured as the percentage of price decline 12 m onths after the  
shock occurs relative to  the pre-shock level.
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Table 1.8: Speed of Price Responses to Oil Supply Shocks
Panel A: FAVAR Panel B: Historical
Dependent variable: w o ­ in & IR ° IF ° - I R 12 IR °
r n (2 ) (3) (4) (i) (2 ) (3) (4)
constant 0.07 0.05 -0.96* -1.14* - 0 .1 0 * - 0 .1 0 -2.9* -3.13*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
pos -0.23* - 0 .2 2 * —0.19+ -0.14 —0 .2 1 + - 0 .2 lt - 0 .2 2 -0.19
(0.09) (0.09) (0 .1 0 ) (0 .1 0 ) (0 .1 1 ) (0 .1 2 ) (0.14) (0.14)
s.d.(x) 1.51 12.3* 0.17 22.9*
(2.4) (3.4) (4.6) (5.0)
energy 0 .0 * 0 .0 * 2.9* 1.94+
0 .0 0 .0 (1 .2 ) (1 .1 )
Observations 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153
R 2 0.06 0.06 0.04 0 .1 2 0 .0 2 0.03 0.07 0 .2 1
I S ignif icant a t  5% ^ ^Signif icant a t  10%
This table presents the following regression results: I R f h = a + ^ P O S i  +  (32s'd-(x i) +  P3pro fit + j3^p(xi) +  (3 ^ energy +  and I R f h — IR ^m = 
ol +  PiPOSi +  (32s.d.{xi) +  ^ 3 p ro fit +  j3±p(xi) +  £*. Panel (A) presents the results where the dependent variable are the impulse response of sectoral 
prices to an oil supply shock identified in a FAVAR model, as explained in the text. Panel (B) presents the regression results where impulse responses are 
computed in response to a oil supply shock identified using Kilian’s historical measure of oil supply shocks. The dependent variables are either the price 
response between 9 months and 12 months after the shock, or the percentage of price changel2 months after the shock relative to the pre-shock level.
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1 PRICE SETTING W ITH PRODUCTION CHAINS
Figure  1.1: A Special Two-sector Model
Labor
HouseholdsY(1)=A(1)*L
The structure o f the econom y in the stylized  two-sector m odel.
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Figure 1 .2 : A Special Two Sector Economy Example
Panel A: Response to an expansionary MP shock
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Panel B: Response of sectoral prices to sector-specific tech. shock
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10 205 15 25 30 35 40 45
This figure shows the impulse response of the sectoral prices in a special two sector economy to  
an expansionary M P shock (panel (A )) and a positive technology shock (panel (B )). As argued, 
the position of a sector along the production chain only m atters in response to  aggregate 
shocks.
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Figure 1.3: Heterogeneity in s*.u;* =  0.85.6* =  <?* =  (1/6).
Panel A: Response of sectoral prices to an expansionary MP shock
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Panel B: Response of sectoral prices to sector-specific tech. shock
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Panel C: Response of sectoral prices to an aggregate tech. shock
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This figure shows the impulse response of sectoral prices to  a monetary policy shock (A), 
idiosyncratic technology shocks (B) and an aggregate technology shock (C), under Case (1). 
Sectors only differ in their share of interm ediate input use. Frequency of prices adjustment 
and the weights in the interm ediate input and consumption baskets are identical.
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Figure 1.4: Heterogeneity in Si, Ui. e* =  =  g.
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Panel A: Response of sectoral prices to an expansionary MP shock
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Sendees
Construction
Mining
Agriculture
Manufacturing
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Panel B: Response of sectoral prices to sector-specific tech. shock
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Panel C: Response of sectoral prices to an aggregate tech. shock
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This figure shows the impulse response of sectoral prices to a m onetary policy shock (A), 
idiosyncratic technology shocks (B) and an aggregate technology shock (C), under Case (2). 
Sectors differ in their share of interm ediate input use and frequency of prices adjustment. The 
weights in the interm ediate input and consum ption baskets are identical.
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Figure 1.5: Heterogeneity in s*, £{ and q .
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Panel C: Response of sectoral prices to an aggregate tech. shock
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Panel B: Response of sectoral prices to sector-specific tech. shock
Panel A: Response of sectoral prices to an expansionary MP shock
This figure shows the impulse response of sectoral prices to  a m onetary policy shock (A), 
idiosyncratic technology shocks (B) and an aggregate technology shock (C), under Case (3). 
Sectors only differ in their share of intermediate input use, frequency of prices adjustment and 
the weights in the interm ediate input and consum ption baskets.
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Figure 1.6: Equivalent Homogeneous Economy: S{ =  0.38, U i =  0.62, £i =  Si =
Panel A: Response of sectoral prices to an expansionary MP shock
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Panel C: Response of sectoral prices to an aggregate tech. shock
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This figure shows the impulse response of sectoral prices to a m onetary policy shock (A), 
idiosyncratic technology shocks (B) and an aggregate technology shock (C).
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Figure 1.7: Relative Price Effects of Monetary Policy Shock (sectoral prices
relative to utilities)
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This figure shows the prices of all sectors relative to that o f utilities in response to a monetary 
policy shock in the three cases analyzed in the text. In cases (2) and (3) where frequency 
of price adjustm ent also varies across sectors, manufacturing sees the largest relative price 
effect.
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Figure 1.8: The Impulse Response of PPI Aggregates to a MP Shock (FAVAR).
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This figure shows the impulse response of three PPI aggregates to a M P shock identified using 
the FAVAR m ethod.
Figure 1.9: Response of PPI Aggregates to a MP Shock Identified by Romer and
Romer (2004).
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This figure shows the impulse response of three PPI aggregates to a M P shock identified using 
the Romer and Romer (2004) measure of m onetary policy shocks.
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Figure 1.10: Response of PPI Aggregates to an Oil Supply Shock (FAVAR).
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This figure shows the impulse response of three P P I aggregates to an oil supply shock identified 
in a FAVAR m odel, as explained in the text.
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F igure 1 .1 1 : Response of PPI Aggregates to an Oil Supply Shock (Kilian’s
narrative approach).
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This figure presents the impulse responses of three PPI aggregates to  an oil supply shock 
identified using Kilian’s historical measure.
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Figure 1.12: Heterogeneity in S{. w* =  0.85., e* = Ci =  g.
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This figure shows the im pulse response of sectoral prices to a m onetary policy shock (A), 
idiosyncratic technology shocks (B) and an aggregate technology shock (C), under Case (1) 
and wage rigidity. Sectors only differ in their share of interm ediate input use. Frequency 
of prices adjustm ent and the weights in the interm ediate input and consum ption baskets are 
identical.
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Figure 1.13: Heterogeneity in s i ,  w*. £{ =  s* =  g.
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Panel A: Response of sectoral prices to an expansionary MP shock
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This figure shows the im pulse response of sectoral prices to  a monetary policy shock (A), 
idiosyncratic technology shocks (B) and an aggregate technology shock (C), under Case (2) 
and wage rigidity. Sectors differ in their share of interm ediate input use and frequency of prices 
adjustment. The weights in the interm ediate input and consum ption baskets are identical.
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Figure 1.14: Heterogeneity in S i ,  U i ,  £{ and Ci.
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Panel A: Response of sectoral prices to an expansionary MP shock
Utilities
S ervices
Construction
Mining
Agriculture
Manufacturing
Ol________ I___________l___________I___________I__________ I___________I___________I____________ __________—
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Panel B: Response of sectoral prices to sector-specific tech. shock
- 0.2
-0.4
- 0.6
- 0.8
Panel C: Response of sectoral prices to an aggregate tech. shock
-0.5
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
This figure shows the impulse response of sectoral prices to a m onetary policy shock (A), 
idiosyncratic technology shocks (B) and an aggregate technology shock (C), under Case (3) 
and with wage rigidity. Sectors differ in their share of interm ediate input use, frequency of 
prices adjustm ent and the weights in the interm ediate input and consumption baskets.
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2 Optim al M onetary Policy w ith  
Overlapping Generations o f Pol­
icy Makers
2.1 In trod u ction
The responsibility for the conduct of monetary policy in many countries lies with a 
committee. Major central banks, most notably the Federal Reserve, the European 
Central Bank, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, and the Bank of Sweden 
operate under Monetary Policy Committees (MPCs). These MPCs consist of a small 
number of individuals who are assigned for a certain period of time and reach their 
decisions in a variety of manners. 16 However, the literature on monetary policy has 
often focused on a single, infinitely-lived central banker. This paper proposes a model 
where members of MPC have finite, overlapping tenures and studies the implications 
of departing from the standard institutional set-up assumed in the previous literature.
I start by assuming a two-member MPC, where each member is in office for two 
terms, and at each point in time there are two MPC members in office. Furthermore,
I assume each MPC member sits on the committee with an “older” MPC member in 
their first year, and with a “younger” MPC member in their second year. Since there 
is an overlap between the tenures of different MPC members I refer to this model 
as a model of overlapping generations of MPC members. Each MPC member has a 
loss function which spans over his two-period tenure, and penalizes him for deviations 
of inflation and output gap from their respective targets. The set-up is otherwise 
standard to the New Keynesian literature (see Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999), 
McCallum and Nelson (2004), and Woodford (2003), Ch.7). The inflation-output gap 
trade-off is governed by a Phillips curve which can be derived from a variety of price 
rigidity models, e.g., a staggered pricing model of Calvo (1983) or Taylor (1980) and 
a price adjustment cost model of Rotemberg (1982).17
I assume that each MPC member is individually able to commit to a path of fu­
ture state-contingent policies. The overlapping structure of MPC member tenures will 
imply that the equilibrium outcome will be different from the optimal policy under 
commitment. 18 A young MPC member would like to optimize in their first period 
and commit to a strong inflation response thereafter. On the other hand, an old 
MPC member has already made state-contingent plans in his first period of tenure,
16 See Blinder (1998) and Gerlach-Kristen (2008) for a discussion on different decision making pro­
cedures in MPCs.
17 See Roberts (1995).
18See, for instance, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999), and Woodford (2003), Ch.7.
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and thus does not want to re-optimize. This is the source of disagreement between 
the overlapping generations of MPC members. Put differently, an MPC member can 
commit to their own future policies but cannot influence the behavior of their suc­
cessors. Therefore the incoming MPC members do not have access to a commitment 
technology in the first period of their tenure. Under rational expectations, the lack 
of such a technology leads the incoming MPC members to find it optimal to choose 
policy sequentially in their first period.
Further, I assume that differences between the choices of the old and the young 
MPC members are resolved through a utilitarian bargaining mechanism (Mas-Colell, 
Whinston, and Green (1995), Chapter 12); namely by maximizing the sum of objective 
functions of both (old and young) MPC members. I will show that this solution 
coincides with averaging the desired inflation rates proposed by each MPC member.
I extend the analysis to a larger MPC in which a fixed proportion (1  — a) of MPC 
members retire in each period and are replaced by young members. Therefore, in 
each period a proportion a  of the MPC are old members and the remaining (1 — a) 
share are young members. I refer to this process as “churning” and to (1 — a) as the 
churning rate. Again, MPC members reach decisions under a utilitarian bargaining 
mechanism, but now the share of each group in the MPC determines their “weight” 
in the bargaining process. An MPC in which old policy members never retire, is 
not different from a single infinitely lived MPC member who possesses a commitment 
technology. On the other hand, an MPC in which churning is complete, i.e. the en­
tire committee is replaced by new members in each period, is equivalent to a single 
MPC member acting under discretion.19 Any churning rate in between these two ex­
treme examples results in paths for inflation and output which are neither like those 
under discretionary monetary policy nor under full commitment, but something in be­
tween. These intermediate results are similar to the concepts of “quasi-commitment” 
suggested by Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007), “loose commitment” by Debortoli 
and Nunes (2007) or “imperfect credibility” by Kara (2003). Whereas these studies 
assume an exogenous stochastic process which determines when and how often past 
promises are ignored, the present paper suggests an institutional reason which justifies 
imperfect credibility and imposes the frequency with which promises are broken.
The model implies that slower churning rates in MPC increase social welfare. This 
means that at any point in time the majority of MPC members should be old. The 
larger the proportion of old members in the MPC, the closer are monetary outcomes 
to optimal policy under commitment. The important question that arises is to what 
extent the institutional set-up (in particular, the size of churning) influences changes
19As Blinder (1998) points out, if all members of an MPC are identical it does not matter whether 
decisions are made by an individual or by a committee. What differentiates monetary outcomes under 
a committee vs. under an individual policy maker in this model, is that MPC members differ in the 
starting date of their tenure.
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in welfare. I show that this relation is quite sensitive to calibration. In particular, the 
results found in Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) who find that small departures 
from discretionary monetary policy bridge most of the gap in terms of welfare between 
discretionary and commitment policy, do not hold in general. I find that under the 
benchmark calibration, gains from commitment increase linearly with the proportion 
of old MPC members. This sensitivity to calibration is consistent with the results in 
Debortoli and Nunes (2007), who also offer a model of “loose commitment” similar 
to that of Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007), and apply their theoretical model to 
a fiscal policy application. They find that in their application average allocations 
are substantially closer to discretion. When the probability of keeping promises is 
decreased from 1 to 0.75, most variables move more than half of the distance towards 
discretion.
2.1.1 Related Literature
This paper is related to a few strands in the literature. The most obvious is the 
literature on MPCs.20 As noted by Blinder (1998) some form of heterogeneity must 
distinguish MPC members from each other for policy under an MPC to be differ­
ent from outcomes under an individual policy maker. A number of papers assume 
differences in preferences, for instance different weights to the twin objectives of infla­
tion and output stabilization (see Aksoy, De Grauwe, and Dewachter (2002), Hefeker 
(2003) and Sibert (2003)). Hahn and Gersbach (2001) consider differences in skill and 
Gerlach-Kristen (2006) studies an MPC with different information. To the best of my 
knowledge no other paper analyzes MPCs where members have overlapping tenures.
The present paper does not aim to justify the existence of MPCs (for an exam­
ple see Gerlach-Kristen (2006)); rather, it takes the overlapping structure of MPC as 
given. However, it has implications for how different decision making procedures af­
fect welfare. Gerlach-Kristen (2006) presents a model in which MPC members receive 
different signals about the economy and studies the performance of different decision 
making procedures in this economy. She concludes that setting the interest rate equal 
to the average of the rates favored by individual MPC members coincides with the 
optimal procedure if the committee members receive signals of equal quality. Thus, 
“averaging” is favored over a voting procedure, whereby the median of the rates pro­
posed by the MPC members is chosen. In the set-up proposed in this paper, the result 
of a voting procedure is trivial: if the majority of MPC members are old, equilibrium 
under voting will be identical to policy under commitment. On the other hand, if 
young members are in majority, the voting procedure will result in discretionary pol­
icy. Therefore, voting could be superior or inferior to a utilitarian bargaining in our 
model.
20See Blinder (1998) for a general discussion of the literature on MPCs.
2 M ONETARY POLICY W ITH OLG POLICY MAKERS 69
A second related strand of literature is that of imperfect credibility or quasi­
commitment. Since the seminal work by Kydland and Prescott (1977), time con­
sistency of a policy with or without a commitment technology is well understood. 
More recently, a literature has emerged which abandons the assumption that policy 
is either conducted under full commitment or under period-by-period optimization. 
These papers build models that can support a continuum of policies under varying 
degrees of commitment by the central bank.
Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) offer a model of “quasi-commitment” by the 
central bank. In their model the monetary policy authority is assumed to formulate 
optimal commitment plans but is tempted to renege on them, and succumbs to this 
temptation with a constant exogenous probability known to and internalized by the 
private sector. By varying this probability of re-optimization the authors investigate 
the welfare effect of a marginal increase in credibility. The present model suggests 
a mechanism which gives rise to this exogenous probability based on an observable 
institutional setting.
In a similar paper, Kara (2003) assumes an additional mechanism for departure 
from perfect commitment. He uses the term “imperfect commitment” to refer to 
the possibility that the central bank will renege on its promises, as it is the case 
in Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007). However, he allows for a difference in the 
actual probability with which the central bank re-optimizes and the probability of 
re-optimization perceived by the public. If the two probabilities are different (i.e. 
the private sector expects the commitment to last shorter than actually intended by 
the MPC member), the bank is said to have an “imperfect credibility” . Kara (2003) 
examines a case in which the monetary authority has both imperfect commitment 
and imperfect credibility and shows that in such a situation, an optimizing mone­
tary authority will choose a less history dependent rule than in the case with perfect 
credibility.
Finally, a parallel discussion of policy commitment is widely studied in the fiscal 
policy literature, particularly in the context of optimal capital taxation policy. Judd 
(1985) shows that under certain conditions, the optimal tax on capital in a determin­
istic steady state is zero (this result holds in a variety of cases). He assumes that the 
government has access to a commitment technology. In the absence of a committm- 
net technology agents could enforce a given equilibrium using a trigger strategy. The 
public and the government follow a particular belief and action strategy which is op­
timal and revert to the sub-optimal, non-strategic equilibrium, should the other party 
deviate. This mechanism is used in Chari and Kehoe (1990). Kurozumi (2008) applies 
the mechanism suggested by Chari and Kehoe (1990) in a monetary policy context. 
These strategies rely on an infinite horizon objective function and therefore, will not 
be sustainable in the model presented in this paper, since the tenure of each MPC
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member is finite. I take for granted that individual MPC members can commit to 
their own actions but cannot guarantee the actions of their successors. Therefore, it 
would be optimal for the successor to re-optimize.
Alternatively, Persson, Persson, and Svensson (2006) and Lucas and Stokey (1983), 
suggest a mechanism that makes the commitment solution to be time-consistent. Each 
government should leave its successor with a carefully chosen maturity of nominal and 
indexed debt for each contingent state of nature and at all maturities. This strategy 
recovers the optimal policy under commitment without access to such technology. 
Their suggestion involves a partial commitment, namely to honor previous debt, but 
no commitment about taxes. In the context of monetary policy this solution will 
not be operational since there are no state variables that could link two consecutive 
periods. In other words, there are no instruments which would allow an MPC member 
to affect the decision of his successor. The new MPC member could reset inflation 
and output gap instantaneously and in effect re-optimize the problem.
The contribution of this paper is twofold: First, the model studies a departure from 
the standard New Keynesian framework assumptions, which brings the model closer to 
what we observe in reality. Namely, I relax the assumption of a single infinitely-lived 
MPC member (or an MPC whose objective function is infinitely long), and replace it 
by an overlapping structure for the MPC members, as we observe in reality. Second, 
the model proposes a mechanism which gives rise to imperfect commitment by the 
monetary authority, as opposed to imposing an exogenous probability with which 
previous promises are broken.21
The normative implication of the model is a particular institutional structure: The 
model suggests that churning rate in the MPC must be slow, whether decisions are 
made through a voting procedure or through (utilitarian) bargaining. Furthermore, 
the model suggests that if churning rate is high, bargaining is preferred to voting. On 
the positive side the model suggests that welfare gains from commitment are sensitive 
to calibration. Under the benchmark calibration (Woodford 1999) welfare gains are 
close to linear in the churning rate of committee.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the theoret­
ical model and derives optimal monetary policy under commitment and discretion as 
benchmarks. Section 3 introduces the overlapping generations of MPC members and 
discusses the solution to the model under utilitarian bargaining. It also extends the 
results to an n —member committee. Section 4 compares utilitarian bargaining with 
voting. Section 5 presents the model calibration and discusses the impulse responses 
of inflation and output gap under varying degrees of credibility. Section 6  concludes.
21See Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007), Debortoli and Nunes (2007) and Kara (2003).
2 M ONETARY POLICY W ITH OLG POLICY MAKERS 71
2.2 O ptim al M on etary  Policy: T he N ew  K eynesian  Fram ework
This section briefly reviews the canonical New Keynesian framework for monetary 
policy design problem used in the literature (see, for instance, Clarida, Gali, and 
Gertler (1999) and Woodford (1999)), and presents the solution under discretion and 
perfect commitment as benchmarks.
2.2.1 Optimal monetary policy and stabilization bias
A representative household maximizes utility in an economy with monopolistically 
competitive firms and some form of nominal rigidity. The private sector’s forward- 
looking behavior is the essence of the New Keynesian model and the source of the 
time-inconsistency problem. Consider an economy with a continuum of infinitely 
lived private agents and a monetary policymaker. The private agents produce and 
consume a continuum of differentiated, imperfectly substitutable goods. The agents 
price their goods in an environment of monopolistic competition, and in the presence 
of nominal rigidities of the form described by Calvo (1983). The supply side of the 
economy is obtained by log-linearizing the first order condition of the firm’s profit 
maximization problem. This gives rise to an equation often referred to as the New 
Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) and takes the following form:
7rt = /3Etirt+i +  kxt +  vt (2 .1)
vt = pvt-i +  et (2.2)
where Xt is the output gap, or the deviation of output from its natural level, 7rt 
is the average price level inflation from time t — 1 to time t , and vt is a cost-push 
shock, representing a variety of supply shocks in the economy. Vt is assumed to 
follow an AR(1) process with an autoregressive coefficient of p, and is subject to 
innovations et with the standard deviation of of . (3 is the subjective discount factor 
of the representative consumer, and A; is a constant and a function of the structural 
parameters of the model. It is clear from the NKPC (2 .1 ) that inflation is a forward- 
looking variable and depends positively on future expectations about inflation and 
current output gap.
The demand side of the economy is described by a dynamic IS equation, which is 
simply a log-linear version of the Euler equation of the representative consumer
x t =  Etx t+1 -  a (it -  Et'Kt+i ~ r1^) (2.3)
where it is the nominal interest rate controlled by the central bank and r ” is the 
natural (real) rate of interest. The natural interest rate is the rate that would prevail 
in an equilibrium with flexible prices. The parameter a > 0 is the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution in consumption.
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The monetary authority minimizes a quadratic objective function subject to the 
NKPC (2.1) and the IS equation (2.3). As shown in Woodford (2003), Ch .6  and Erceg 
and Levin (2006), this loss function can be obtained as a second-order approximation 
of the representative household’s utility function with Calvo (1983) or Taylor (1980) 
style staggered pricing of monopolistically competitive firms.22 The period objective 
function depends on the variance of the output gap, x2, and the variance of inflation, 
7r2, in the economy. Specifically, the monetary authority minimizes:
o o
L = E 0 ' £ p t [ir? + \x'}\ (2'4)
t= 0
Note that in this specification the monetary authority’s inflation and output gap 
targets are both assumed to be zero. Targeting the natural rate of output eliminates 
the traditional inflation bias a la Barro and Gordon (1983). The monetary authority 
will not attempt to push the economy beyond its potential through inflation surprises. 
For example, the monopolistic competition distortions could be removed and efficient 
level of output restored using subsidies, eliminating the need for monetary policy to 
target an output level higher than the natural rate. Nevertheless, as argued exten­
sively in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (1999) the ability of the 
monetary authority to commit to a policy will still deliver a better outcome than 
under discretion, as it gives the monetary authority an extra policy instrument. This 
additional instrument is the ability to influence expectations through promises about 
future policies. By committing to future policies a monetary authority can internalize 
the effect of its decisions on expectations and thus gain an extra policy tool. In the 
absence of a commitment technology, the monetary authority takes agents’ expecta­
tions as given which will result in sub-optimal outcomes. This inefficiency is often 
referred to as the “stabilization bias”.
2.2.2 Optimal response under discretion
In the absence of a commitment technology, the monetary authority ignores the effect 
of its actions today on the formation of expectations. In effect, the monetary authority 
re-optimizes the objective function in every period, taking the expectations about 
future values of inflation as given. Thus, the dynamic optimization problem above 
breaks into an infinite number of contemporaneous optimization problems, or one- 
shot games. This is what we refer to as the discretionary outcome. The problem 
therefore simplifies to minimizing
Lt = (*t +  Az?)
22This results is based on certain assumptions including an infinite horizon model, and therefore, 
does not hold in the overlapping generations model assumed here, where MPC members’ loss function 
spans a finite period. See Debortoli and Nunes (2007).
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subject to (2.1) and (2.3). Note that since it does not appear in the objective function, 
the constraint (2.3) can be ignored. We can obtain the optimal solutions for irt and 
Xt by minimizing the monetary authority’s loss function, subject only to the NKPC 
(2 .1 ), and then recover the optimal path for it using the IS relationship.
The first order condition of this optimization problem is
7it + j^xt = 0 (2.5)
Combining (2.5) with the NKPC (2 .1 ), we obtain the following expressions for 7r* and 
xt :
=  *» +  A (l-& > )'» (2'6)
X (  =  ~  K? + \(1  — @p)Vt ( 2 ' 7 )
Note that both inflation and output gap are functions of the current period cost push 
shock. In other words the monetary authority brings back inflation to its zero level 
immediately. The impulse response is shown in figure (2.1).
2.2.3 Optimal response under com m itm ent
When the monetary authority has access to a commitment technology, it has the
ability to influence expectations by committing to a certain form of policy behavior
in the future. This implies that the problem can no longer be treated as a static 
optimization problem. The Lagrangian Cc can be written as
oo
Cc =  E0^ 2  f t  [ftt + ^xt + 2(Pt (*t “  PEtnt+i ~ kxt -  vt)] (2.8)
t=o
where <pt is the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (2.1) in period t > 0. The first- 
order condition for the optimal policy is then given by differentiating the infinite 
period objective function (2 .8 ) with respect to irt and Xf.
*t — (ft +  <Pt~i =  0 and Xxt +  kipt =  0 Vt > 0
together with the initial condition that <p_i = 0 , which indicates no previous com­
mitment in period zero. Substituting out the Lagrange multipliers yields an inflation 
rate rule that implements the optimal policy
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Woodford (1999) argues that optimal commitment policy lacks continuity in its 
form and thereby “fails to be time consistent only if the central bank considers ‘opti­
mality’ at each point in time” (p. 293). He thus proposes its variant from a timeless 
perspective, which specifies the equilibrium to be optimal in all periods. This requires 
that the policy at time zero is also that associated with the commitment policy. There­
fore the optimal policy from a timeless perspective is implemented by an inflation rate 
rule of the following form:
7Tt +  ^  [xt -  Xt- 1] =  0 Vt > 0 (2.9)
The inflation rate rule (2.9), together with the NKPC (2.1), implies the following 
second order difference equation in xt :
//3 +  l + fc2/A\ 1 k
x t+i ~ y  ^  J x t +  p X t-i =  j ^ y t  (2 .1 0 )
The stationary solution to this difference equation is:
= ^ Xt- '  ~  \ m - p \ Vt (211)
where /x£ < 1 and //£ > 1 are the roots to the characteristic equation below:
2 fP  + l  + k2/ \ \  1
M - (  -p  ) ,  + p = o
Combining the solution for xt (2.11) and (2.9), obtains the solution for 7r* :
+  (2 .12)
2.3 O verlapping G enerations o f  M P C  m em bers
This section introduces a committee with overlapping generations of MPC members.
First it analyzes the structure of a two member MPC. It defines the bargaining mech­
anism and derives the equilibrium path of inflation, output gap and interest rates. It 
then generalizes the solution to an n-member MPC and derives the equilibrium policy.
2.3.1 A 2-member M PC
Consider the following set-up. Monetary policy is set by an MPC which comprises of 
two members in each period. Each MPC member is in office for two periods. The first 
period of his tenure overlaps with the 2nd period of his predecessor’s term in office. In 
the second period of his term, an MPC member shares the office with his successor. 
So during each period, the terms of two “generations” of MPC members overlap. In
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this paper I refer to an MPC member as “young” while serving their first term, and 
as “old” while serving their second (or higher) terms.
The objective function of each MPC member only spans across his tenure while in 
office. Specifically, consider the two MPC members who share an office in period t. I 
label the loss function of each MPC member by the date at which he begins his term
in office. The objective function of an MPC member who begins his term at time t — 1
is
£*-i,o =  - P ^ E o  [(itl-i +  +  /3(tt? +  \x t) \  (2.13)
where £*-i,o denotes the time-zero expectation of the objective function of an MPC
member whose term begins at time t — 1. Similarly, the time-zero expectation of the 
objective function of an MPC member whose term begins at time t is:
Lt,o =  - f tE o  [(tif +  Aar?) +  +  \x%+1)\ (2.14)
The old MPC member would like to minimize £*-i,o subject to the Phillips curve 
relationships in periods t — 1 and t\ i.e.:
7Tt_i =  kxt- i  +  PEt-l'Kt +  Vt-1 and (2.15)
7Tt = kxt +  fiEtirt+i +  vt (2-16)
whereas the “young” MPC member would like to minimize Lt$ subject to:
7Tt = kxt +  PEt'Kt+i +  vt and (2.17)
nt+ 1  =  kxt+i +  PEt+int+2 +  vt+i (2.18)
One can impose the contraints each MPC member faces into their objective func­
tions, given that these constraints should always be weakly binding. This means that
Ls,o =  —fisEo *
[?r2 +  a (7T. 0E,W.+1 U,)2]
(2.19)
where LS)o defines the objective function of the life-time maximization problem of an 
MPC member whose career begins at time s, and it already takes into account the 
constraints that each MPC member faces in his lifetime. The two MPC members in 
office at any point in time decide what the inflation and output gap in that period 
should be 23 through a bargaining process.
The source of disagreement between the old and the young MPC members in office
23 As it is customary in such problems, we assume that the monetary authority decides the inflation 
level desired and the corresponding it can is uniquely determined from the IS equation.
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at anytime is their access to a commitment technology. I have assumed that each MPC 
member can only commit to their own future policies. Therefore, they have access to 
a commitment technology in all but the first period of their tenure. This assumption 
may be justified in the real world, in that policy makers are unknown before they 
are elected, and there is larger uncertainty about their future policies. However, once 
they occupy an office and announce their future plans, the uncertainty is reduced to 
a large extent.
Take the two MPC members in office at time t. In the set-up proposed above, the 
lack of a commitment technology for the incoming MPC member leads him to choose 
policy sequentially in his first period. The young MPC member would maximize (2.14) 
subject to (2.17) and (2.18) taking private agents’ expectations about 7r* as given. On 
the other hand, the old MPC member maximizes (2.13) subject to (2.15) and (2.16), 
Since this policy maker has already served in t — 1, he has had the ability to commit 
to his time t policy and therefore influence Et-i'Kf. This MPC member can thus take 
advantage of this additional endogenous variable to offer a better trade-off between 
inflation and output gap. This is the source of disagreement between the two MPC 
members, which needs to be resolved through bargaining.
Next, we explore the bargaining process and its equilibrium solution to the mon­
etary design problem.
2.3.2 The Bargaining Process
The two MPC members in office at any time period t decide what the inflation and 
output gap at that period will be, through a bargaining process. This can be thought 
of as a time zero bargaining. In other words, all future MPC members meet at time 
zero and agree on a state-contingent plan. I make two important assumptions for 
the following analysis. First, only the MPC members in office at time t  can decide 
on the monetary outcomes of period t. This is a crucial assumption; since all MPC 
members taking office from time t onwards affect monetary outcomes at time t by 
influencing the expectations of agents about future. Therefore, potentially all MPC 
members could enter into a “grand bargain” and decide for a state-contingent plan 
for the paths of inflation and output gap. The optimal outcome under this scenario, 
would be equivalent to the commitment solution. By limiting the bargaining process 
to the two incumbants at each time, excludes this “grand bargain”.
The second underlying assumption is that we analyze the solution from a timeless 
perspective (Woodford 1999). In other words, the time periods in the analysis that 
follows are sufficiently far away from time zero, that the effect of the initial period can 
be neglected. Next, we explore the bargaining mechanism and its equilibrium solution 
to the monetary policy design problem.
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The Bargaining Problem  Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) define a bar­
gaining problem among I  agents by its two elements: a utility possibility set U C K 7 
and a threat point, or status quo point u* € U. The set U represents the allocations of 
utility that can be settled on if there is cooperation among the different agents. The 
point u* is the outcome that will occur if there is a breakdown of cooperation. Co­
operation requires the unanimous participation of all agents and thus in equilibrium 
will imply that : U > u*i where % is a unity vector of length I.
Definition 1 A bargaining solution is a rule that assigns a solution vector f(U,u*) € 
U to every bargaining problem (U,u*).
In our particular problem, Ut — (L t- i ,L t) '. In other words, the bargaining possi­
bility set at time t is comprised of the objective functions of the young and the old 
MPC members, occupying office at time t.
Let the status quo point be u* = (—1, —l ) . 24 The negative value for status quo may 
be interpreted as the social costs of indecision or irreconcilable differences within the 
monetary authority and the ensuing public embarrassment. Note that the objective 
functions of both participants are always weakly positive, and therefore, abandoning 
the bargaining process is never optimal for either party.
The Utilitarian Solution and the Stationary Equilibrium In this paper I will 
consider a particular bargaining mechanism, namely the utilitarian solution. Define 
the utilitarian solution / t*(C7) such that it maximizes on U. Given that U is
convex, the solution is uniquely defined. I focus on this bargaining solution for two 
reasons: the addivity makes the maximization very tractable. The second reason 
is more conceptual. In an infinite horizon context, an agent minimizes a weighted 
average of the losses in all periods. The utilitarian solution to the bargaining problem 
above proposes a similar method, in that it aims to minimize a weighted average of 
the losses accrued to each party (or all parties, in the case of a committee).
In the case of an MPC which comprises of two members, ft(U) maximizes the sum 
of the two utility payoffs from each party. Therefore, the two MPC members choose 
nt and xt to find:
ft(U ) = max [Lt-ifi +  L* 0] (2 .2 0 )nt,xt
where Lt~i and Lt are defined as in (2.19).
The first order condition of the maximization problem with respect to 7r* is as 
follows:
24 We will explore a particular solution to the bargaining problem, namely the utilitarian solution. 
It is easy to show that the utilitarian solution to a bargaining problem satisfies the property of 
independence of utility origins (IUO). This means that the bargaining solution does not depend on 
absolute scales of utility. Therefore, our choice of it* does not matter, and in fact, we can suppress 
the term it* in the definition of / .
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[7Tf +  j^Xt -  ^ x t- 1] +  [?rt +  ^ x t] = 0 (2.21)
Note that the first order condition (2.21) is an average of the two first order 
conditions under commitment and discretion (c.f. first order conditions (2.5) and 
(2.9)). Now, combining the first order condition (2.21) and substituting it into the 
NKPC (2.1) yields a second order difference equation for xt :
/ £ /2  +  l  +  fc2 /A \ 1 k
X t+1 -  ^-------------   j  Xt + = - V t
Its characteristic polynomial
has roots /tj and fi2 inside and outside the unit circle respectively. The corresponding 
solution for xt and 7r* are:
** =  M - ' - m ^ - P\Vt (2-23)
+ (2'24)
Comparing the roots < /if and fi2 < ^ 2 * Tliis implies that the equilibrium 
response of the output gap to a cost-push shock is less persistent compared to op­
timal policy under commitment, and closer to the response under discretion. The 
equilibrium response of inflation, output gap and interest rates under a two mem­
ber committee are displayed in figure (2.2) with a dashed lines with plus signs. We 
see that the response of all three variables is roughly half-way between the response 
under commitment and discretion. The initial response of inflation and output gap 
are smaller than that under discretion but larger compared to optimal policy under 
commitment. As argued above, the persistence of all three variables are less compared 
to the policy under commitment.
2.3.3 71-m ember Com m ittee
The results of previous section can be extended to a more generalized setting. In this 
section, I relax two assumptions about the set-up in section 2.3.1. First, the MPC is 
composed of n > 2 number of members. Second, MPC members serve a T —period 
term. Here, an MPC member is considered “young” if and only if he is serving his first 
term. Note that it is only the first term which is special in the optimal policy under 
commitment. If policy was timeless, as suggested by Woodford (1999), or the tenure 
of an MPC member was long enough that the effect of time zero could be ignored, 
then nothing would distinguish different MPC members from each other, regardless
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of when they started their term. However, when tenures are finite the incoming MPC 
members find it optimal to implement the discretionary policy in their first term. This 
is the source of disagreement between young and old policy makers.
Assume that at any period t , the MPC is made-up of n members. Further assume 
that in each period ny of the MPC members retire and are replaced by young ones. 
Therefore, at any period t the MPC is composed of ny young member and nQ = n — ny 
old members. Note that the number of incoming and outgoing members should be
Ttequal for the size of the committee to remain constant. I refer to — =  a  and define then
churning rate to be 1 — a. A constant churning rate 1 — a  and a constant committee 
size requires that ny MPC members retire in each period and are replaced by young 
ones. All the members of the MPC at time t should retire by t A T ,  therefore we 
must have that ny — n /T . Moreover, not all of the old MPC members begin their 
careers together. The only distinction we need to make is between those members 
whose terms start at time t and those members who have started their term earlier. 
The bargaining solution will maximize the sum of all MPC members’ utilities. Again, 
denote the loss function of an MPC member by a subscript referring to the date their 
tenures begin. Thus, Ljto denotes the time zero expectation of the loss function of an 
MPC member whose term begins at time j. For determining monetary policy at time 
t , all MPC members whose terms began from t — T  + 1 to MPC members beginning 
their tenure at t enter the bargaining process. The utilitarian solution to this problem 
is defined as:
T - 1
f t (V )  = max ^  UiLt-i, o +  nyLtfi (2.25)Kt,Xt
1 = 1
where LS)o is the time zero expectation of the loss function of an MPC member whose 
term began at time s and is defined as
U ,o = -FE0 X >2+. + x( ^ ^ - ^ s +M- u s+i)2]
 ^ t\/
2 = 0
and Ui are the number of old MPC members whose terms begin at time t — i. Note 
that ^  uji = n0. Differentiating equation (2.25) with respect to irt yields the following 
first order condition:
n0[nt +  ~  ^ - i ]  +  ny[^t +  ^Xt\ = 0  (2.26)
Equation (2.26) shows that the first order condition under a utilitarian bargaining 
solution is a weighted average of the first order conditions of the old and the young 
MPC members. Rewrite equation (2.26) as
a[irt +  ^ x t -  ^ x t- 1] +  (1 -  a) [nt +  ^ x t] =  0 (2.27)
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Thwhere a = — , or the churning rate. Combining first order condition (2.26) and
Th
substituting it into the NKPC (2.1) yields a second order difference equation for xt
( a/3 + 1  +  k2/X \  a k _
-  (  p )  =  jfH (2-28)
This difference equation is stable with constant coefficients if and only if the ratio a 
of old MPC members to total is constant at all times. This is the requirement the 
churning rate is constant. The characteristic polynomial of this difference equation is
o ( a/3 H- 1 H- k2 /  X \ a  . .
m2 - ( —  p  — )l*  + 0  = O (2-29)
and has roots /i" and [1% inside and outside the unit circle respectively. The solution
for Xt is:
-  am - P]Vt (230)
r \
It can be shown that > 0 Va 6  [0,11. Furthermore, note that when a = 1,da
the solution coincides with that under commitment and when a = 0  the solution 
coincides with period-by-period optimization. The immediate conclusion is that the 
lower the churning rate (higher a) the closer the outcomes will be to optimal policy 
under commitment.
This conclusion can be cast in terms of the duration of the MPC members’ service
Tl 1as well. Note that we defined the churning rate a s l  — a = —  = —. A sT  increasesn T
towards infinity, a  increases towards 1. This is reasonable; we would expect that
the longer the duration of an MPC member’s term in office, the closer the solution
would be to that under full commitment. In the limit, if policy members never retire 
(T —> oo or a  =  1) then the outcomes would be identical to those under commitment. 
On the other hand, if T  = 1 (or a = 0), each MPC member will be in office for 1 term 
only, clearly delivery the solution under commitment.
2.4 U tilitar ian  B argain ing vs. V oting
Blinder (1998) classifies MPCs into individualistic vs. collegial. In individualistic 
committees decisions are reached through voting: positions are offered and debated 
and once all committee members put forth their case, they vote. On the other hand, 
in a collegial committee a consensus is built and recalcitrant members are persuaded 
to go along (usually by the chair person).
The model presented here could be interpreted as a collegial committee whereby 
a compromise solution is reached. Inflation is chosen as the weighted average of 
inflation levels favored by MPC members. What would be the result if decisions were 
made through voting instead? In other words, how would an overlapping generations
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structure for MPC members affect the monetary outcomes if the MPC was more 
“individualistic” as opposed to “collegial” in Blinder’s words?
Gerlach-Kristen (2006) compares decision making procedures in a model where 
there is uncertainty about potential output. She compares “averaging” procedure 
where the interest rate is set equal to the mean of the rates favored by the individual 
MPC members with a voting procedure which implements the median of these rates. 
She concludes that averaging coincides with the optimal procedure if the committee 
members are “equally skilled” in the sense that the signals they receive in the economy 
are of equal quality, however voting can lead to better decisions than averaging if 
abilities vary between policy makers.
In the model presented in this paper, a voting procedure has a trivial outcome. If 
the majority of the committee members are old, the voting outcome will be the same as 
policy under commitment and else, voting will result in discretionary monetary policy. 
Thus, whether voting is a welfare improving decision making procedure compared to 
bargaining depends on the composition of the committee. What is clear is that under 
both procedures low churning rate is preferred. However, as we will numerically show 
in the next section, the gains from low churning rate are continuous under bargaining 
whereas they are discrete under voting. These results suggest that if churning rate in 
the MPC is low, voting is preferred to bargaining since voting will recover the outcome 
under commitment but bargaining will not. On the other hand, if churning rate is 
high bargaining is the preferred decision making procedure. The bargaining outcome 
will be strictly preferred to the discretionary policy as long as the churning rate is less 
than 1 0 0 %.
2.5 C alibration  and S im ulation  R esu lts
In the benchmark calibration for the model’s parameters I follow Woodford (1999). 
This calibration is summarized in table (2.1). The model is assumed to refer to 
quarterly variables, with interest rates and inflation measured as annualized percent­
ages. All parameter values are reasonably standard, with the possible exception of 
the relative weight on the output gap in the monetary authority’s loss function. This 
relatively low value is derived from a micro-founded model which approximates the 
loss function as a second order expansion of the utility function of the representative 
consumer. It is therefore consistent with the rest of the structural parameters. I also 
report results for values of A more commonly found in the optimal monetary policy 
literature. In measuring the loss to the society, one metric would be the unconditional 
expectation of expression (2.4) . 25 I follow Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) and
2 5 This is the metric chosen by King and Wolman (1999), Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), Rude- 
busch and Svensson (1999), and Walsh (2003).
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report the change in welfare associated with different levels of credibility as a fraction 
of the total difference in welfare between discretion and commitment.26
Table (2.1) also compares the benchmark calibration with another set of para­
meters commonly used in the literature, suggested by McCallum and Nelson (2004). 
These authors suggest that the actual value of k probably lies between 0.01 and 0.1 
which is consistent with the estimates in Gali and Gertler (1999). The value of A 
which is related to the monetary authority preferences is more subjective. The range 
suggested by McCallum and Nelson (2004) includes the benchmark parameter.
2.5.1 Impulse Responses to Independent Shocks
Impulses are normalized to produce an annualized one percentage point increase in 
inflation on impact, for given expectations. Given the forward looking nature of the 
model, the actual increase in inflation is a function of the forecasted response of policy 
to the shock.
We assume that the economy starts in the steady state, with zero inflation and 
no output gap. Figure (2.1) shows the path of inflation, output gap and interest 
rate under commitment and discretion. With the benchmark calibration, this just 
replicates the results in Woodford (1999). Under discretion the monetary authority 
moves its instrument with the shock, returning the economy to the steady state as 
soon as the effects of the shock have faded. Given an i.i.d. impulse, this implies that 
the economy is driven into a sharp recession, accompanied by high inflation, but for 
only one period. This is the policy that each young MPC member would like to choose 
in any period following the period of the shock.
Under commitment instead, the monetary authority exploits the possibility of 
influencing inflation expectations in its favor in the period of the shock, by promising 
a protracted mild recession, accompanied by deflation. This can be accomplished 
with a very limited movement in the interest rate .27 It is clear why absent of a 
commitment technology this path for the policy variable is time inconsistent: the 
monetary authority would want to return to zero inflation and output gap as soon as 
the shock has disappeared. Note that in the absence of new shocks and inflation bias, 
the steady state values of the endogenous variables under discretion are consistent 
with those under optimal commitment.
These two extreme results are obtained with an MPC also, when monetary policy 
is set by voting among MPC members. As noted in section 2.4 if the level of inflation 
is decided upon by a simple majority vote, then the paths of inflation, output gap 
and interest rate will be those under optimal policy with commitment if a majority of
26This method eliminates the need to specify the standard deviation of the cost-push shock.
27We are assuming that there are no shocks to the natural interest rate.
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MPC members are old. On the other hand, when the majority of MPC members are 
young the equilibrium paths of variables of interest will be those under discretionary 
monetary policy.
Now consider the response of variables when monetary policy is set by an MPC. 
As argued in section 2.3.3 this is equivalent to choosing an inflation level equal to the 
average of inflation levels favored by all MPC members. Consider, first, the impulse 
response of the two-member committee studied in section 2.3.1. Figure (2.2) presents 
these impulse responses (with a dashed-plus line). The paths of inflation, output 
gap and interest rates under a two member committee is the same as that under a 
committee of any size with a  =  1 / 2 .
Note that the inflation response is roughly halfway between the response under 
commitment and discretion. This is unlike the results in Schaumburg and Tambalotti 
(2007) who conclude that relatively low levels of credibility are enough to produce 
qualitative responses of the economy very close to the ones obtained under commit­
ment. Furthermore, the contraction required to bring back inflation to the steady state 
level, is also halfway between that under discretion and commitment. Figure (2.2) also 
shows the monetary outcome under a committee with three quarters of its members 
being old. As we see the results are closer to the response under commitment. Very 
roughly, the responses of all variables are three-quarters of the way between discre­
tionary and commitment response. We will quantify this more accurately in section 
2 .6 .
The response of nominal interest rate is similar. The optimal response to a positive 
cost-push shock is raising nominal interest rates. Under discretion, and when shocks 
are i.i.d, interest rates are raised heavily in the period of the shock, but return to their 
steady state value immediately after. Under commitment, the initial rise in interest 
rates is much lower, but the return to the steady state is very persistent. These two 
patterns are reflected in the response of interest rates under a committee. Under a 
two-member committee, or when a = 1 / 2 , the initial hike in interest rates is roughly 
halfway between the discretionary and commitment responses. When a  =  3/4, the 
response is much closer to that under commitment.
2.5.2 Impulse Responses to Persistent Shocks
This section analyzes the response of the model when the economy is hit by a per­
sistent shock (p =  0.80). Figure (2.3) shows this response under commitment and 
discretion. It is apparent that the path of the variables under discretion is much 
closer to commitment with a persistent shock, since the exogenous persistence causes 
a similar persistence in inflation and output gap under discretion that is desirable 
under commitment.
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The initial rise in inflation and output gap is much higher under a persistent 
shock, compared to an i.i.d. shock. This is because of the forward looking nature of 
the model. Although the initial shock is just as large as the one studied in the i.i.d 
case, the prolonged cost-push shock implies a much higher cost in terms of output gap, 
and higher initial inflation. Figure (2.4) shows the response of these variables for a 
committee with a = 0.5 (dashed-plus line) and a = 0.75 (dashed-cross line) proportion 
of old members. The shape of all inflation responses are similar, with initial inflation 
hike being the highest under discretionary monetary policy. Furthermore, the paths 
of inflation with a = 0.5 and a = 0.75 are distributed quite evenly between the path 
of inflation under commitment and discretion.
The path for output-gap shows a different pattern. Under discretion, the response 
to a cost-push shock is always proportional to the current period output gap. Since the 
shock is monotonically decreasing in size, the output gap also increases monotonically 
towards its steady state. However, under commitment, and to a lesser degree under 
committees with a = 0.5 and a = 0.75, there is some persistence in the response of 
output gap to a cost-push shock. This means that the response to a persistent shock 
becomes hump-shaped and the recession worsens before it gets better. The same non­
monotonicity is reflected in the response of interest rates. In reality, the monetary 
authority would control interest rates and thus the hump-shaped pattern in interest 
rates would also be reflected in the output-gap .28
2.6 W elfare A nalysis
An important question that arises is to what extent the institutional set-up of a 
MPC influences the level of welfare. Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) answer this 
question in the context of their quasi-commitment technology and conclude that only 
small deviations from discretion are needed in order to obtain welfare levels very 
close to optimal policy under commitment. I analyze the same question by looking 
at the changes in society’s loss when proportion of old members in the MPC moves 
away from a = 1 (equivalent to policy under commitment) to a = 0  (equivalent 
to policy under discretion). The loss to society is calculated as the unconditional 
expectation of variances in inflation and output gap, as in (2.4). The variation of 
this loss function with a  is demonstrated in figure (2.5). One can see that unlike the 
conclusion reached by Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) in this model, and under 
the benchmark calibration, the gains from commitment are close to linear with the 
proportion of old members in MPC.
It turns out that this conclusion is quite specific to this calibration. Consider 
the alternative calibration suggested by McCallum and Nelson (2004) in table (2.1).
28Since we have assumed away demand shocks, setting inflation or interest rate as monetary targets 
are equivalent.
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Specifically, assume that A =  0.1 and k = 0.01. As figure (2.7) shows the variations 
in the loss function become a convex function of a. In other words, the committee 
must be much closer to an old member majority, before most benefits of commitment 
are obtained. This convexity is consistent with the findings by Debortoli and Nunes 
(2007). In the fiscal policy application they analyze, they find that a small departure 
from full commitment moves most variables substantially towards discretion.
Another metric for measuring the effect of a varying a  is to plot the volatility of 
output gap against inflation volatility associated with the optimal policy for different 
levels of a. Figure (2.6) shows the efficient frontier under the benchmark calibra­
tion. Moving away from fully discretionary monetary policy, i.e. the case when all 
MPC members begin their terms simultaneously will reduce both standard deviation 
of output gap and inflation. Beyond a certain a, decreases in inflation volatility re­
quire volatilities in output-gap. Compare this efficient frontier, with the one in figure 
(2.8) which corresponds to a higher A =  1 (and k = 0.01). Given the higher weight 
associated with inflation volatility, moving towards the optimal point, i.e. commit­
ment policy, involves decreasing inflation volatility substantially at the cost of higher 
output-gap volatility.
2 .7  C onclusions
This paper presents a model in which monetary authority is modeled as a committee 
with churning of members who have finite terms and are replaced by new committee 
members. Older and younger generations of MPC members decide on monetary policy 
by engaging in a utilitarian bargaining procedure. A MPC composed of entirely old 
members replicates the monetary outcomes under a single central banker who sets 
policy under commitment. The other extreme is a committee fully composed of young 
or incoming members who replicate the results under discretion. Any combination in 
between will generate results that are often referred to as imperfect credibility in the 
literature. Thus, this model provides a justification for imperfect credibility of the 
monetary authority, which has hitherto been exogenously assumed by other papers.
The model has a normative implication: slower replacement rates of MPC members 
results in improved welfare. Under a voting procedure the change in welfare is discrete. 
If the majority of MPC members are old, the equilibrium policy will be that under 
commitment and else, it will be discretionary. However, the change is continuous if 
bargaining is the decision making procedure. In this case, the lower the churning rate, 
the closer the expected loss will be to the commitment policy.
Furthermore, calibrating the model reveals that the rate of change of welfare with 
the degree of commitment is highly sensitive to the parameters used, particularly the 
subjective weight of inflation vs. output-gap volatility and the slope of the NKPC.
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This result explains the apparent discrepancy between previous studies which had 
reported convexity or concavity of welfare gains in the degree of commitment. Under 
the benchmark calibration (Woodford 1999) welfare gains are roughly linear in the 
degree of commitment or the share of old members in the MPC.
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Table 2.1: Calibration of Parameters
Variable Description (1) (2)
cr Intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption 1.5 -
/? Discount factor 0.99 0.99
K output-gap elasticity of inflation 0.1 0.01,0.1
X relative weight on the output gap in the welfare function 0.048 0.001,0.1
P autoregression parameter for ut 0 0.80
This table presents the benchmark calibration of the m odel, following Woodford (1999) in 
colum n (1) and the alternative calibration suggested by McCallum and Nelson (2004) in 
colum n (2).
Figure 2 .1 : Dynamic Response to a Cost-push Shock
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This figure shows the dynam ic responses to a one standard deviation, uncorrelated cost push 
shock under com m itm ent (dotted line) and discretion (dashed line). The parameters are 
calibrated according to  the benchmark presented in table (2.1).
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Figure 2 .2 : Dynamic Response to a Cost-push Shock : Committee
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This figure shows the dynamic responses to a one standard deviation, uncorrelated cost push 
shock in an MPC with various majorities. The parameters are calibrated according to the 
benchmark presented in table (2.1). The dashed-plus line corresponds to a  =  0.5, the dashed- 
cross line corresponds to a  =  0.75. Commitment and discretion responses are represented by 
the dotted line and the dashed line respectively. The path of inflation and output-gap in a 
two person committee (a =  0.5) is roughly halfway between commitment and discretion. The 
responses under a  —  0.75 are much closer to commitment outcomes.
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F igure 2.3: Dynamic Response to a Persistent Cost-push Shock
Inflation
3 r
1
0 5
Output-gap
i
10
1
15
i i i
0 5
Interest rate
10 15
i 1 i_________________________________________ i____________________
0 5 10 15
This figure shows the dynamic responses to a one standard deviation cost push shock with 
persistence (p  =  0.8) under commitment (dotted line) and discretion (dashed line). Other 
parameters are calibrated according to the benchmark presented in table (2.1).
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F igure 2.4: Dynamic Response to a Persistent Cost-push Shock : Committee
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This figure shows the dynamic responses to a one standard deviation, persistent cost push 
shock (p  —  0.8) in an MPC with various majorities. The other parameters are calibrated 
according to the benchmark presented in table (2.1). The dashed-plus line corresponds to 
a  =  0.5, the dashed-cross line corresponds to a  =  0.75. Commitment and discretion responses 
are represented by the dotted line and the dashed line respectively. The path of inflation and 
output-gap in a two person committee (a =  0.5) is roughly halfway between commitment and 
discretion. The responses under a  =  0.75 are much closer to commitment outcomes.
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Figure 2.5: Variation of Expected Loss with a
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This figure shows the variation of expected loss to society with a, or the proportion of old 
MPC members under benchmark calibration. The two solid lines show the expected loss under 
commitment and discretion. When a  =  0 (churning is 100%) the loss to society is the same 
as in discretionary monetary policy. When a  —  1 the loss to society is the same as under 
commitment.
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Figure 2.6: Efficient frontier - Benchmark Calibration
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This figure shows the efficient frontier under the benchmark calibration. Each point corre­
sponds to a value of a  between 0 and 1. The y-axis shows the standard deviation of output-gap 
and the x-axis the variation of standard deviation of inflation. The parameters are calibrated 
according to the benchmark case in table (2.1).
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Figure 2.7: Variation of Expected Loss with a  - McCallum and Nelson (2004)
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This figure shows the variation of expected loss to society with a, or the proportion of old MPC 
members under the alternative McCallum and Nelson (2004) calibration (A =  0.1 , k  =  0.01). 
The two solid lines show the expected loss under commitment and discretion. When a  —  0 
(churning is 100%) the loss to society is the same as in discretionary monetary policy. When 
a  =  1 the loss to society is the same as under commitment.
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F igure 2.8: Efficient Frontier - McCallum and Nelson (2004) Calibration
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This figure shows the efficient frontier under the benchmark calibration. Each point corre­
sponds to a value of a  between 0 and 1. The y-axis shows the standard deviation of output 
gap and the x-axis the variation of standard deviation of inflation. The parameters are cal­
ibrated according to the alternative calibration suggested by McCallum and Nelson (2004) 
A =  0.1, k  = 0.01.
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3 A sset Prices in a N ew s Driven  
R BC  M odel
3.1 In trod u ction
In this paper we study the hypothesis that time varying expectation of consumption 
growth -  long-run consumption risk -  can be generated by a richer structure of news 
about productivity shocks. This has important asset pricing implications. A growing 
literature, pioneered by Bansal and Yaron (2004), suggests that shocks to expected 
consumption growth, or long-run risk, can generate the premia we observe in the 
data. These studies take consumption dynamics as given. The natural question that 
follows is whether our standard real-business-cycle (RBC) models can give rise to such 
dynamics in consumption growth. We attempt to answer this question by studying 
the asset pricing implications of a production economy.
Our theoretical premise is a standard RBC model augmented along two dimen­
sions. First, we assume recursive preferences as suggested by Epstein and Zin (1989), 
Epstein and Zin (1991) and Weil (1989). This preference specification allows us to 
separate risk aversion from elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS). More im­
portantly, investors with Epstein-Zin preferences also demand a premium for holding 
assets correlated with shocks to expected consumption growth, as well as the stan­
dard shocks to realized consumption growth. Following Bansal and Yaron (2004), the 
riskiness associated with expected consumption growth is what the literature often 
refers to as “long-run risk” . More formally, long-run risk can be defined as stochastic 
conditional expectation of consumption.
The second departure of our model from the standard RBC model is incorporating 
“anticipated shocks” . Our model is driven by productivity shocks. These shocks 
have an unanticipated component, as is often assumed in macroeconomic literature, 
but also an anticipated component. Anticipated shocks are news about movements 
in the productivity process that materialize in the future. Anticipated shocks are 
important because they can generate a significant amount of long-run risk. As we will 
discuss in detail, long-run risk in consumption can arise in two ways. First, through 
consumption smoothing and second, exogenously, through anticipated shocks. Shocks 
to expected productivity growth will translate into shocks to expected consumption 
growth. Epstein-Zin preferences allow us to price these risks and hence generate much 
larger premia compared to a standard RBC model with constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) preferences.
It is worth emphasizing the intuition for anticipated shocks. Anticipated shocks 
are important because they generate significant amount of long-run risk, which from
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Bansal and Yaron (2004), we know translate into realistic asset pricing implications. 
These shocks create expected movements in consumption. Consider the following ex­
ample: In an endowment economy, an agent receives some news at time t , about an 
increase in his consumption in several periods period t - 1-2. With power utility pref­
erences, the stochastic discount factor depends only on realised consumption growth 
and is not affected by the news. Therefore the pricing of a realized return on a generic 
asset {Rt+i) is not affected. In other words, shocks to expected consumption growth 
do not affect asset returns. Whereas with recursive preferences, the shock to expected 
consumption growth affects the return on wealth which enters the stochastic discount 
factor. This simple example shows how allowing for news shocks will create long-run 
risk in consumption, which combined with non-recursive preferences can significantly 
increase the price of risk in the economy.
We solve the model using the standard macroeconomic technique of approximation 
around the non-stochastic steady state, often referred to as perturbation method. A 
first order approximation eliminates any premia as returns to all assets are the same 
to the first order. Therefore, we use a second order approximation in order to capture 
the effect of risks on asset prices. We do so by drawing on Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 
(2004) and their framework for approximating a general class of DSGE models to the 
second order. We show how their framework can be applied to solve models with 
recursive preferences. This approach is well adapted to solve problems with a large 
number of state variables and is computationally efficient.
Shocks to the predicted component of consumption and dividend growth were 
explicitly modeled in Bansal and Yaron (2004). However, extending it to the general 
framework of anticipated shocks and quantifying their impact on asset prices, as we do, 
is novel. We follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008) by assuming that shocks may be 
predicted up to 3 quarters in advance. The authors estimate these shocks in an RBC 
model using Bayesian methods and show that anticipated shocks explain the majority 
of business cycle frequency movements of the main macroeconomic indicators. We 
study the impact of such shocks on pricing of risk in the economy.
We argue that using the claim on dividend payments by the firm as the theoretical 
counterpart to equity might be misleading. Assumptions about the industrial organi­
zation of the goods and, importantly, labor markets will be reflected in dividend flows 
and thus will affect equity prices. It would be desirable to separate these two aspects. 
Thus in this paper we take the view that using the claim on future consumption flows 
as the risky asset of interest is a more appropriate tool to measure the price of risk in 
a production economy. So in referring to “equity premia” we mean the excess return 
of holding the consumption claim over the risk-free rate.
Our benchmark model matches important macro indicators such as consumption 
growth level and volatility and investment volatility as a share of output volatility.
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The model also matches the financial data well. The implied level of risk free rate 
and its volatility are in line with the data. Expected premia over risk free rate are 
on average 4.5% annually. This is still about 2 % less than that observed in the data, 
but much higher than previously achieved in general equilibrium models with long- 
run risk. These results are even more remarkable given that our parameter values 
fit well within the range regarded as “reasonable” in the literature. We use a risk 
aversion parameter of 7  =  10 and an EIS of x/j = 1.5. These are the values used in the 
benchmark calibration of Bansal and Yaron (2004).
Our analysis is related to previous work in a few strands of literature. The first 
group are papers which study the impact of anticipated shocks or news on the dy­
namics of macroeconomic variables. Beaudry and Portier (2006) find that long-run 
movements in TFP explain a large fraction of business cycle fluctuations and cause 
standard business cycle co-movements. Moreover, these authors argue that antici­
pated shocks are highly correlated with the component in the innovations to stock 
prices which are orthogonal to TFP shocks. Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) propose 
a more comprehensive model of news driven business cycles. Finally, Schmitt-Grohe 
and Uribe (2008) estimate an RBC model allowing for anticipated shocks at different 
horizons. We borrow their suggested shock structure and their quantitative estimates 
for the sizes of these shocks.
Various calibrations of long-run risk models assign different relative importance to 
news about expected growth and volatility or their correlation thus putting emphasis 
on different channels through which risk premia can be increased. Bansal and Yaron 
(2004), Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron (2006) and Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron (2007) and 
Backus, Routledge, and Zin (2008) present the results of different calibrations. Beeler 
and Campbell (2009) provide a valuable summary and discussion.
We know of two previous attempts to understand whether long-run consumption 
risk is a realistic and reasonable feature in a production economy with endogenous 
consumption. Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2007) answer in the affirmative by point­
ing out that in the simple RBC model i.i.d. shocks to productivity growth generate 
predictable movements in consumption growth. Croce (2008) introduces long-run pro­
ductivity risk and studies its implications for the endogenous consumption dynamics 
and asset prices. Nevertheless, despite creating some endogenous persistent move­
ments in consumption neither paper achieves the asset pricing implications presented 
in Bansal and Yaron (2004).
In terms of methodology, our paper is related to those using approximation tech­
niques to study recursive preferences in DSGE models. Tallarini (2000) is among the 
first to separate RRA from EIS in an RBC model in order to reconcile macroeconomic 
and asset pricing facts. Rudebusch and Swanson (2008a) study the term premium on
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nominal long-term bonds in a DSGE model with Epstein-Zin preferences. They are 
interested in the size as well as time-variation in premia, therefore they approximate 
their model to the 3rd order around the non-stochastic steady state. They do so using 
the algorithm of Swanson, Anderson, and Levin (2006). Binsbergen van, Fern&ndez- 
Villaverde, Koijen, and Rubio-Ramfrez (2008) perform likelihood-based inference in 
a DSGE model with Epstein-Zin preferences. To do so, they solve their model using 
a multi-step perturbation technique. One advantage of our technique is that we use 
the code provided by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) for a generic DSGE model 
and show how approximating this class of models with Epstein-Zin preferences can be 
obtained by only obtaining the first-order conditions to the social-planner’s problem. 
Finally, Backus, Routledge, and Zin (2007) use a DSGE model with recursive prefer­
ence to explain the lead of asset prices over the business cycle.29 They use a log-linear 
approximation to do so. In a companion note to the present paper, Malkhozov and 
Shamloo (2009) demonstrate the relation between Backus, Routledge, and Zin (2008) 
approximation to a second order perturbation method.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. 
Section 3 describes the structure of anticipated shocks. Section 4 briefly discusses 
our solution technique. Section 5 discusses our benchmark calibration and its main 
results. Section 6  presents the impulse responses of macro and financial variables to 
different types of shocks. Here, we also discuss in detail why the claim on dividend is 
not a suitable counterpart to equity in reality. In section 7 we offer some discussion on 
the role of EIS, stationary vs. non-stationary shocks, and news shocks in our model. 
Section 8  concludes.
3.2  M od el
Our setup is a variant of the Kydland and Prescott (1982) RBC model with one good, 
physical capital, endogenous labor input, and shocks to productivity. We extend the 
standard model by assuming recursive preferences, adding frictions in the form of 
adjustment costs to investment and allowing for news shocks. We exploit the second 
welfare theorem and find the equilibrium allocations by solving the social planner 
problem.
3.2.1 Preferences
The representative consumer maximizes a utility function defined recursively:
MaxUt
Ct ,Nt
29 We discuss how our model delivers this result in section (3.6), when we study the impulse response 
of financial and macroeconomic variables to the shocks in our model economy.
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where
i
Ut = L i ' *  (3.1)
u, = (1 - N t f C t
The period utility Ut is multiplicative in consumption (Ct) and leisure (1 — JV*), re­
flecting the complementarity of leisure (see for example Eichenbaum, Hansen, and 
Singleton (1988)). This specification has two advantages over a utility separable in 
consumption and leisure. First, it ensures that period utility is always positive. Sec­
ond, as emphasized by Rudebusch and Swanson (2008a), under separable utility the 
value function is not proportional to wealth, and therefore, 7  could not be interpreted 
as the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Whereas our specification ensures that the 
household’s value function Vt = MaxUt is proportional to W /-7 , making 7  a direct 
measure of risk of aversion.30
Unlike CRRA utility function, Epstein-Zin preferences allow us to separate the 
EIS from the coefficient of relative risk aversion (see Epstein and Zin (1989)). The
parameter 7  stands for the agent’s relative risk aversion and ?/>, for his EIS. This
separation has an important implication for the agent’s preferences towards the early 
resolution of uncertainty. In the power utility case investor is indifferent towards the 
timing of resolution of uncertainty, if 7  > \/i\) ( 7  < 1 /VO the investor prefers early 
(late) resolution of uncertainty. Intuitively, with 7  > \ji\) the agent’s propensity to 
smooth consumption across states is greater than his propensity to smooth consump­
tion across time.
3.2.2 Technology
The consumption good is produced according to a constant returns to scale neoclassical 
production function
Yt = Z t(A tNt)1- a K f  (3.2)
where Kt is the stock of capital, Nt is the labor hours and Yt is the output. Zt and 
At represent the stationary and non-stationary components of the TFP respectively. 
We will describe their dynamics below.
The law of motion of capital is given by
K t+1 = Kt . [(1 -  S) + 4>(It/ K t)] (3.3)
where It = Yt — Ct and 0  is a positive, concave function, capturing the fact that capital
30For more details see Rudebusch and Swanson (2008a).
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adjustments are costly. We follow Jermann (1998) in specifying 4> as below:
<t> (It/Kt) = + a 2)  (3.4)
where ot\ and 012 are parameters. These parameters are set such that the adjustment 
cost is zero on the balanced growth path; i.e. <j>(I/K) =  I / K  and <jf ( I /K )  = l .31 
Note that qt =  — 7— r-is the marginal rate of transformation between new capital
and consumption, or Tobin’s q. Since qt = ( I /K )  1^ T (I t/K t)1^  we can interpret r  
as the elasticity of investment-capital ratio with respect to Tobin’s q.
We now introduce our specification for the technology shocks. The stationary (Zt) 
and non-stationary (At) components of the TFP follow:
In At+\ — In At = x]+l
In Zt+i = x1+l
where x 1 and x \ are stationary shocks. We let the two shocks to be the first two
elements of a first order auto-regressive vector (VAR(l)) x t .
x t+i = H0 +  H ix t +  H2et+i (3.5)
where Ho is (n x 1 ), Hi is (nxn ) ,  H2 is (n x ne) and et is a vector of normally distrib­
uted innovations, et ~  iV(0, JnJ .  We assume all innovations are perfectly observable. 
As we will demonstrate when we introduce anticipated shocks, the other elements of 
the vector of state variables xt include the anticipated components of the productivity 
shocks. This general specification nests several models as special cases: the standard 
growth model, the long-run productivity risk model (Croce 2008), a model with antici­
pated shocks (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2008) as well as models with transitory shocks 
around a time trend in productivity growth (Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer 2007).
3.2.3 Equilibrium
The social planner’s problem can be summarized by the Bellman equation
V (K t ,x t) = max (Ut) or 
Ct ,Nt
Vt = max (((1 -  N t fC t ) 1- *  + (S{EtK (3-6)
where Vt is the problem’s continuation value or simply the value function. The maxi­
mization problem is subject to the production function (3.2), law of motion of capital
31In particular, we set ai = (^)1^rand c* 2 = 3 3 7  (3 7 )
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(3.3) and the exogenous dynamics (3.5). It follows that the Euler equation and the 
optimal consumption-leisure trade-off can be written as (3.7) and (3.8) (see appendix 
(A.l) for the derivation):
Et „  ( d K t+2\ - 1 dKt+ldKt+2
OCt dKt+l
Ar \ &K t+1 r  dKt+l
where Mt+i is the stochastic discount factor, defined as:
✓ \ 1/^-7
=  1
=  0
Mt+i = (3 Vt+i
UK?)1
(3.7)
(3.8)
We assume perfect labor markets, and therefore wages are equal to the marginal 
product of labor. Hence, it is optimal for the representative firm to employ the level 
of labor chosen by the social planner and supplied by the representative agent.
3.2.4 Financial implications
The focus of our analysis are equilibrium asset prices. In equilibrium the return on 
any asset i, R \ +15 satisfies
Et ( Mt+iRi+i )  =  1 
We define the one-period risk-free rate as
We consider two assets. First, a claim on the aggregate consumption stream and 
second, a claim on the dividends paid out by the firms who own the capital stock. 
The dividend stream at time t is defined as output net of investment and wages
Dt = Yt -  WtNt -  I t
Let Pt and P f  represent the price of the consumption claim and the dividend 
claim respectively. Then, the total returns on the assets can be defined as the sum of 
period flow and capital gain:
m +i = (Pt+i + Ct+i)/Ptc 
Pf+1 =  (Pf+i+Dt+i ) / P f
Alternatively, the return on firm equity can be computed from the profit maximiza­
tion problem of the representative firm (for instance, see Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer
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(2007)):
^  1/^ '( l^ ) + d‘+1
SH+l = '
W  (&)
where
,  _  ^t+i________ ^________ i t + i  ^V-^t+iy
if‘+1 ( ^ t) k<+1 (£?r)
Previous attempts, such as Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2007) and Croce (2008) 
have interpreted equity in the data as the claim on dividend stream paid by the firm. 
This interpretation is, to say the least, questionable as a direct counterpart for the 
stockmarket. Indeed, it has proved difficult for these papers to match the dynamics 
of the firm dividends to the actual stockmarket aggregate dividend in a model which 
reasonably describes the economy. This poor result could arise even in a model which 
prices the risks in the economy accurately.
We will discuss the co-movements of the dividend stream (as defined above) with 
macro aggregates implied by this model and show that in general they are very poor. 
We interpret this result as evidence against the use of dividend claim as the counterpart 
to stocks. We take the view that this restricted definition of equity has been a major 
obstacle in the previous attempts to reproduce the Bansal and Yaron (2004) results 
in a DSGE model. Thus, in this paper we restrict our focus to obtaining a realistic 
price of risk in the economy. One possible approach is to look at the risk premium 
and Sharpe ratio of the most generic asset - i.e. the consumption claim.32
3.3  In trod u cin g  A n ticip ated  Shocks
In this section we specify our model by introducing several anticipated shocks. Our 
framework is that of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008). Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) 
have a similar model in which they include news shocks. The focus of these papers 
is to reproduce the correct macro aggregate co-movements and in particular neither 
paper studies the asset pricing implications.
3.3.1 Long run risk and anticipated shocks
From the stochastic discount factor (3.9), we can see that (assuming that labor supply 
is inelastic) there are two priced factors in this economy. The first is the realized 
consumption growth which is the usual risk factor in the Consumption CAPM. The 
second is the deviation of value function from its expected value, which will occur
32It can be shown that the value of consumption claim represents aggregate wealth when leisure 
does not enter the utility function. The calibration we present in this paper assumes an inelastic labor 
supply and therefore, satisfies the condition above.
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if there are shocks to expected consumption growth. Under power utility, only the 
former factor is priced.
We refer to stochastic conditional expectation of a certain variable as long-run risk. 
Anticipated shocks are not the only way to create long-run risk in consumption. Indeed 
Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2007) show that persistent time variation in expected 
consumption growth is a salient feature of RBC models even with unanticipated i.i.d. 
productivity shocks provided the propensity to smooth consumption is not too high 
(EIS not too low). In other words consumption long-run risk arises endogenously. An 
obvious way to amplify the effect is to increase the persistence in productivity shocks, 
which gives rise to persistent future movements in consumption.
Our framework allows for persistence in TFP shocks. The main contribution of our 
paper is to introduce shocks that will increase productivity not immediately but only 
one or several periods in the future. They lead to an expected increase in consumption 
at the period when technology improvement is realized. The relative importance of 
substitution and income effects will determine the sizes of the immediate response of 
consumption to the shock and the response after the eventual productivity increase.
We see that the mechanism through which anticipated shocks give rise to high 
premia is closely related to long-run risk and crucially depends on the recursive pref­
erences assumption.
3.3.2 Structure of shocks
The stationary and non-stationary TFP shocks are autoregressive and subject to an­
ticipated (e1,^2,^3) and unanticipated (e0) innovations. This specification is taken 
from Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008).
x t =  (1  “  Pa )^A  +  Pa x \ -  1 +  £A,t +  £ A,t- 1 +  £A,t- 2 +  £A,t- 3
x t =  (1  -  P z ) ^ Z  +  P z x t - 1 +  £ Z,t +  £ Z,t- 1 +  £ Z,t- 2 +  £ Z,t- 3
The agent learns about innovation e t  at date t and it affects the productivity at the 
same date. Innovations £t-i>£t-2 i£t-3 are anticipated one, two and three periods 
ahead - they affect date-t productivity, but are in period t — 1, t — 2, and t  — 3
information sets respectively. Therefore, at date t the agent learns about 4 shocks
£t,£t,el and £2, affecting productivity immediately and in one, two and three periods 
ahead. We assume all shocks are independent.
Additional lagged innovations can easily be incorporated in to the recursive for­
mulation of the problem by increasing the number of state variables. The matrices 
Ho, Hi, and H<i of the VAR(l) representation of the shocks are given in the appendix 
(A.4).
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3.4  P ertu rb ation  M eth od s S o lu tion
We solve the model introduced in the previous section by expanding the value func­
tion, policy functions, and the laws of motion for the state variables around the non­
stochastic steady state. This is the standard practice in macroeconomic literature 
since the closed form solution of the model is known at this particular point in the 
state-space. We opt for perturbation methods as opposed to numerical methods such 
as value function iteration or projection for two reasons: First, we would like to inves­
tigate a problem with a large number of state variables. The high dimensionality of 
the problem makes numerical methods computationally infeasible. Furthermore, per­
turbation methods are attractive as they obtain (approximate) analytical expressions 
for state-evolution equations and policy functions. Caldara, Fern&ndez-Villaverde, 
Rubio-Ramfrez, and Yao (2008) document the accuracy of perturbation methods and 
compare them with alternative computational approaches.
We follow the procedure suggested by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) for finding 
a second-order approximation to the solution of a general class of discrete-time ratio­
nal expectations models. Their method applies to a large class of DSGE models in 
macroeconomics. We will briefly review this method below. Let the set of equilibrium 
conditions of the model we wish to approximate be written as
E t f  (yt+i, Vt, x t+i, x t) = 0  (3.10)
where Et denotes the mathematical expectations operator conditional on information 
available at time t. The vector xt of predetermined variables is of size nx x 1 and the 
vector yt of non-predetermined variables is of size ny x 1 . The state vector xt can 
be partitioned as Xt =  [x|; . The vector x\  consists of endogenous predetermined
state variables and the vector x \  of exogenous state variables. Specifically, we assume 
that x^ follows the exogenous stochastic process given by
x t+ i =  A x t +  w £t+ 1 ;
where both the vector xf  and the innovation et are of order n  x 1. The vector Et is 
assumed to be independently and identically distributed, with mean zero and vari­
ance/covariance matrix 7 .33 The scalar a and the n  x n  matrix fj are known parame­
ters .34
The solution to the recursively defined model is given by the equilibrium policy
33It is not neccessary to specify the exact distribution of the vector of shocks. For obtaining an n th 
order approximation, we only need to specify the first n  moments.
34a  can be thought of as a parameter scaling the size of uncertainty. Without loss of generality we 
can assume that a  is either 0, at the non-stochastic steady state, or equal to 1 otherwise.
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function for yt and the laws of motion for xf.
Vt = g(xt lar) (3.11)
xt+i = h(xt ,cr) +  crrjct+i (3.12)
We wish to approximate functions g and h around the non-stochastic steady state,
where a = 0 and x% =  x. We define the non-stochastic steady state as vectors {x\ y)
such that
f { y ,y ,x ,x )  = 0
Thus, finding a second order approximation to the solution equations (3.11) and (3.12) 
involves solving for elements of the (matrix) derivatives of g and h with respect to x  
and cr, in the Taylor expansion below:
g(xt ,cr) = g(x,0) + gx{x,Q) (x -  x) + g<j(x,Q)G
(x -  x)T gxx(x, 0 ) (x -  x)
(x -  x)T gxa(x, 0)<7
+ 2a9ax{x,0) ( x - x )
+ \g ss(x, o)<t2 
h(xt,cr) =  h(x, 0 ) -I- hx(x, 0 ) (x — x) +  ha(x, 0 )cr
1+ |  (x -  x)T hxx(x, 0 ) (x -  x)
(x -  x)T hX(7{x,0)a
+ -<jhcrX(x, 0 ) (x -  x) 
+ ^ h a(T(x,0)(j2
- \ T
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) offer an algorithm for finding the elements of 
these matrixes. This is achieved by differentiating (3.10) with respect to all elements 
of x  and the scalar a and evaluating the derivatives at the non-stochastic steady state. 
These obtain a system of equations, the solution to which are the elements of matrix 
derivatives of g and h. We refer the reader to these authors’ original paper for more 
details.
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) show that ga =  ha = gax = hax = 0. The fact 
that ga = ha = 0 implies that the first order approximation is not affected by the 
volatility of the shock. In other words volatility does not matter to the first order. 
This implies that to the first-order the unconditional mean of all variables are equal
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to the their value in the non-stochastic steady state of the model. This important 
implication makes it impossible to obtain risk-premia in a first-order approximated 
model. To gain intuition, note that in a non-stochastic world, all assets are risk-free 
and hence premia do not exist. Therefore, the first order approximation of a model 
cannot generate premia either, as volatilities do not enter the approximated form.
Moreover, gax = hax — 0 implies that a second-order approximation can only 
produce constant risk premia. Note that the only non-zero term involving a is 
^9(7(j(x,0)a2, which is constant over time. Therefore, a second-order approximation 
cannot produces time-varying risk premia. Furthermore, it can be shown that the 
risk aversion parameter 7  does not affect the non-stochastic steady state value (or 
the vector x ). Neither does it enter the expressions for hx or hxx evaluated at the 
non-stochastic steady-state. 7  only enters in the term ^haa(x, 0)a2. This means that, 
to the second order, risk aversion only affects the difference between the stochastic 
steady state and the non-stochastic steady states but not the dynamics of the vari­
ables. This result is intuitive given that variance of shocks only affect the difference 
between the stochastic and non-stochastic steady state and therefore 7 , which mea­
sures the sensitivity of agents to this risk, should also only show up in the terms where 
variance does.
We can apply perturbation of any order to any transformation of the variables. 
As it is standard in macroeconomics, we obtain a second order approximation to the 
logarithm of variables. The resulting policy functions are different from what would 
have obtained if the linearization was performed on levels. But the results are the 
same, up to the second order.
Since labour augmenting productivity process At has a unit root, the model econ­
omy is growing. In order to find a local approximation to the model solution around
a particular point we need to transform the problem into a stationary one. For any
variable Xt  inheriting the unit root, define Xt  as the variable normalized by the unit-
Xroot technology shock, so that Xt = —---- . Note that the utility function (3.1), the
At - 1
production function (3.2) and the capital stock (3.3) are all homogeneous of degree
one in Kt and At. As a consequence Vt is also homogeneous of degree one. Therefore, 
Vt ( ~ \
Vt = ----  = V  ( K t , x t ) . We obtain the stationary equilibrium by re-writing equa-
A t-i  \  /
tions (3.2) to (3.8) in terms of the new stationary variables. See appendix (A.2 ) for 
details.35
35 A technical note on the compatibility of our model with Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) solution 
is in order. In models with recursive utility, unlike those with time-additive preferences, the value 
function Vt (as well as the expression E t appear in the Euler equation, and therefore have
to be approximated. This has been problematic for several previous attempts to apply standard 
perturbation techniques to models with recursive preferences. We treat Vt and E t ( Vj+i7 ) as two
3 ASSE T PRICES IN  A NEW S DRIVEN RBC MODEL 107
3.5 C alibration  and R esu lts
The model produces macroeconomic aggregates such as output, consumption and 
investment, in addition to the standard financial moments. In this section, we present 
a calibrated version of the model in section 3.2, with one source of exogenous variation: 
the non-stationary TFP shock. We calibrate the break-down of the variance of this 
shock into different horizons of anticipation according to Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 
(2008), which to the best of our knowledge is the only study which estimates a DSGE 
model with news shocks. We compare the results with the data and show that the 
model is capable of producing large premia and low risk-free rates. Finally, we argue 
that including capacity utilization might improve the co-movements of macroeconomic 
variables.
We borrow our shock structure and the relative sizes of the innovations from the 
estimated RBC model in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008). However, it is worthwhile 
to emphasize that there are important differences between the model we consider and 
their estimated model, which makes it hard for us to compare our results to these 
authors’. First, we differ in our preference specifications. We assume Epstein-Zin 
preferences to study the effects of long-run risk, whereas Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 
(2008) assume habit formation in consumption and leisure. Second, the authors in­
troduce capacity utilization, which plays an important role in creating the correct 
co-movements of macro aggregates. These effects will be discussed in section 3.6. 
Third, (in the current version of the paper) we ignore labor supply decisions by as­
suming a perfectly inelastic labor supply.36 Despite these modeling differences, their 
exercise is uniquely useful to us for disciplining our calibration of anticipated shocks.
3.5.1 C alib ra tion
P a ram ete rs  Panel (A) of table (3.1) reports the values of the parameters which 
are constant across all models. All the parameters are calibrated at quarterly fre­
quency. This is the frequency often used in analyzing the business cycle properties of 
macroeconomic aggregates. We set a, the share of capital in the production function 
and depreciation rate of capital to standard values in business cycle literature (see 
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005)). The mean technology growth rate is set 
such that the output growth of the economy is around 2% annually. In this paper,
control variables in vector yt and add two additional equilibrium conditions: these are the definition 
of the value function and the value of Et > both evaluated in the non-stochastic steady state.
36 Our model and solution method allow for endogenous labor supply. In general, including labor 
allows for an extra dimension along which agents can smooth consumption and hence makes it a 
harder task to match the observed premia. On the other hand, calibrating the employment dynamics 
jointly with the asset pricing implications of our model is an interesting exercise. In an extension to 
this work we intend to investigate this issue further. The only other asset pricing paper we know of 
in which labor enters recursive preferences is Bakus, Routledge and Zin (2007).
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we assume a perfectly inelastic labor supply, i.e. we set 77 =  0  and fix the size of the 
labor force at 1 .
Panel (B) describes the calibration of some parameters in the benchmark case. 
We set r ,  or the parameter governing the amount of adjustment costs to match the 
relative volatility of investment to output. We find that unlike typical calibrations of 
RBC models, investment is not too volatile relative to output in our model. Thus, in 
our calibration we set this cost to be zero (corresponding to an infinitely large value 
for t ) .  This is also the finding by Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2007). In their model 
with non-stationary TFP shocks (which the authors refer to as LRRII) r  is set at 18. 
This elasticity is so high that the resulting investment volatility is virtually the same 
as if t  was assumed to be infinitely large.
We choose 7  =  10 for our benchmark calibration, similar to Bansal and Yaron 
(2004). We reproduce our results for 7  =  7.5 -  the other value considered in that 
paper -  and show that lower risk aversion only reduces premia and raises the risk 
free rate (which can be brought down by re-calibrating the discount factor), and very 
little else (see table (3.4) for the results). The fact that macroeconomic time series are 
unaffected by the coefficient of relative risk aversion has been pointed out by Tallarini 
(2000).
Finally, we calibrate the discount factor ft is calibrated as the inverse of steady 
state risk-free rate.
Shocks Our model is (potentially) driven by two exogenous forces: the station­
ary productivity shock (Zt) and the non-stationary productivity shock (At). In our 
benchmark calibration we set the volatility of stationary shocks, Zt , equal to zero. As 
we will demonstrate in detail in section 3.8.1, these shocks only contribute to higher 
output volatility without raising consumption volatility and thus creating too little 
volatility of consumption relative to output compared to the data. This also means 
that stationary shocks have virtually no effect on premia.
The non-stationary TFP shock is subject to anticipated and unantic­
ipated (e^) innovations. We use the estimated properties of the non-stationary TFP 
shocks described in the estimation exercise of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008). The 
authors also include investment specific productivity shocks and government shocks 
in their model. However, after estimating the full information model, they show that 
productivity shocks (stationary and non-stationary) account for 98% of output growth 
volatility and 100% of consumption growth volatility. This suggests that ignoring in­
vestment specific and government shocks in our model should have little effect on our 
predictions about business cycle properties of macroeconomic time-series.
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Table (3.2) reproduces the estimated variances for all of the components of the 
non-stationary shock, reported in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008). These estimates 
are obtained using a Bayesian estimation method. We weigh all the variances by a 
factor k to achieve the level of consumption volatility observed in the data. The three 
columns in this table show the mean, 5% and 95% estimates of each parameter.
3.5.2 Results
Table (3.3) contains the main results of our benchmark calibration exercise. The 
empirical moments, except for the unconditional mean of consumption growth rate, 
are taken from Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2007) and pertain to annual U.S. sample 
from 1929-1998. The unconditional mean of per capita consumption growth rate is 
the annualized mean, obtained using BEA quarterly data on per capita consumption 
from 1948QI-1998QIV.
Looking at the macro variables in panel (A), we observe that the model matches 
the volatility of consumption, but volatility of output is slightly higher than in the 
data. Investment volatility (as a share of output volatility) is also very close to the 
data. The accurate volatility of investment means that we do not need to include 
adjustment costs. Adjustment costs are often incorporated into RBC models as a way 
to dampen the volatility of investment in response to shocks to levels observed in the 
data and also create hump-shaped responses to monetary and TFP shocks (see, for 
instance, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005)). But in our model, we achieve 
the correct investment volatility without adjustment costs.37
In general we believe that real frictions such as capital adjustment costs are a re­
alistic feature of the economy and are necessary to explain a number macroeconomic 
stylized facts. However, in this paper we show that some of the implications of includ­
ing real frictions in an RBC model can also be achieved by assuming a richer shock 
structure instead. A good example would be the volatility of investment. It is well un­
derstood that the volatility of investment obtained from an RBC without adjustment 
costs is too low compared to the date. This was the original motivation for including 
adjustment costs. Including anticipated shocks allows investment to respond to future 
shocks as well the realized one, therefore decreasing the volatility of investment for a 
given exogenous productivity volatility assumed.
The model also matches the financial data relatively well. The level of risk free 
rate is in line with the data, but its volatility is slightly lower. There is no empirical 
counterpart for the consumption claim and therefore its risk premium. However, the
37Adjustment costs are useful for other features they generate in an RBC model. They give agents 
an incentive to respond immediately to news about future fundamentals (see, e.g., Jaimovich and 
Rebello, 2007) and are necessary to create the correct comovements in response to investment specific 
shocks (see, e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2001).
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Sharpe-ratio of this asset, which represents the price of one unit of risk associated 
with the consumption claim, is higher than the Sharpe-ratio of stockmarket returns. 
This implies that our model has no difficulty in assigning a price to consumption risk 
which is of the same order of magnitude as in the data. We view this as the major 
achievement of our model.
Note that in Bansal and Yaron (2004) specification, achieving a high variance of 
excess returns is possible since the volatility of dividend growth is calibrated. In the 
data, dividend growth volatility is much higher than consumption growth volatility 
(see table (3.5)). One way to reconcile this issue, is to interpret the stock-market 
as leveraged consumption claim, a view often taken in the consumption-based asset 
pricing literature. See for example the discussion in Barro (2005). Adopting this view, 
we can choose the leverage parameter in order to match the stock-market volatility 
and magnify the consumption claim premium accordingly. We choose to look directly 
at Sharpe-ratios.
The model is less successful in explaining the co-movements of macroeconomic time 
series. In the model, consumption and output do not co-move as strongly as in the 
data. Introducing capacity utilization and increasing adjustment costs will increase 
this co-movements as output also responds to future news about productivity. The 
same is true for the co-movements of consumption and investment. As we will discuss 
in detail below, the response of consumption is hump-shaped. Therefore, anything 
that would generate the same type of response in investment and output will increase 
the co-movements of these two variables with consumption.
3.6 T h e D yn am ic E ffects o f  A n tic ip a ted  Shocks
In this section we present the impulse response of the variables of interest to different 
shocks in the economy. First, we study the impulse response of macro aggregates and 
compare them to the standard RBC model. We then look at the response of financial 
variables. In particular we show explicitly, why the claim on the stream of dividends 
paid out by firms (with the Cobb-Douglas technology specified in the model) is not a 
suitable theoretical counterpart for the empirical market returns.
3.6.1 Response of macroeconomic variables
Figure (3.1) displays the impulse responses to two types of non-stationary TFP shock, 
namely an unanticipated and a one-quarter anticipated shock to the non-stationary 
component of total factor productivity (e^, shown in solid and e \ ,  shown in crossed 
line respectively). All variables are measured in percent deviation from the de-trended 
non-stochastic steady state.
3 ASSE T PRICES IN  A NEWS DRIVEN RBC MODEL 111
The response to the 1-quarter anticipated non-stationary shock is shown with a 
crossed line in figure (3.1). TFP remains at the steady state level until period 2 
and stays high thereafter. Nevertheless, consumption increases in anticipation of the 
increase in TFP next period. Note that output does not increase. This is because TFP 
has not changed and capital is also fixed. Given that there are no adjustment costs, 
it is optimal to increase investment when productivity rises. However, due to higher 
consumption and constant output, there are less resources available for investment. 
Therefore, capital stock falls slightly and then rises (this pattern will be reflected in 
dividend flows, as we will observe later).
The solid line in figure (3.1) shows the response to the unanticipated non-stationary 
TFP shock. Note that the different final level of At in response to anticipated and 
unanticipated innovations is due to the different variances of the two shocks. The 
responses are qualitatively the same as in the anticipated case. Output rises in pe­
riod 1, when TFP rises and stays higher permanently. Consumption also gradually 
moves towards a higher level. Unlike the anticipated case however, capital increases 
monotonically as period zero capital is fixed and output is higher at period 1 already.
Figure (3.2) shows the response to a three-quarter anticipated stationary TFP 
shock (crossed line) and the response to an unanticipated stationary TFP shock (solid 
line). Even though in calibrating our benchmark model we eliminate stationary shocks, 
it is interesting to analyze the response of variables of interest to such shocks. In re­
sponse to the anticipated shock, consumption rises immediately, even though the TFP 
increase has not materialized. Between the announcement and the actual increase in 
productivity, output is roughly constant, decreasing only slightly due to the decreas­
ing capital stock and capital decreases for the same reason as above: The absence 
of adjustment costs do not bring forward future needs to increase investment. But 
higher consumption, without an increase in output results in a temporary reduction 
in investment and capital stock levels. The capital stock rises slowly after the shock 
is materialized.
Note that this model does not produce the hump-shaped response of output in 
response to stationary TFP shocks, which is typically found in VAR studies (but it 
does create a hump-shaped response in consumption). Other authors mainly focusing 
on business cycle responses of aggregate variables, such as Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 
(2008) and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) obtain these responses by including adjust­
ment costs and capacity utilization .38 Adjustment costs in investment imply that if
38The specification of adjustment costs in this paper penalizes the level of investment (for instnace, 
see Chari, Kehoe and McGratten (2000)). Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001) claim that it is 
difficult to account for the hump-shaped response of investment with this type of adjustment costs 
and thus, these authors and many others in the RBC literature use an adjustment cost function which 
penalizes the change in investment.
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the optimal level of investment is about to rise in the future, agents increase invest­
ment today in order to arrive in the period with high productivity with a high level 
of capital stock, therefore, avoiding adjustment costs of rapid changes in investment. 
Allowing for variable capacity utilization also implies that output rises upon receiving 
the news about higher future productivity and in response to higher consumption and 
investment demand. Therefore allowing for these features can generate hump-shaped 
responses in output and investment as well as consumption.
3.6.2 Response o f financial variables
The bottom two panels of figures (3.1) and (3.2) show the response of premia on the 
consumption claim and risk free rates to the four shocks we analyzed. In response 
to shocks to the non-stationary TFP, the premia on the consumption claim rises. 
Note that this occurs for both anticipated and unanticipated shocks at the same time. 
Indeed, we expect this to be the case as anticipated shocks to asset prices should 
be arbitraged away. The magnitude of the effect is much larger for the anticipated 
shock, for it has a larger standard deviation and thus a larger final adjustment to 
consumption level.
Anticipated shocks are a natural channel through which we can explain the asset 
prices lead of the business cycle. This pattern has been reported in a number of 
empirical studies. Most recently this has been documented by Backus, Routledge, and 
Zin (2007) who show that both equity prices and term spreads lead the business cycle. 
Because asset prices are forward-looking, news about the future are incorporated in 
them but might not be reflected in the macroeconomic quantities as the anticipated 
shocks are yet to realize. Prices may contain more information than the history of 
macro variables. This is the simplest theoretical way to account for the predictive 
power of financial variables.
The risk free rate also rises as all the agents try to borrow against future wealth to 
increase consumption today. In response to an anticipated shock to the non-stationary 
TFP, the major increase in the risk free rate occurs a period before the TFP shock 
is realized. The increase in TFP will bring about a large increase in consumption, 
and thus risk-free rate increases as all agents try to bring forward part of this wealth 
effect.
The response to the stationary TFP shock is qualitatively similar. Again, the 
excess return on the consumption claim increases immediately for the unanticipated 
shock and at the time of news release for the anticipated shock. The risk free rate rises 
immediately in response to the unanticipated shock. In response to the anticipated 
shock, the risk free rate only rises moderately once the news arrives but the large 
increase occurs the period before consumption increases due to the realization of the 
shock.
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3.6.3 B ehavior of d iv idend flows
In this section we analyze the behavior of dividend flows. Dividends are calculated as 
firms’ excess output after paying wages and investment expenditure:
D  =  r K  — I  = C — wL  (3.13)
This is the specification used in previous papers which considered asset prices in a 
production economy (see Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2007) and Croce (2008)). 
These papers are less successful in generating the correct size, volatility and co­
movements of dividends with other variables than in generating the key features of 
macro variables. We show that given the specification above the claim on dividend 
flows is not a good measure for stock market returns and thus it is difficult to gen­
erate asset pricing implications similar to those in Bansal and Yaron (2004), where 
the authors assume the properties of dividend growth. A major difficulty arises from 
the fact that dividend flows, as defined in (3.13), are negative in many periods, i.e. 
they flow from households to firms. This finding is counter-factual. As emphasized 
before, it is important to isolate the assumptions about the production function and 
industrial organization of markets from dividends. This allows us to focus on pricing 
of risk in general as opposed to a particular type of asset.
Im pulse response of d ividends Figure (3.3) shows the response of de-trended 
dividend flows in response to the four types of TFP shocks analyzed above (e^, e \ ,  e°z 
and e\, clockwise from the top). In response to an unanticipated shock to TFP (both 
stationary and non-stationary), dividend flows fall. Given the definition of dividends 
from (3.13) above, a mechanical explanation for this decrease is the following: in 
response to an increase in TFP investment grows whereas capital (K ) is fixed. More 
intuitively, dividends are cut back to fund investment. In the periods after the shock, 
dividends will increase again as the return to the extra capital accumulated is paid 
out to investors and dividends eventually go back to their steady state.
An alternative explanation is that in the presence of high EIS, the substitution ef­
fect dominates the income effect and therefore the agent increasingly wants to make use 
of the higher TFP in the future (permanently, in the case of A t shocks and temporar­
ily in the case of Zt shocks). Thus, he increases investment which diverts resources 
away from dividend payments. When the EIS is high enough (as is the case in our 
calibration), in fact dividend payments can be negative; i.e. the household diverts 
resources to the firm in order to fund future investment.
The panels on the right in figure (3.3) show the response of dividend flows to an 
anticipated TFP shock. When the news of a future shock to TFP arrives, the agent 
increases his consumption at the cost of investment. This means that resources are 
transferred from the firm to the household to fund consumption. On the other hand,
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when the shock is materialized, the resources have to be transferred back to the firm 
in order to fund the increase in investment.
These dynamics are counter-factual. The assets held by stockmarket participants 
almost never have negative dividend flows. In general, we argue that the claim on the 
dividends paid out by a representative firm is not a good counterpart for equity in the 
real world. One of the conceptual difficulties of studying equity premia in an RBC 
model has been the definition of a counterpart for equity in the model. The common 
approach is to look at the marginal product of capital or the return on the dividend 
claim. We argue that this has some undesirable implications. Most importantly, it 
does not allow us to separate the asset pricing part of the model from the employment 
and wages part (which is not the focus of such papers). This comes about because 
dividends are defined as consumption minus wages, and therefore a model generating 
realistic consumption dynamics but failing on employment and wages, will inevitably 
produce unrealistic dividends and thus asset pricing implications.
A good alternative approach is to explicitly model equity and debt as in Gomes 
and Schmid (2009). The authors embed an endogenous capital structure model in a 
simplified production economy in order to study the lead of asset prices and spreads 
over the business cycle. We aim to incorporate capital structure in our framework as 
a future extension. In this paper, we circumvent the imperfect modeling of the labor 
market by focusing on the most generic asset i.e. the consumption claim.
C orre la tion  of d iv idend and  consum ption  grow th In their benchmark model, 
Bansal and Yaron (2004) achieve asset pricing implications that are much closer to 
what is observed in the data than previous attempts. They assume an endowment 
economy and thus are able to calibrate the process for consumption and dividend 
growth according to the salient features of these two series in the data. In order to 
generate the results in their paper in a general equilibrium setting, a model should 
be able to obtain the correct moments for consumption growth and dividend growth 
processes as closely as possible. Table (3.5), column 2, summarizes five important sta­
tistics in the data from Bansal and Yaron (2004). Column 3 summarizes the counter­
parts these authors generate in their calibrated model (under their Case I calibration, 
without stochastic volatility).
Columns 4 and 5 show the counterparts of these moments generated under our 
benchmark calibration. The “dividend claim” column reports these values when equity 
is interpreted as a claim on all future dividends paid by the firm. The “consumption 
claim” column reports the statistics for the same model, but when equity is interpreted 
as the claim on future consumption instead.
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The properties of the consumption process are clearly unaffected by the choice 
between the two models. The properties of what is interpreted as dividend varies sig­
nificantly. Volatility of firm dividend growth is much closer to the data compared to 
the volatility of consumption growth. This is reflected in the low volatility of excess 
returns in table (3.3). On the other hand, dividend growth shows very little auto­
correlation and more importantly, close to no correlation with consumption growth.
3.7  D iscu ssion
3.7.1 The role of EIS
The pricing of long-run risk in Bansal and Yaron (2004) economy can be understood by 
looking at assets as both intertemporal and interstate consumption smoothing devices. 
Bhamra and Uppal (2006) provide a good intuition for the respective role of RRA 
and EIS in portfolio-consumption choice: A positive shock to expected consumption 
growth increases wealth to consumption ratio, which adjusts through movements in 
wealth since consumption is exogenous. This adjustment depends on the size of the 
EIS. If the substitution effect dominates the wealth effect, i.e. EIS>1, the agent would 
like to hold more of the asset, thus driving prices up. Otherwise (when EIS<1) the 
agent prefers bringing the increase in consumption forward, depressing prices.
How does this matter for risk premia? Shocks to expected consumption growth af­
fect expected future returns to wealth. The agent with RRA>1 wants to hedge against 
these changes in the investment opportunity set (and bet on them if RRA<1). Notice 
that RRA and 1/EIS are comparable measures of propensity to smooth consumption 
across states and time respectively. Therefore if RRA=1/EIS (CRRA) the changes 
in wealth-consumption ratio exactly offset the hedging demand. With Epstein-Zin 
preferences there can be a wedge between RRA and 1/EIS which will translate into 
premia. As an example, consider an agent with EIS and RRA>1, exposed to a pos­
itive shock to expected consumption growth. The intertemporal substitution effect 
drives up asset prices. The hedging demand effect would imply that the agent wants 
his portfolio to depreciate. Therefore a premium is required for the agent to hold the 
asset in equilibrium (See (Malkhozov 2009) for a formal argument). If consumption 
and dividends are correlated the results for the pricing of aggregate risk carry forward 
to the risk premium for the claim on aggregate dividends.
Figure (3.4) summarizes these effects. Each panel displays how the main moments 
in the economy vary as we increase ^  from 0.1 to 2. The rest of the parameters are 
held constant as in our benchmark calibration. The top right panel shows that as ip 
increases the risk premium on consumption claim rises. Moreover, the importance of 
the long-run risk increases with increased wedge between 7  and l/ift as the agent is
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willing to resolve intertemporal risk sooner. Overall the two effects do not cancel each 
other and the risk premium for the consumption claim (aggregate wealth) goes up. 
These effects are demonstrated in figure (3.4).
The second panel in figure (3.4) shows that the risk-free rate also falls with the 
EIS. This is intuitive: as EIS increases the agent cares less about the volatility of his 
consumption across time. Thus, he does not have a strong desire to borrow in order 
to bring forward future increases in his consumption, and therefore driving down the 
risk free rate.
The volatility of consumption growth decreases monotonically with EIS. This can 
be understood by looking at the response of consumption growth to a shock to the per­
manent component of TFP. As emphasized by Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2007), in 
response to a positive shock to the non-stationary TFP, consumption growth jumps to 
a higher level, increasing towards its higher steady state value gradually. The higher 
the EIS the lower this initial jump, and thus the lower the unconditional volatility 
of consumption growth. In other words, in response to a permanent TFP shock, the 
agents with higher EIS choose to have small realized consumption growth but large 
expected consumption growth.
We must distinguish between the unconditional volatility of consumption growth 
and the conditional volatility of consumption growth. The former is the variable 
displayed in the panel 3 of figure (3.4). The latter is the variable emphasized in 
Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2007) in the context of asset pricing implications. Also 
note that the monotonicity of the variation in consumption growth volatility with 
EIS is very specific to the our assumptions about the shocks. In general consumption 
growth volatility can vary non-monotonically with EIS.
The increase in autocorrelation of consumption with higher values of EIS is con­
sistent with the intuition above. With higher values of EIS, and in response to TFP 
shocks, the agents make smaller adjustment to consumption initially, but expect a 
large adjustment in consumption in the long-run. Another way of looking at this is 
that with low values of EIS the wealth effect dominates and the agent increases his 
consumption immediately rather than invest to take advantage of the positive tech­
nology shock. Consumption growth is not spread through time but occurs (close to) 
instantaneously with a volatility close to that of the productivity shock. Therefore 
the unconditional volatility of consumption is high and the persistence of consumption 
growth is low. Raising EIS decreases the short-run component of risk and increases 
the long-run component.
Correlation of output and consumption growth also increases. As we observed in 
the impulse responses, the response of output is delayed. In response to anticipated 
shocks, in fact output does not respond until the shock is realized. Therefore, the more
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delayed the response of output to TFP shocks, the higher the correlation between 
consumption and output. We argued that by increasing EIS the expected growth in 
consumption becomes larger relative to the instantaneous consumption adjustment. 
This is consistent with the rising correlation between output and consumption growth.
3.8  T h e  role o f  an tic ip ated  shocks
In this section, we discuss the relative effect of anticipated and unanticipated shocks 
to TFP on macro and financial variables. We have introduced news shocks in the RBC 
setting in order to account for the strong empirical evidence that most of the changes 
to productivity are anticipated one or several quarters in advance. The motivation for 
allowing news shocks is twofold. First, it is a reasonable generalization, especially when 
studying asset prices, that the information set of the agents contains more information 
than the current and the past realizations of the productivity shocks. Furthermore, 
there is strong empirical evidence which shows that anticipated shocks are important 
in explaining macroeconomic and financial variables. In a VAR study Beaudry and 
Portier (2006) find that technology shocks are first captured by stock prices before they 
affect productivity. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008) find that anticipated (stationary 
and non-stationary) shocks explain close to 70% of the variance of output growth, 
over 80% of the variance in consumption growth, and close to 50% of the variance 
in investment growth. As explained in detail in section 3.5, the authors estimate 
the relative importance of different shocks within an RBC model. In this paper we 
take their suggested estimates on the relative importance of these shocks and ask how 
introducing anticipation (or enlarging the agents’ information set) in an otherwise 
simple RBC framework affects quantities, prices and price-quantity co-movements 
compared to the model with unanticipated shocks only.
We answer this question using two measures. First, we look at the variance de­
composition (for trended variables), or level decomposition (for stationary variables). 
Second, following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008), we look at the pure “anticipation 
effect”, by changing the information set of households to separate their actions into 
response to news (anticipation effect) and response to the realization of a shock.
D ecom posing th e  effects of an tic ip a ted  shocks Table (3.6) shows the contri­
bution of each of the four shocks in our calibration to variables of interest. Columns 
(1 ) and (2 ) show the share of variance of consumption and output growth attributable 
to each of the four shocks. The one-quarter ahead anticipated shock explains about 
60% of the variance of output and consumption. Column (3) shows the reduction 
in risk-free rate compared to a non-stochastic economy, attributable to each shock. 
Again, e \  has the largest effect on risk-free rate. Finally, column (4) breaks down the 
excess return of the consumption claim into its components.
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Overall, the anticipated shocks explain about 95% of consumption and output 
volatility in our calibration. They also reduce the risk-free rate by over 300 basis 
points relative to the non-stochastic case and account for 97% of the premia generated 
by the model.
A ntic ipa tion  effect To understand the importance of anticipated shocks in creating 
long-run risk and their effect on financial variables, we find it useful to decompose 
anticipated shocks into an “anticipation” and “realization” effect, as put by Schmitt- 
Grohe and Uribe (2008). The anticipation effect is changes in behavior triggered by 
the arrival of a news about future without any physical variable being affected. The 
realization effect occurs when the shock materializes. We observed some of these effects 
qualitatively when studying the impulse response of variables of interest to anticipated 
and unanticipated shocks. For instance in response to news about a future increase 
in TFP capital falls whereas it starts rising when TFP in fact increases. Thus, the 
anticipation effect is a fall in capital whereas the realization effect is an increase in 
capital.
Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008) we decompose these two effects by 
eliminating the anticipation channel, and comparing all variable in a “no anticipation” 
world to those of the benchmark economy. The difference must be due to the pure 
anticipation effect. To do so, we change the information set of households such that 
they can only learn about shocks on the period that they occur. In other words, we 
replace the law of motion of the non-stationary TFP shock as follows:
A In At = arj+ 1  =  A +  vA,t
but now replace the variance of vA,t with the sum of all of its anticipated and unan­
ticipated components. In other words,
«tf, = W l)a + W t)2 + (<d)a + W i)2
This economy is identical to the baseline model with anticipated shocks introduced 
earlier, except for the timing with which the agents learn about the shocks.39 Table 
(3.7) reproduces all the results in table (3.3) under the no-anticipation calibration.
We observe that without anticipated shocks the volatility of consumption rises, 
and therefore volatility of investment falls. The volatility of output is the same as in 
the benchmark model given that the variance of productivity shocks are kept constant. 
We also observe, that without anticipated shocks, the risk-free rate rises and the excess 
return of consumption claim falls by 0.8%. The intuition for these two results are the 
following: by eliminating anticipated shocks in our model, we shut down a main source
39For more details, we refer the reader to section 6 of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008) paper
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of expected consumption growth risk -  or long-run risk in consumption. Thus, there 
is less incentive for buffer-stock savings and risk-free rates rise. The fall in premia 
could be due to lower amount of risk, or, lower price of a unit of risk. As observed 
from table (3.7), the amount of risk associated with this asset, i.e. the volatility of 
consumption growth, in fact rises slightly compared to the benchmark case. Thus, all 
of the fall must be due to a lower price of risk. The lower price of risk can also be 
explained by the absence of anticipated shocks. To understand this, consider a special 
example: In an endowment economy where consumption is subject to i.i.d. shocks, 
shocks to consumption growth are entirely “realized”; i.e. the expected consumption 
growth is always the same as in the steady state. This model has no long-run risk.
A production economy generated long-run risk in a few ways: consumption smooth­
ing always implies that shocks to today’s productivity show up as persistent consump­
tion growth. Furthermore, persistence in TFP itself creates some movement in the 
expected consumption growth. Anticipated shocks, as explained before, are yet an­
other avenue for generating expected consumption growth. By eliminating anticipated 
shocks, shocks to consumption do not have a “news” component and are therefore less 
undesirable. This intuition is confirmed by the lower premia.
The largest difference is the correlations between output and consumption growth. 
As explained earlier, in our specification there is no reason to bring future increases 
in output forward, and thus in response to news about future shocks output remains 
roughly constant until the realization of the shock. Whereas consumption rises imme­
diately upon the arrival of the news. Thus, allowing for anticipated shocks weakens 
the correlation between consumption and output growth.
3.8.1 Stationary TFP Shocks
In the Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008) calibration stationary TFP shocks play an 
important role. They account for 6 6 % percent of output growth fluctuations and about 
40% of consumption growth fluctuations. An important question is how eliminating 
them will affect our results. Table (3.9) reproduces the results in table (3.3) for a 
model with stationary as well as non-stationary TFP shocks. The non-stationary 
shocks are calibrated as before. We calibrate the stationary TFP shocks according to 
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008) estimates. They are reproduced in table (3.8). We 
multiply all variances (stationary and non-stationary) with a factor n! in order to keep 
the standard deviation of consumption growth constant.
We observe that the volatility of output growth has increased nearly twofold, 
even though the volatility of consumption is the same. This means that the ratio of 
consumption to output volatility is counterfactually low. The risk free rate is not much 
different despite the additional risk that the economy is exposed to. And surprisingly,
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premia are lower. Given these findings, and our current specification we find that a 
model without stationary shocks will fit the data better and hence stationary shocks 
are excluded from our benchmark calibration.
3.8.2 A lternative Preferences
Habit formation has been advanced as an important alternative to the standard pref­
erences specification in both consumption-based asset pricing and RBC models. We 
take the view that the Epstein-Zin utility specification imposes less structure on the 
preferences of the agent than the habit formation specification, as it only assumes con­
stant EIS and RRA coefficients. Models with habit formation claim a partial success 
in the Lucas-tree setup: they achieve high equity risk premia at the cost of volatile 
interest rates. However, simply introducing habit formation in a production economy 
does not generate the desired asset pricing implications. The agent has a strong desire 
for smoothing consumption yet he can achieve this without generating fluctuations in 
equity returns (see Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001)).
In the context of a news-driven business cycle Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008) 
and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) both assume habit formation utility functions (al­
beit with some differences) in order to match the macro-economic co-movements. In 
particular the preferences are designed in such a way to mitigate the wealth effects 
of an anticipated productivity shock and generate a boom in investment in response 
to it. The Epstein-Zin preferences address this issue, at least partially, since the EIS 
coefficient is set to be greater than 1 .
A related work by Rudebusch and Swanson (2008a), Rudebusch and Swanson 
(2008b) compares the performance of DSGE models with habit formation vs. recur­
sive preferences and nominal long-run risks for the pricing of bonds. The authors 
find that the model with Epstein-Zin preferences produces better joint results for the 
macroeconomic variables and the bond yields.
3.9  C onclusions
In this paper we study the asset pricing implications of a stochastic growth model with 
recursive preferences and a general shock structure, which allows for news shocks. The 
aim is to investigate whether asset prices obtained in an endowment economy with 
long-run risk (such as Bansal and Yaron (2004)) can be replicated in a production 
economy framework.
The model is subject to stationary and non-stationary TFP shocks, each of which 
have an unanticipated component as well as anticipated components at 1, 2, and 3 
quarter horizons. We solve the model by a second order perturbation technique. We
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use the framework introduced by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and show how the 
generic code they develop for approximating DSGE models can be applied to models 
with recursive preferences.
Our benchmark calibration can match the main macroeconomic moments in the 
data such as volatility of consumption, output, and investment growth. It also pro­
duces financial moments close to those observed in the data: low risk free rates, with 
volatility close to that observed in the data; risk premia of around 4.5% annually 
(compared to 6.5% in the data). We achieve these results without resorting to un­
usual parameter values for EIS or risk aversion. In our benchmark calibration, we 
choose an EIS of 1.5 and a risk aversion coefficient of 10 which corresponds to the 
benchmark calibration of Bansal and Yaron (2004).
Both the volatility of excess returns and the risk premium of consumption claim 
are lower for consumption claim than it is empirically observed for equity. However, 
the stock-market is not the empirical counterpart of the consumption claim. For the 
latter, the model is successful in generating a high Sharpe-ratio.
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008) show that news shocks are important in explain­
ing business cycle movements of the main macroeconomic variables. In this paper, 
we discuss their asset pricing implications. We show that news shocks increase the 
endogenous long-run risk in consumption. Under Epstein-Zin preferences these risks 
will be priced, therefore creating much larger premia compared to a case where all 
shocks are unanticipated.
From our results, we conclude that sufficient long-run risk can endogenously arise 
in a production economy with the right ingredients. The importance of anticipated 
shocks is recently emphasized in the macro literature. The contribution of this paper 
is to note that these shocks can be thought of as a source of long-run risk and have 
important asset pricing implications.
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A  A p p en d ix
A .l  Equilibrium Conditions
The first order conditions with respect to consumption and labor are respectively:
( i - i v ^ a - v v - J c - v *  =  - 0 E t { y ^ ^ \ t { v tzXVKt+^ ^ y z - u )
The envelope condition with respect to capital implies
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Combining first order conditions (3.14) and (3.15), we obtain the condition for optimal 
consumption-leisure trade-off
N \d K t+ 1  dKt+i
Finally, the Euler equation can be derived by combining first order conditions (3.14) 
and (3.15), and transversality conditions
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A .2 Stationary Form and the Steady State
XDefining the stationary version of a variable X t as Xt, where Xt = —A and defining
A t-i
the stationary version of the value function as Vt, where Vt = V (K t,A t, Z t,fit) we can 
re-define the the equilibrium point of the model in terms of the stationary variables. 
Since the value function is homogeneous of degree one in Kt and At
V (K t , At , Zt , *(_1’" 2)) =  A t - iV f - j ^ - ,  - A - ,  Zt , x t h~2))
A t ~  i  A t - 1
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The optimality conditions can be rewritten as
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The capital evolution equation and investment become
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Finally, the non-stationary technology shock is normalized as below, whereas the 
other stationary state variables remain unchanged.
In At+i = x]+l 
In Zt+i = x 2t+l
xt+i = Hq + H\Xt +  fyct+ i
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The solution for the non-stochastic steady state can be expressed in closed form
N
x
A
Z
k
Y
I
V  
Q
const
( I - H ^ 1 H0
exp (a;1) 
exp (a:2)
= (iiv)
olZ
a — 1
1—a _
K az ( a a t ) '  
( A - ( 1 - 8 ) ) K  
- C _1( 1 -  N)(  1 -  a )Z A 1-°‘N - aK a
1 - 4
1 - , 8A1-*
=  V l~7
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A .3 Scaling the Value Function
In practice value function can take very large or very small values. These would be
magnified when evaluating the term Et which appears in the Euler equation.
This can be problematic when numerically evaluating the model. To avoid this issue,
we scale the value function such that V  takes a reasonable value in the non-stochastic
i —l
steady state. We note that pre-multiplying ut  ^ by a constant A scales the value
function by A1-^ . Moreover this does not have any effect on equilibrium quantities 
or prices.
Vt = max ( a  ( ( 1  -  
Therefore, we choose A such that at the steady state V = V1 - 7  =  1 .
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A.4 The Structure for Anticipated Shocks
Anticipated productivity shocks can be represented as a VAR(l). We present only 
the non-stationary shocks, as is the case in our benchmark calibration. Adding the 
stationary shocks is very similar, but are omitted for parsimonious presentation.
In At+i -  In A t = x]+1
%t+ 1 — H o  +  H \ x t  +  H 2c t+ i
where
( x\ \ 
£A,t
F 2£A,t
F 3£A,t
F 2£A , t - l
F 3£A,t- 1
V X 1- 2I
where elA t , e ^ t ,and e \ t are respectively the 1-quarter-, 2-quarter- and 3-quarter-ahead 
anticipated component of the non-stationary TFP shock. Also, the autoregressive 
matrixes are defined as:
H0 =
/ (1 — Pa ) ^ a ^ { Pa 1 0 0 1 0 1 \ I a A 0 0 0 \
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a l 0
0 H 1 = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 h 2 = 0 0 0 a l
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 ) 0 0 0 0 1 0 ) \ 0 0 0 0 /
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Table 3.1: Model Calibration
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Panel A: Basic Parameters Calibration (Quarterly)
Parameter Description Value
a Capital share in production function 0.34
6 Depreciation of capital 0.025
A Mean technology growth rate 0 .6 %
'n Curvature on leisure 0
N Size of labor supply 1
tP EIS 1.5
Panel B: Calibration of the Benchmark Model 
Parameter Description Value
/3 Discount factor 0.995
r  Adjustment cost parameter oo
7  Coefficient of risk aversion 10
This table reports our calibrated parameters. The parameter values in panel (A) are kept 
constant throughout the models. The parameters in panel (B) pertain to our benchmark 
calibration. The time unit is a quarter.
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Table 3.2: Calibrating the Non-stationary TFP Shocks
Mean 5 percent 95 percent
Pa 0.14 0 .0 0.27
A  W 0.59 0.05 1.4
A  (%) 2.3 1 .6 3.0
A  (%) 1.3 0 .2 2.4
A  (%) 1 .1 0 .1 2 .0
K 1.52 — —
This table reports Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008) estimates of the variance and autocorrela­
tion coefficient of the non-stationary TFP shock. Their results are based on 4 million elements 
of a MCMC chain of draws from the posterior distribution. In our calibration we weight all 
the variances by a factor k to obtain a variance in consumption which is the same as in the 
data.
3 ASSET PRICES IN  A NEW S DRIVEN RBC MODEL
Table 3.3: Benchmark Calibration Results
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Statistic Data Benchmark Model
Panel A: Macroeconomic Variables
Average consumption growth
E[Ac]% 1.9 1.9
Volatility of consumption growth
a (Ac) (%) 2.72 2.75
Relative volatility of consumption to output
a (Ac) /a  (Ay)  0.52 0.47
Relative volatility of investment to output
a ( A i ) / a ( A y )  3.0 3.0
Panel B: Financial Variables
Average risk-free rate
E [rf ] (%) 0.86 0.82
Volatility of risk-free rate
<7 [r/] (%) 0.97 0.70
Average excess returns
E  [rE -  rf] (%) 6.33 4.53
Volatility of excess returns
<7 [rE — Tf \ (%) 19.42 5.00
Sharpe ratio of consumption claim
E  [rE ~ r f \ / a  [rE - r f ]  0.33 0.91
Panel C: Growth Rate Correlations
Correlation of output and consumption growth
corr(gY ,gc ) 0.49 0.15
Correlation of output and investment growth
corr(gY ,gj) 0.67 0.95
Correlation of consumption and investment growth
corr(pc ,p7) 0.40 -0.16
This table reports key annualized moments for the benchmark calibration discussed in the 
text. TFP shocks are non-stationary. The empirical moments are taken from Kaltenbrunner 
and Lochstoer (2007). The unconditional mean of per capita consumption growth rate is 
the annualized mean, obtained using BEA quarterly data on per capita consumption from 
1948QI-1998QIV.
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Table 3.4: Benchmark Calibration with 7  =  7.5
Statistic Data Benchmark Benchmark w/ 7  =  7.5
Panel A: Macroeconomic Variables
Average consumption growth
E  [Ac] % 1.9 1.9 1.9
Volatility of consumption growth
a  (Ac) (%) 2.72 2.75 2.75
Relative volatility of consumption to output
a (Ac) / a  (Ay) 0.52 0.47 0.47
Relative volatility of investment to output
a (Ai) /or (Ay) 3.0 3.0 3.1
Panel B: Financial Variables
Average risk-free rate
E[rf ](%) 0.86 0.82 1.62
Volatility of risk-free rate
(j[r/](% ) 0.97 0.70 0.70
Average risk premia
E[rE - r f }{%) 6.33 4.53 3.34
Volatility of risk premia
0  \ te — Tf] (%) 19.42 5.00 5.00
Sharpe ratio of consumption claim
E [ r E - r f ] / a [ r E ~ r f ]  0.33 0.91
Panel C: Growth Rate Correlations
Correlation of output and consumption growth
corr(gY ,gc ) 0.49 0.15 0.15
Correlation of output and investment growth
corr(gY ,gI ) 0.67 0.95 0.94
Correlation of consumption and investment growth
corr(gc ,gI) 0.40 -0.16 -0.16
This table reports key annualized moments for an alternative calibration with 7  =  7.5; all 
other parameters are as in the benchmark calibration discussed in the text. TFP shocks are 
non-stationary.
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Table 3.5: Dividend and Consumption Growth
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Variable Data BY model Dividend claim Cons, claim
Volatility of consumption growth
°(g) 2.93 2.72 2.45 2.45
Autocorrelation of consumption growth
AC(  1) 0.49 0.48 0 .2 0 0 .2 0
Volatility of dividend growth
<*(9d) 11.5 10.96 10.9 2.45
Autocorrelation of dividend growth
ACd( 1) 0 .2 1 0.33 0 .0 1 0 .2 0
Corr. of cons, and dividend growth 
corr(g, gd) 0.55 0.31 -0.08 1
This table compares the properties of dividends flows in the data and its co-movement with 
consumption, with two possible model counterparts: 1) If a claim on future dividend payments 
by firms is considered equity; and 2 ) if a claim on future stream of consumption is considered 
as equity. Column 3, reports the moments achieved in Bansal and Yaron (2004) model, in 
Case I.
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Table 3.6: Variance Decomposition
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c(%) <JAy% E[rf ] (%) E  [rE ~  rf ] (%)
Benchmark - — 0.82 4.53
5 4 0 .2 0 0.15
e\ 62 62 2 .2 1 2.87
£a 2 0 2 0 0.47 0.89
4 13 14 0.44 0.62
This table shows the variance decomposition of consumption and output growth volatility, as 
well as the amount of risk free rate and premia generated, due to each of the four anticipated 
shocks. The first row reports these values under the benchmark calibrations. Columns 3 and 
4, marked as % of benchmark, report the share of variance in consumption and output growth 
volatility due to each shock.
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Table 3.7: Model without Anticipated Shocks
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Statistic Data Benchmark Model No Anticipation
Panel A: Macroeconomic Variables
Average consumption growth
E[Ac}% 1.9 1.9 1 .8
Volatility of consumption growth
a (Ac) (%) 2.72 2.75 2.80
Relative volatility of consumption to output
a (Ac) Ja (Ay) 0.52 0.47 0.48
Relative volatility of investment to output
cr (Ai) / cr (Ay)  3.0 3.0 2.15
Panel B: Financial Variables
Average risk-free rate
E[rf \(%) 0.86 0.82 1.15
Volatility of risk-free rate
a[r/](% ) 0.97 0.70 0.63
Average excess returns
E[rE - r f ](%) 6.33 4.53 3.70
Volatility of excess returns
o[rE - r f ] ( % )  19.42 5.00 4.51
Sharpe ratio of consumption claim
E[rE ~ r f \  /a[rE -  rf] 0.33 0.91 0.82
Panel C: Growth Rate Correlations
Correlation of output and consumption growth
corr(gY ,gc ) 0.49 0.15 0.96
Correlation of output and investment growth
corr(gY ,gI ) 0.67 0.95 0.99
Correlation of consumption and investment growth
corr(gc ,gj) 0.40 -0.16 - 0 .1 2
This table reports key annualized moments when we assume, as discussed in the text, that 
shocks are not anticipated. TFP shocks are non-stationary. The empirical moments are 
taken from Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2007). For comparison, results from the benchmark 
calibration are reproduced here.
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Table 3.8: Calibrating the Stationary TFP Shocks
Mean 5 percent 95 percent
Pz 0.89 0.87 0.89
4  (%) 2.7 2.4 3.1
4  (%) 0.56 0.05 1.3
4  (96) 0.56 0.05 1.3
4  (96) 3.0 2.5 3.6
K 1 .2 1 - —
This table reports Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008) estimates of the variance and autocorre­
lation coefficient of the stationary TFP shocks. Their results are based on 4 million elements 
of a MCMC chain of draws from the posterior distribution. In our calibration we weight all 
the variances by a factor k to obtain a variance in consumption which is the same as in the 
data.
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Table 3.9: Model with Stationary and Non-stationary Shocks
Statistic Data Benchmark Model Model w/ Z(t)
Panel A: Macroeconomic Variables
Average consumption growth
E[Ac]% 1.9 1.9 2 .2 2
Volatility of consumption growth
a (Ac) (%) 2.72 2.75 2.77
Relative volatility of consumption to output
a (Ac) / a  (Ay) 0.52 0.47 0.24
Relative volatility of investment to output
a (Ai) / a  (Ay) 3.0 3.0 2 .8
Panel B: Financial Variables
Average risk-free rate
E[rf }(%) 0 .8 6 0.82 0.83
Volatility of risk-free rate
* [r/] (%) 0.97 0.70 0.74
Average excess returns
E  [rE -  Tf\ (%) 6.33 4.53 3.13
Volatility of excess returns
a [rE -  rf \ (%) 19.42 5.00 4.25
Sharpe ratio of consumption claim
E  [rE -  7 7 ] / a  [rE -  rf ] 0.33 0.91 0.89
Panel C: Growth Rate Correlations
Correlation of output and consumption growth
corr(gY ,gc ) 0.49 0.15 0.33
Correlation of output and investment growth
corr(gY ,gj) 0.67 0.95 0.97
Correlation of consumption and investment growth
corr(gc ,gj) 0.40 -0.16 -0.04
This table reports key annualized moments for the economy subject to both stationary and 
non-stationary TFP shocks, each at 4 different anticipation horizons. The empirical moments 
are taken from Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2007). For comparison, results from the bench­
mark calibration are reproduced here.
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Figure 3.1: Macroeconomic Impulse Responses to A t
Non-stationary shocks A(t)
0.06
0.04
0.02
0 5 10 15 20 25
Consumption
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0 5 10 15 20 25
Risk premia
0.03 r
0  1 1 1 1 1
0 5 10 15 20 25
Output
0.16
0.14
0.12
0 5 10 15 20 25
Capital
0.35
0.34
0.33
0.32
0 5 10 15 20 25
x -|o'3 Risk free rate
-6.5
-7.5
0 5 10 15 20 25
Impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation innovation in the anticipated and unanticipated 
component of the non-stationary TFP (£^: Solid line and e \ \  Crossed line).
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Figure 3.2: Macroeconomic Impulse Responses to Z t
Stationary shocks Z(t)
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Impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation innovation in the anticipated and unanticipated 
component of the stationary TFP (s®  : Solid line and e \  : Crossed line).
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Figure 3.3: Dividend Impluse Responses
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to the stationary and non-stationary TFP shocks (e^, £®, £ z  and £ clockwise from the top).
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Figure 3.4: Variation of Macroeconomic and Financial Variables with EIS
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The research presented in this thesis offers considerable scope for future developments.
Chapter 1 of this thesis contributes to a growing literature, which tries to reconcile 
the high frequency of price changes at the micro level with the apparent rigidity at 
the aggregate level. The research in this area has shown that there are significant 
heterogeneity in the frequency of price changes between different sectors, for a variety 
of reasons. I believe disentangling the deep determinants of this heterogeneity into 
“intrinsi” vs. “extrinsic” price sources of stickiness is an important issue. By intrinsic 
price stickiness I refer to a measure of how costly it is for a firm to change its prices, 
literally. In other words, some measure of how efficient the price-changing technology 
of a firm is. By the “extrinsic” component of price stickiness I refer to a measure 
of how the environment external to a firm’s technology of price change would affect 
the optimal frequency with which the firm chooses to change its price. For instance, 
factors such as the market structure of an industry, or, as proposed by the model I 
introduced earlier, the position of a firm in the production chain, might affect the 
frequency with which a firm changes its price. Most papers in the literature use 
the observed “frequency of price change” as a measure of how sticky the price of a 
certain good is. But this frequency could be affected both by intrinsic and extrinsic 
factors. Disentangling these two effects would help us predict how changes in industrial 
organization or business practices may affect price stickiness in an economy and thus 
would provide guidance for policy.
Reconciling macroeconomic co-movements and asset pricing implications of DSGE 
models is an important direction of future research. Chapter 3 of this thesis is a 
contribution in this direction. We see three dimensions along which Chapter 3 can be 
extended in order to improve the macroeconomic and asset pricing predictions of this 
class of models.
First, is defining an appropriate model counterpart for the equity market. One way 
to deal with this issue would be to introduce a realistic representation of the dynamic 
capital structure choices faced by the firms, as in Gomes and Schmid (2009). Such set­
up allows for more realistic counterparts for the equity and debt markets. Furthermore, 
this framework would allow us to study additional asset pricing implication for credit 
spreads.
Second, is incorporating a more realistic model of the labor market. In the current 
version of the model, the assumptions about the labor market imply constant shares 
of profits and wages in the output. This implication is counterfactual. A better model 
of the labor market will also affect asset prices in our model. Dividends are defined 
as consumption less wages in the economy. Therefore, even if we achieve realistic
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consumption dynamics but counterfactual labor market predictions, the aggregate 
dividend process and therefore the asset prices will be erroneous.
Finally, we believe that estimation would be an interesting direction of future re­
search. Solving DSGE models with perturbation methods has an important advantage 
over other numerical procedures, and that is their computational tractability. This 
solution technique will allow us to take the model directly to the data and estimate 
the importance of the news shocks at various horizons using jointly macroeconomic 
and asset pricing time series.
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